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ABSTRACT

This thesis proposes to link certain consistent themes in the historiography of
interwar and wartime Hungary. Hungary’s inability to successfully resolve its minority
problems led to the nation’s dismemberment at Trianon in 1920 after World War I. This
fostered a national Hungarian reaction against the Trianon settlement called the
revisionist movement. This revisionist “Trianon syndrome” totally dominated Hungarian
politics in the interwar period. As Hungary sought allies against the hated peace
settlements of the Great War, Hungarian politics irrevocably tied the nation to the
policies of Nazi Germany, and Hungary became nefariously assessed as “Hitler’s last
ally,” which initially stained the nation’s reputation after World War II.
Although some historians have blamed the interwar Hungarian government for
the calamity that followed Hungary’s associations with Nazi Germany, this thesis
proposes that there was little variation between what could have happened and what
actually became the nation’s fate in World War II. A new interpretation therefore
becomes evident: the injustices of Trianon, Hungary’s geopolitical position in the heart
of Europe, and the nation’s unfortunate orientation between the policies of Nazi Germany
and Bolshevik Russia predestined the nation to its fate in World War II. There was no
other choice for Hungarian policy in World War II but the Axis alliance.
The historian of East Central Europe faces a formidable challenge in that the
national histories of this region are often contradictory. Hungarian historiography is
directly countered by the historical theories and propositions of its Czech, Serb, and
ii

Rumanian enemies. By historiographical analysis of the histories of Hungary, its
enemies among the Successor States, and neutral sources, this thesis will demonstrate
that many contemporary historians tend to support the primary theses of Hungarian
historiography. Many of the arguments of the Hungarian interwar government are now
generally supported by objective historians, while the historiographical suppositions of
the Successor States at the Paris Peace Conference have become increasingly reduced to
misinformation, falsification, exaggeration, and propaganda. The ignorance of the
minority problems and ethnic history of East Central Europe led to an unjust settlement
in 1919 and 1920, and by grossly favoring the victors over the vanquished, the Paris
Peace Treaties greatly increased the probability of a second and even more terrible World
War.
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INTRODUCTION

In the history of mankind, few regions have suffered the ethnic and political
discontent of East Central Europe and the Balkans. Underlying currents of national
anxiety that had been aggravated and provoked by the imperial ambitions of Russia,
Turkey, and Habsburg Austria in the nineteenth century escalated and finally exploded
into bloody conflict in the twentieth. Austria’s annexation of Bosnia in 1908 provoked
neighboring Serbs, and the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 further destabilized the region.
Ethnic Serbian terrorists assassinated Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914
sparking the uncontrolled diplomatic spiral that manifested in the horrors of the Great
War. With the collapse of the Central Powers in 1918, chaos reigned as the old European
order fell apart and insurgent forces of Czechs, Serbs, and Rumanians fed upon the dying
remnants of the old Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Empire. The West pondered “eternal
peace” in 1919, but was unable to prevent a second World War against Adolf Hitler’s
expansionist Third Reich. Even Hitler was forced to act promptly in 1940 to prevent
regional conflict in his southern Balkan flank among Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.
With the fall of the Third Reich in 1945, Soviet military hegemony suppressed the
underlying national ambitions of Russia’s East Central European satellites for almost half
a century. Russian troops swiftly crushed Hungarian resistance in 1956 and Czech
discontent in 1968. With the disintegration of the Communist bloc in 1989 and the early
1990s, many old disputes resurfaced. Slovenia and Croatia seceded from the Yugoslav
union in 1991; Slav Macedonia swiftly followed. Civil War embraced Bosnia until 1996.
1

The Czechoslovak union dissolved in 1993. Conflict in the ethnically Albanian Kosovo
district of Serbia prompted NATO air strikes and military action against Yugoslavia in
1999.
Unhappily enduring this era of change and conflict, the Hungarian nation
struggled to maintain national identity and ethnic union in the face of the disintegrating
world order of the Great War, the political uncertainty of the interwar period, and the
fatal alliance with the Fascist powers. The turmoil of East Central Europe has always
affected Hungary directly. Although at the beginning of the twentieth century Hungary
was temporarily secure in the Compromise of 1867 that established the Dual Monarchy
of Austria-Hungary, the Habsburg Empire was an aging political construct whose multinational nature faced serious problems in a rapidly changing world.
The 1920 Treaty of Trianon sanctioned the territorial acquisitions of Hungary’s
enemies among the states that succeeded the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. The
nation was reduced to a rump state, bereft of much of its population, resources, and
former glory as its thousand-year geographic boundaries along the Carpathian Mountains
and Transylvanian Alps were torn apart and handed over to enemies and subjects of the
Hungarian Crown. Czechs seized the pro-Magyar Slovaks of the northern Carpathians,
and the “oriental vassals” that Budapest considered the Rumanians and Serbs took
control of Transylvania and the frontier regions of the Bánát-Bácska.
Throughout the entire interwar period, Hungary’s greatest battle has been with the
ignorance of the world community concerning the issues of East Central Europe. The
ignorance of the history and ethnicity of Hungary’s frontiers allowed the propaganda of

2

its Czech, Serb, and Rumanian enemies to manifest during the Great War. British
diplomat David Lloyd George summarized the average Western position on East Central
European geography at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference in his statement “Where the hell
is the Bánát?!”1 Twenty years later, as Britain faced German demands in 1938, British
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain declared his government’s position regarding the
potentiality of conflict over the German-Czech-Sudeten problem as a “quarrel in a far
away country between people of whom we know nothing.” Over a half-century later, the
problems that embrace East Central Europe are still relatively unknown to the
international community.
The rapid changes of the 1990s amazed the world as Germany united, the
Communist bloc and the Soviet Union dissolved, and rapid changes wracked the Balkans.
The average Westerner has little understanding of the roots of such problems as the
Yugoslav Civil War of the 1990s, the Greek perception of a danger to its ethnically
mixed northern regions by an independent Slav Macedonia, or the circumstances and
causes of the 1993 division of Czechoslovakia. The roots of these changes are in the
failed peace dictates of the Paris Peace Treaties that followed World War I. The
diplomats of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference sought to create an “eternal” peace that
would create a new world order.
By grossly favoring the states that had attached themselves to the Allied cause in
the Great War, the Paris Peace Treaties not only ruined the potential for a lasting peace,
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David Sherman Spector, Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference (New York:
Bookman Associates, Inc., 1962), 71.
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but quite possibly caused the Second World War. The Wilsonian ideals and principles of
self-determination by which the Central Powers surrendered in the Great War were not
applied to victors and vanquished alike. Instead, these ideals were violated in the attempt
to create a mix of new ethnic national states, mostly from the remains of the old Austrian
Habsburg and Russian empires. In the end, the Europe of the Paris Peace Treaties never
survived the twentieth century.
No nation at Paris was so horribly mutilated as the thousand-year old Hungarian
Kingdom of St. Stephen. The Hungarian Kingdom suffered the most radical changes of
all the territorial dictates of the Paris Peace Treaties so that three “Allied” states could be
created or expanded: Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslav union, and Greater Rumania. In
1920, 3.2 million Magyars found themselves living in states hostile both to their new
ethnic Hungarian minorities and the government in Budapest. With 71 percent of its
territory lost, the Treaty of Trianon reduced Hungary, already basically an agrarian power
in 1914, to a nation bereft of most of its natural and mineral resources.
France took advantage of the minority problems that had manifested in the
Kingdom of Hungary from 1867 to 1914 in order to create a band of states loyal to Paris
that could presumably contain future German aggression. The new Successor States
would create the scenario of a war on multiple fronts for Germany, which had always
been the greatest fear of the German military command. While Poland and
Czechoslovakia directly bordered almost all of Germany’s eastern territories, Yugoslavia
and Rumania could theoretically present a supportive Balkan front that would provide
men and materiel against a future German conflict. The Polish-Rumanian front would
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also provide an excellent barrier against Bolshevik Russian expansion, another fear of the
French high command. Hungarian territory comprised much of the land ceded to the new
Successor States for these purposes.
The Hungarian state prior to 1918 suffered from a multitude of minority
problems, but with the exception of the Rumanians and possibly the Serbs, these
minorities had no national identity, and could be compared to the Britons and Alsatians
of France, or the Welsh and Scots of Great Britain, which maintained their nationality yet
posed no danger to the unity of the state. Due to the perceived gross injustices of
Trianon, the movement for Hungarian frontier revision, henceforth known as
“revisionism,” united Hungarians in a common cause, and the Trianon Treaty became
known as the third great calamity of the Hungarian state, after the Mongol invasion of
1241 and the Turkish conquest of 1526. Since the League of Nations and the Western
powers favored the status quo of what became generally known as the Europe of
Versailles, Hungary was forced to turn to the nations that opposed that status quo:
Germany, Austria, and Italy. This would lead to the fatal alliance between Hungary and
Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich, which ruined Hungary’s reputation with the West. Willing or
not, Hungary attained the ultimate distinction of being “Hitler’s last ally” in the Second
World War.
I propose as a thesis for a Master of Arts degree in the field of History that
Hungary’s revisionist movement and irredentist minority problems directly linked
Hungary to the Third Reich, and further, that this was the only avenue open to Hungarian
revisionism in the interwar and wartime period. This essay will be original as a
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synthesis of the historical and historiographical arguments from the perspectives of both
Hungary and its Czech, Serb, and Rumanian enemies. Since this will be balanced by
neutral interpretations, I hope to provide a clarification of the often contradictory national
histories of these nations in order to establish certain consistent themes in the history and
historiography of this greatly troubled region.
Hungary’s minority problems aggravated the nation’s position at Trianon, and
Czech, Serb, and Rumanian propaganda, with direct French support, not to mention the
terror of the Kun regime, put Budapest at the worst position that can be possibly
imagined. Although many Hungarians sympathized with Great Britain through the
interwar period, few in Budapest would forget that the West had sacrificed Hungary at
Trianon. Although the British may have realized that Trianon was an unjust settlement,
the West in general did nothing to help Hungary’s position, forcing Hungary to turn to
other disgruntled powers that opposed the status quo of the Europe of Versailles. My
analysis will demonstrate through historiographical interpretation that Hungary’s foreign
policy was thus predestined to alignment with fascist Italy and Germany.
Between Germany and Russia, the powers historically most interested in East
Central Europe, there was little room for Hungarian foreign policy to maneuver. It is
unlikely that Hungary could have deviated from its historical path of 1920 to 1944 given
its revisionist aims. Fear of Soviet Bolshevism and the lack of a Western presence in
East Central Europe greatly influenced Hungary’s adherence to the Axis cause. Adolf
Hitler was further able to exploit the Balkan and East Central European problem better
than his Western peers.
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By skillful manipulation of the minority problems of this region, Hitler secured a
general balance of power in the Balkans by countering nationality against nationality,
such as Slovaks against Czechs, and Rumanians against Hungarians. This secured the
economic needs of the German war machine for Hitler’s ultimate purpose: the military
conquest of the Soviet Union. In the end, the Axis alliance proved fatal to almost all
involved, and only Finland escaped relatively unscathed.2 The lack of any self-restraint
as Hungary jubilantly reclaimed border revisions from 1938 to 1940 brought the nation
deeper and deeper into the German sphere of influence until Hungary became the center
of the German supply network in the Balkans. The blunder of Hungarian belligerence in
the Yugoslav campaign of 1941 became a turning point in the issue of Hungarian
“honor,” so often invoked by Hungarian authors and supporters. Soon Hungary became
attached to the “crusade against Bolshevism,” and found itself at war with Britain and the
United States. After this, there was no way out of Hungary’s affiliation with Nazi
Germany, and soon Hungary would pay its highest price in its thousand-year history: loss
of political continuity in the face of German occupation in March 1944 and “liberation”
by the Red Army in 1945.
If history is a quest for “truth,” the historian of East Central Europe faces a
formidable task, for the national histories of these nations are often opposed to each
other. The historical and historiographical theories of Hungary differ greatly from those
presented by its Czech and Rumanian enemies. In this historical quagmire of debated
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Although Finland lost districts of Karelia and passage to the Barents Sea, there
were no Russians in Helsinki, and the nation’s political continuity remained intact.
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facts and events, it is by historiographical analysis that the clearest picture of “truths”
may be established in the history of Hungary, its nationality problems, and its
relationship to the Third Reich.
It will become clear through historiographical analysis that many of the more
neutral authors tend to support arguments that have often been called “revisionist” by
Hungary’s enemies. There is an increasing tendency among neutral authors to support
Hungarian historical and historiographical propositions and national theories and while
reducing the claims of Hungary’s enemies, so long accepted whole-heartedly by the
West, to the level of propaganda. The Rumanian Daco-Roman theory of Roman origins
is now dismissed by most serious historians and maintained only by politicians. The
Czech claims at Trianon are often now recognized as deliberately deceptive in their cases
at Trianon to secure railways and “navigable” rivers, many of which are now positively
identified as mere streams and brooks. Serbian pan-Slavism in the Yugoslav union has
failed, and Croatia and Slovenia have chosen independence instead of the “Greater
Serbia” of rule from Belgrade. In light of this analysis, it will become clear that the
historical and historiographical suppositions of the Hungarian state and the Magyar
community may not have been so far from the truth as believed by many in the West in
the interwar and wartime period.
This thesis will be divided into four main chapters that survey and balance the
historiographical interpretations of as many perspectives as possible among the topical
material. The first will detail interpretations of Trianon, the root of Hungary’s interwar
political decisions, and will demonstrate the severity of this treaty and its implications for
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Hungarian foreign policy. The second chapter will explore the historiographical
arguments of the nations that succeeded the Habsburg monarchy at the Paris Peace
Conference. The minority problems of Hungary and East Central Europe have proved
disastrous for the region since the time of the Balkan wars of 1912 to the Bosnian war of
the 1990s. A third chapter will therefore be dedicated to explaining the history and
historiography of the of ethnic dilemma of the region from various perspectives in an
attempt to establish a neutral interpretation of the historical roots of the ethnic and other
problems of Hungary and the Successor States to the Habsburg Empire. The fourth
chapter will clarify the relationship between Hungary and Nazi Germany, from
interpretations of being an “unwilling satellite” to Budapest’s nefarious assessment as
“Hitler’s last ally.”
The issue of “honor” will be periodically invoked in this assessment, as
Hungarians consider themselves an “honorable” people and nation. Hungarian authors
repeatedly invoke Hungary’s “honor” in the nation’s policy of rarely straying beyond its
natural borders. The Hungarian government refused to attack Slovakia in coordination
with Hitler’s “Plan Green” for a military solution on the Czech state in 1938 based on
Hungary’s “honorable” claim only for the ethnic regions and not Slovakia as a whole.
Hungary’s Regent Admiral Nicholas Horthy repeatedly declared his refusal to turn upon
Nazi Germany based on the fact that “Hungary had never, in its thousand year history,
turned against an ally.” Where this “honor” was when Hungary attacked Yugoslavia in
1941 despite a treaty of “eternal friendship” will be assessed.
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Present-day Hungary, an ethnically homogenous land based on the nation’s fate at
Trianon, has invoked the nation’s “honor” in abandoning, at least officially, irredentist
aims to reclaim the lost minorities among its neighbors in favor of a peaceful European
union. It will become clear, however, that there still remains a “Trianon syndrome”
among today’s Hungarians. That syndrome predestined Hungary to the Axis cause in the
late interwar and wartime period, and will most probably always be a part of the
Hungarian national consciousness.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TREATY OF TRIANON

Introduction to the Problem: Interpretations of the Paris Peace Treaties
Understanding the circumstances of the Treaty of Trianon are the focal points for
any discussion of twentieth century Hungarian history and the revisionist movement that
dominated interwar Hungarian politics. The decisions of the Paris Peace Conference in
1919 and 1920 shaped international diplomacy and the modern world order more than
any event in modern history. From the events of World War II, to the end of the Cold
War and the dissolution of East Central Europe that began in 1989, so many of the events
in twentieth century world history trace their roots to the diplomacy of the Paris Peace
Conference.
Any general assessment of the Paris Peace Conference is problematic. The crux
of the problem is that views and conclusions regarding the peace are often contradictory
and differ with nationality. Interpretations of the “victorious” powers often differ from
the vanquished. Therefore, analyses of the peace process that ended World War I have
been accorded a wide range of historiographical interpretations. This is especially true
among the minor powers, such as Hungary and the states that succeeded the Habsburg
Empire, which have written diametrically opposed national histories.
Another problem is the difficulty in separating the Paris Peace Conference from a
causal relationship to the Second World War. Some historians argue that the events in
Paris in 1919 must be viewed independently from the world crises that began in the
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1930s. Others argue from the causal perspective, that World War II was an extension of
the failed peace negotiations of the Great War. In any event, interwar Hungarians
blamed Trianon as the singular cause of their nation’s sufferings. With the loss of 3.2
million Hungarians to the Successor States, at least one third of all Magyars, Hungarian
interwar diplomacy sought nothing less than total revision of the Trianon Treaty. The
Czechs and Rumanians by contrast insisted that the treaties of Versailles, Trianon, and St.
Germain “solved” the problems of Europe in 1914.
Given such contradictory assessments, historiographical interpretation, in which
the views of victors and vanquished are balanced by neutral third parties, may offer the
clearest path to establish certain “truths” among the national histories of the states
affected by the Paris Peace Conference. It will become clear in such an analysis that
many arguments heretofore considered “revisionist” among the enemies of Hungary may
be closer to the truth than had been previously believed. Although Hungary may be
rightly condemned for certain actions in its relationship to the Third Reich, such as the
1941 participation of the invasion of Yugoslavia, the path of interwar Hungarian
diplomacy may have been predestined by the nation’s fate at Trianon in 1920.

The Fall of the Habsburg Empire in the Great War
In the Spring of 1918, World War I had embraced Europe for its fourth bloody
year. In a final bid to achieve a breakthrough and victory on the Western Front, German
General Erich Ludendorff, commander of German forces in the west, reinforced his
position with 45 divisions from the victorious campaign against Russia in order to break
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the static front and achieve victory before American forces could arrive en masse and
turn the war of attrition against Germany. Germany began the attack on 21 March 1918
and continued the attacks through June in an attempt to drive a wedge between French
and British forces. Although the German troops achieved initial breakthroughs in several
sectors, Germany failed to achieve a strategic victory in the west. Germany wasted its
manpower in the assault, and by July initiative had passed to the Allies. The Allies began
their counter-offensive on 8 August 1918, and by November, reinforced with fresh
American forces, the Germans had been driven back over 50 miles into Belgium.
The Allies achieved additional victories in the Balkans and the Middle East.
Bulgaria surrendered on September 29 and the Ottoman Empire on October 30. With the
loss of Bulgaria and Turkey, Austria-Hungary could no longer maintain belligerence on
the Balkan front. The Habsburg Empire’s doom was sealed. István Tisza of the
Hungarian Parliament announced on October 17 “We have lost the war.”3 As Serbs swept
through Bosnia and Croatia, Czech nationalists took over Prague, and Rumanians
advanced deep into Transylvania, the Habsburg Empire began to internally disintegrate.
On November 3, Austria-Hungary signed an armistice at Padua. Germany signed an
armistice on November 11. After four terrible years of bloodshed, the Great War had
ended.
In accord with the Padua agreement of 3 November 1918, the Austro-Hungarian
Army was dismantled and a general armistice proclaimed. Austria became a federal
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Stephen Sisa, The Spirit of Hungary: A Panorama of Hungarian History and
Culture (Cleveland: Rákóczi Foundation, 1983), 220.
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state, and Hungary was proclaimed a republic on November 13 with Count Mihály
Károlyi as its provisional president. Since Austro-Hungarian military units and local
militias had been generally disbanded, Hungary was virtually defenseless against Serb,
Czech, and Rumanian incursions into Hungarian territory. Károlyi’s republic collapsed
in the face of internal chaos and invasions on all fronts, leaving the country ripe for a
Bolshevik takeover, which indeed manifested in the Soviet republic of Béla Kun on 21
March 1919.
Kun’s regime implemented a reign of terror in Hungary which totally antagonized
the populace and further complicated Hungary’s cause at the Paris Peace Conference. As
Rumanians swept across the countryside and finally entered Budapest on 6 August 1919,
Kun and his associates fled. In a counterrevolution from the political right, Admiral
Nicholas Horthy, having organized a national Hungarian army based at the southeastern
town of Szeged, established control of the country by 16 November 1919. The
Hungarian Parliament elected Horthy Regent and Commander in Chief of the Hungarian
Army on 1 March 1920.
On 8 January 1918, President Woodrow Wilson of the United States had
announced as the tenth of his Fourteen Points, that for the peaceful restructure of postwar
Europe, the population of Austria-Hungary would be “accorded the freest opportunity of
autonomous development.” In accord with that peace, the delegates at Paris
dismembered the Hungarian Kingdom, a political entity that had existed in its
approximate boundaries since 896. The Paris Peace Conference forced Hungary to sign
the Treaty of Trianon on 4 June 1920. The severity of Trianon amazed the Hungarians,
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who could hardly imagine that their participation in the conflict warranted such a hostile
response from the Allies. Trianon was even more severe than the 1918 Brest-Litovsk
Treaty between Germany and Russia, repeatedly denounced by the Allies, which, despite
its extreme terms, affected few Great Russians.
Of a prewar population of 21 million, Trianon separated 13,356,000 or 63.6
percent of Hungary’s population to the states that succeeded the Habsburg Empire. Of
the 125,600 square miles of the Hungarian kingdom, Hungary lost 89,700 square miles,
or 71.4 percent of its territory, leaving the nation a population of 7.6 million with 35,900
square miles of territory.4 Of the 20,886,487 population listed in the census of 1910,
Hungary was left with 7,615,117, while Rumania received 5,257,467, Czechoslovakia
3,517,568, Yugoslavia 4,131,249, and Austria 291,618. Of the Hungarian-speaking
population of 10,050,575, as many as 3,219,579 went to the Successor States: 1,704,851
to Rumania, 1,063,020 to Czechoslovakia, 547,735 to Yugoslavia, and 26,183 to
Austria.5 Hungary’s economic losses were severe: the nation lost 61.4 percent of its
arable lands, 88 percent of its timber, 97 percent of its fir woods, 62.2 percent of its
railroads, 64.5 percent of its paved roads, 83.1 percent of pig iron output and iron ore, 50
percent of its iron works, 55 percent of industrial plants, 67 percent of its credit and
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Ibid., 225. This correlates with Paul Robert Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East
Central Europe, vol. 1 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998), 133-139.
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Although some sources quotes that as many as 3.5 million Magyars were
separated from Hungary at Trianon, only 3.2 million can be directly accounted for given
census and other information regarding this figure. C. A. Macartney, Hungary: A Short
History (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1962), 207.
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banking institutions, and all of its gold, silver, copper, and salt deposits.6 The nation was
left with a standing army of only 25,000 compared to the 542,000 troops of the newly
formed states that succeeded the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Hungarians united in a
movement that penetrated all classes and stratifications of society with a new national
slogan: “Nem, nem soha!” (“No, no never!”). Hungarians vowed never to accept the
Trianon dictates, and the interwar period of Hungarian politics remained a constant
search to secure allies that would support revision of that treaty.
A partial aspect to the problems at Trianon was the virtually untamed occupations
of huge amounts of Hungarian territory by the Successor States between the cessation of
formal hostilities on 3 November 1918 and the final peace dictates of 4 June 1920.
Zsuzsa L. Nagy’s 1988 article “Peacemaking after World War I: The Western
Democracies and the Hungarian Question” in Stephen Borsody’s The Hungarians: A
Divided Nation argues that during the time between the armistice and Trianon, Hungary
had no officially established borders. The Successor States continually pushed through
Hungary, always extending new borders without authorization or consideration from the
Western Powers.7 The author’s criticism is that whereas Britain and the United States
urged containment of the military actions of the Successor States, France “supported
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Sisa, The Spirit of Hungary, 226, matched for confirmation with Admiral
Nicholas Horthy, Memoirs (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1957), 115.
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Zsuzsa L. Nagy, “Peacemaking after World War I: The Western Democracies
and the Hungarian Question” in The Hungarians: A Divided Nation (New Haven: Yale
Center for International and Area Studies, 1988), 32.
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every claim against Hungary to the full.”8 France thereby gave a carte blanche or at
least looked the other way as Czechs, Serbs, and Rumanians pushed and plundered across
Hungary at will. The Kun regime further complicated Hungary’s position as the Allies
sought containment of the Bolshevik threat that had surfaced not only in Hungary, but
also briefly in Bavaria and Slovakia.9
In an article in Borsody’s volume entitled “Hungary at the Brink of the Cliff,”
Sandor Szilassy explains that the chaotic conditions and drastic regime changes of
immediate post-Great War Hungary limited the nation’s political options in the 19181920 period. The Padua agreement of 3 November 1918 ended hostilities for the
Habsburg Monarchy and demobilized the Austro-Hungarian Army, therefore there was
no defense in central Hungary against the Serbs, Czechs, and Rumanians who overran
and pillaged the countryside.10 Szilassy proposes that the invasions of the Successor
States, political weakness of the new regime of Mihály Károlyi, rampant unemployment,
starvation in the cities, and the complete breakdown of the economy from the Allied
blockade provided the opportunity for the Soviet Kun regime to come to power. The
reign of terror that was Kun’s Bolshevik revolution lasted from March 21 until the
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Rumanian occupation of Budapest on August 6.11 Szilassy argues that whereas Britain
was indecisive in its East Central European policies, France openly advocated the
dismemberment of historic Hungary12 in accord with its desire to create a string of
nation-states to curtail both Germany and Bolshevik Russia. The Successor States did
their best to frighten the Allied delegations at Paris with the bogeyman of a return of the
Habsburg Monarchy in Hungary, and Hungary’s fate was decided in the summer of 1919
without representation.13 Szilassy argues that Trianon thus turned a once proud and
powerful country into a “militarily and economically weak pauper of the continent for the
next two decades.”14
Trianon left only one-third of the Hungarian Kingdom as it had existed in 1914.
Hungary’s representative, Count Albert Apponyi was not even invited to Paris until
January 5, 1920, by which time, the Successor States of Rumania, Yugoslavia, and
Czechoslovakia had already made their cases. The Allied Supreme Council rejected
Apponyi’s bid for plebiscites, since the British and French had by this time already
formulated the major tenets of the peace treaties.15 Hungarian representatives argued that
their kingdom, alongside its Polish ally, had shielded Europe from the Mongols and
Turks, and that the boundaries of the Kingdom of St. Stephen had scarcely changed in a
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thousand years. Such historical arguments were ignored and forgotten, and in the name
of “self-determination” Hungary was completely dismembered. Even as late as 1998,
Hungarian author Steven Várdy argues in his essay “The Impact of Trianon on the
Hungarian Mind,” that “the terms of the treaty were so harsh and punitive that one looks
in vain for parallels in modern European history.”16 Hungary now believed that the West
it had historically shielded was faithless and treacherous. Vardy explains that “whole
generations of youngsters grew up having only historic Hungary’s borders etched into
their minds and fully convinced that Trianon Hungary was but a temporary phenomenon
that was bound to disappear like an evil nightmare.”17 Despite political differences,
virtually all Hungarian historians are one in condemnation of Trianon. The new “Trianon
syndrome” would dominate Hungarian diplomacy in the late 1930s and drive the nation
into the eager grip of Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich.

The Flawed Peace Process: Paris 1919
The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 faced difficulties that transcended any peace
settlement in world history. Even the peace conferences of 1814 and 1815 could not
compare to the problems which faced the representatives at Paris after the Great War.
Alan Sharp’s Versailles Settlement, published in 1991, summarizes some of the basic
problems which faced the diplomats at Paris in 1919. As Sharp explains, the Paris Peace
16
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Conference sought nothing less than to “reshape the world” and establish a new order of
peace that would encompass the globe.18 Sharp presents the case of the German world
empire: the liquidation of Germany’s colonies alone in Africa and Asia affected over 1
million square miles and 14 million people.19 The collapse of the Ottoman Empire
further determined that the Middle East had to be completely restructured. Never before
had a peace conference faced the burden of both a complete restructure of the European
world order as well as issues in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.
The French position at the Paris Peace Conference has become subject to many
debates that will be explored in this chapter. Sharp clarifies certain aspects as to why
French policy sometimes became quite radical at the peace conference. The German
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine had ensured the enmity of France since 1871. Since
Germany had attacked France again in accord with the implementation of the Schlieffen
Plan in 1914, France wanted certain guarantees against future potential German
aggression.20 Paris even sought an independent Rhineland as a buffer state. Above all
else, the French quest for security, with the loss of their old Russian ally of 1894 to 1917,
led them into eastern Europe, in which a strong Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania
were deemed vital to the French strategic command.21
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The threat of the spread of Bolshevism was another factor in French planning
after the Great War. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 had robbed France of its vital
ally in the east, and most of Europe feared the spread of Bolshevism across Europe.
Sharp explains that to the European governments, Bolshevism meant “chaos, despair,
fanaticism, famine, anarchy, and a threat to all orderly government.”22 Thereby, the
French took the lead in establishing the cordon sanitaire, to isolate Bolshevik Russia by
the creation of states such as Poland, Greater Rumania, and Czechoslovakia that could
theoretically contain Russia and provide allies against Germany.23 Sharp’s primary thesis
regarding the link between establishment of the cordon sanitaire and the Paris Peace
Treaties is that the Bolshevik threat led to a certain race in the peace proceedings to
maintain order and prevent chaos.24 In some cases, there simply did not seem to be
enough time to fully examine all issues to certain problems when the threat of
revolutionary disorder seemed to loom across Europe. In the case of Hungary, the
disorganization of the conference and the fact the no single commission addressed the
Hungarian problem as a whole became that nation’s unjust undoing.
Sharp proposes that the peace settlements of 1919 and 1920 did not solve the
problems of 1914. Many of the problems of 1914 remained, while new issues emerged
such as the disputes concerning the Successor States.25 Germany had not surrendered
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unconditionally, but had signed an armistice based on Wilson’s peace principles.26
Although Germany was no longer a colonial threat to Britain or France, Sharp believes
that little else had changed, and Germany was still potentially powerful.27 France
ensured future German hostility, for example, by what Sharp considers “malevolent and
vindictive” reparations policies.28 Further, unlike the peace of 1815 or even 1945, the
peacemakers at Paris did not always have full control over all contested areas, such as in
East Central Europe. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck once gloomily predicted in
the nineteenth century that “some damned fool thing in the Balkans” would one day
explode like a powder keg for Europe. That threat was not solved by the Paris Peace
Treaties.
The roots of the Trianon problem are directly tied to the failure of the Allied
powers to create a just and lasting peace at Paris in 1919. Although there is a movement
to view the events of the Paris Peace Conference without retrospection to the calamity
that began in the late 1930s, a recurring theme in the historiography of the period is that
the conference caused the second and more terrible World War. In a recent assessment,
Margaret MacMillan in her book Paris 1919, published in 2002, asserts that the study of
the Paris Peace Treaties “is a study of flawed decisions with terrible consequences, many
of which haunt us to this day.”29 The Big Four “set out to do nothing less than fix the

26

Ibid., 17.

27

Ibid., 18.

28

Ibid., 83.

29

Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New
22

world, from Europe to the Pacific . . . from small islands to whole continents.”30 Harold
Nicholson continued in his 1933 book Peacemaking 1919, “we were preparing not peace
only, but Eternal Peace.”31 Why this peace failed so badly becomes a complex
interpretive historical study.
A recurring theme in so many of the histories of the Paris Peace Treaties that is
quite indisputable is the almost total lack of understanding of the details and complexities
of East Central Europe and the Balkans. If the contemporary West still lacks
understanding of the events that unfolded in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, the ignorance
at Paris in 1919 can well be imagined. Future Hungarian Prime Minister Count Pál Teleki
proposed as the thesis for his Evolution of Hungary and its Place in European History,
published in 1923, that Hungary, although in the heart of Europe, “has remained almost
unknown to the outside world,” a factor which doomed the nation at Trianon.32 Bruce
Pauley’s 1972 article “The Patchwork Treaties: St. Germain and Trianon Reconsidered”
likewise laments the ignorance and lack of objective analysis in the construction of the
treaties that destroyed the Dual Monarchy, which must be therefore “condemned” for
causing the European crises of the late 1930s.33
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Pauley continues as a major thesis in his book The Habsburg Legacy, that
knowledge of the Habsburg Empire and its minority problems remained largely unknown
to the international community well into the twentieth century.34 It is therefore unlikely
that the delegates at Paris could have ever established a just peace for East Central
Europe when part of the problem was a general ignorance of the affairs of the region.
The task in Paris became an almost continuous arbitration of minor disputes among the
Successor States and the enemies they sought to vanquish.
Regarding the nature of the Trianon settlement, Pauley asserts that of the more
than 3 million Magyars handed over to the Successor States, 1.5 million of them lived
just over the Hungarian border “in concrete blocks.”35 Any request for plebiscites were
refused except in the Burgenland. Pauley assesses that “no patriotic Hungarian . . . could
accept Trianon as final. Revision of the treaty (or simply ‘revisionism’) became almost
an obsession with the Hungarian people and their governments throughout the interwar
period.”36 Regarding self-determination, Pauley maintains that “the theory was only
imperfectly applied at Paris:” Hungary was denied the very principles by which the
Czech state was constructed. “Further, by dividing the Successor States into victors and
vanquished the Allies aggravated rather than appeased national hatreds.”37
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Pauley summarizes that “The world of 1919 . . . was far more revolutionary and
insecure” than that of the treaties of 1814-1815.38
In a comparative historiography of the Paris Peace Conference, it will become
clear that the failure of the peace treaties to establish a lasting peace may have directly
been tied to the French directive to keep Germany indefinitely impotent and contain the
Bolshevik threat from spreading across Europe. French policy directly supported the
creation of a string of nation-states along the borders of Germany and its Austrian and
Hungarian allies that could maintain an eastern bastion that would theoretically
continually submit Germany to the scenario of a war on multiple fronts, the nightmare of
German military planning since the time of Bismarck. The line from the Baltic to
Rumania would also presumably contain the Bolshevik threat. Based on the so-called
“Switzerland solutions” to the problems of East Central Europe, France gave its tacit
approval to the formation and expansion of the Successor States from the remnants of the
Habsburg Empire, particularly Hungarian territory. The Successor States thereby
continually pushed into Hungarian territory until Trianon finally validated the lines of
occupation, most of which violated the ethnic principles so often invoked at the Paris
Peace Conference.
One of the more important early studies of the Paris Peace Treaties by one of its
participants is David Lloyd George’s massive two volume The Truth About the Peace
Treaties, published in 1938. To explain the position of France at the conference, Lloyd
George reminded his readers of the revenge France sought since its humiliation in the
38
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Franco-Prussian War of 1871 and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. Lloyd George claimed
that the Allied policy had been to “persuade and pacify” the unstable regions of Europe
and focus a “severe but just” policy towards the vanquished Central Powers.39 Lloyd
George asserted that the Paris Peace Treaties accomplished the greatest liberation of
subject peoples in the history of the world.40 From the Finns to the Baltic states to the
minorities of the Habsburg Empire, many “nations” achieved independence for the first
time. This included the Magyars, who were “liberated” from rule from Vienna.41 Lloyd
George concluded that the Paris Peace Conference sought to make a just peace in 1919,
to liberate oppressed peoples, and prevent future war, but ultimately the “temple of
peace” failed despite the good intentions of its framers.42
Margaret MacMillan’s Paris 1919 supports the theory of a French “conspiracy”
of sorts in their application of the peace terms of 1919 and 1920. MacMillan contends
that across the globe, from Africa to the Middle East, French and British interests often
collided. Relations were even worse between the French and Americans. Whereas
Wilson sought a just and lasting peace, many French diplomats sought nothing more than
to punish Germany for the Great War and the humiliation of 1871.43 France and England
had been traditional enemies, and their friendship was very recent. Indeed, British
39
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diplomat Lord George Curzon commented in 1919 regarding the course of French
diplomacy: “I am seriously afraid that the great Power from whom we may have most to
fear in the future is France.”44
A most valuable analysis as a direct eyewitness account of the Paris Peace
Conference is Harold Nicholson’s Peacemaking 1919, first published in 1933. The
author’s purpose was to preserve for posterity, “before it evaporates, the unhealthy and
unhappy atmosphere of the Peace Conference.”45 The Nicholson thesis is that the four
terrible years of war and unprecedented bloodshed had created such hot feelings among
the powers that not even “supermen” could have drawn up a peace of “moderation and
righteousness” in 1919.46 Nicholson claimed that the conference treated Germany as if it
had been “beaten to her knees,” and that “it never entered our heads that we had
purchased the surrender of Germany [and the other Central Powers] by an offer of the
Fourteen Points.”47 Regarding the Western knowledge of the ethnic and geographic
problems of East Central Europe, Nicolson considered the Paris Peace Conference
“ignorant and ill-informed,”48 and lamented that day by day, injustice prevailed at the
conference, yet the committees “endured in silence.”49
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Although Nicholson believed that the lack of attention to the rights of the
vanquished powers was problematic, his prejudice was still dominant and perhaps
characteristic of the victors. While Austria might have been a “pathetic relic,” his
distaste for Hungary was clear: “Like the Turks, they had destroyed much and created
nothing. . . . For centuries the Magyars had oppressed their subject nationalities. The
hour of liberation and retribution was at hand.”50
Nicholson’s account freely admitted that Wilson’s ideal collapsed at the
conference. The lack of a “Hungarian Committee” placed more Hungarians under
foreign rule than was “constant with the doctrines of self-determination.”51 Wilsonian
peace theoretically safeguarded the minority and linguistic problems of the Habsburg
Empire; instead the peace favored only the “Allied” states that succeeded the monarchy.
Nicolson summarized: “We came to Paris confident that the new order was about to be
established. . . . We arrived as fervent apprentices in the school of President Wilson: we
left as renegades.”52
Francis Deák’s analysis Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, published in
1942, presents an important thesis regarding Hungary’s position at the peace conference
and clarifies the unified Magyar position regarding Trianon. The primary Deák thesis is
that if the Central Powers had indeed caused the war, “the measure of guilt should have
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been divided in proportion to responsibility” in the peace treaties.53 Hungary had little
responsibility for the Great War, and all too often Vienna, not Budapest, dictated national
and foreign policy in the Dual Monarchy. Hungarians could not understand the
harshness of Trianon, which transcended the treaties accorded Germany, Austria,
Bulgaria, and even Turkey. The Hungarian delegation that went to Trianon included Pál
Teleki and Stephen Bethlen, experts in Magyar history and geography who arrived in
Paris to the shock that matters had already been settled for Hungary. Having rested so
much hope on the American delegation and the perceived justice of Wilsonian
diplomacy, the Hungarian diplomats arrived to find that Wilson and much of his
entourage had already returned to America before the Hungarian arrival.54
Another important thesis in Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference that holds
true in retrospect is Deák’s assertion that never in the history of diplomacy had so many
talented individuals gathered for a peace conference failed so badly as the diplomats at
Paris in 1919 and 1920.55 In exact opposition to their purpose, the Paris Peace Treaties
prevented a lasting peace for Europe and ensured future instabilities. Even in Britain,
many diplomats and politicians feared the repercussions of splitting camps into victors
and vanquished. Deák quotes one Sir Samuel Hoare of the House of Commons who
stated in 1920 “It seems to me to be a cruel paradox that after a war that was meant to
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end war we should see in Central Europe a state of militarism far worse than ever it was
before 1914.”56 David Lloyd George continued to harbor serious doubts about Trianon:
“There will never be peace in South-Eastern Europe if every little state now coming into
being is to have a large Magyar Irredenta within its borders.”57
Although Deák admits that Hungary’s minority problems proved a stumbling
block for the nation at Trianon, Deák totally rejects the “solutions” forced upon the
nation. Deák directly counters the thesis of Czecho-Slovak cultural and national unity
and accuses Beneš, the chief proprietor of that thesis, of attempting to secure the
Slovakian regions of the Carpathians strictly for the region’s economic value. Deák
argues that many purely Magyar regions were granted the Czechs simply for a transverse
railway in the region.58 Deák accuses the Rumanians, however, of outright treachery in
the incidence of 3 August 1919 in which the Rumanians disposed of any military
resistance to their occupation of Hungary: in the wake of the Kun regime, the Rumanian
military invited most of Hungary’s military officers to a base in southern Hungary to
reform that body as a militia and police force. When the Hungarians arrived, they were
taken to Transylvania as “prisoners of war.” Thus, Hungary lost much of its officer corps
in 1919.59 To Deák, Wilson’s Fourteen Points were meaningless at Trianon. The
alliance of the Little Entente curtailed any Hungarian resistance to the treaty, and
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Hungary had no choice but to accept the peace terms.60 Ultimately, Deák concludes that
had honest justice been applied by the Paris Peace Treaties, World War II could possibly
have been avoided.61
Among the most important testimonies from the Hungarian side of the Trianon
issue are the publications of Count Pál Teleki and Stephen Bethlen, Hungarian diplomats
present at Trianon and future Hungarian premiers. Count Pál Teleki was the noblest and
perhaps most honest of interwar and wartime Hungarian politicians, respected by friends
and enemies alike. Teleki’s Evolution of Hungary and its Place in European History,
published in 1923, although calling for direct revision of Trianon, was probably the most
accurate and scholarly of early Hungarian revisionist texts. The Teleki thesis of 1923
was the first among historians, revisionist or otherwise, to proclaim the ignorance of the
West concerning the issues of East Central Europe as the direct reason for the destruction
and partition of historic Hungary.62 Hungary became reduced to an exceptionally weak
agrarian state bereft of its minerals, resources, 90 percent of its timber, and its best corn
and wheat lands.63 Teleki likened Trianon’s effect upon Hungarians to the French the
loss of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, which united all Frenchman in solidarity for vengeance.
Teleki argued that revision of Trianon, perhaps the greatest injustice ever imposed upon
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a European state since the eighteenth century partitions of Poland, would be the first step
toward a general and lasting peace for all of Europe.64
A continuation of the early Hungarian point of view was Count Stephen Bethlen’s
The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace, published in 1934. Bethlen was Premier of
Hungary from 1921 to 1931. His book was a compilation of lectures the author delivered
in London in 1933. The Bethlen thesis was that the “falsehood and villainy” of Trianon,
whose revision was “the Creed of the Hungarian nation in the dark night of its present
fate” was matched in calamity for the Hungarian people only by the Mongol incursion of
1241 and the Turkish conquest of 1526.65 To ensure a lasting European peace, Bethlen
insisted that the self-determination promised but never applied at the Paris Peace
Conference must be realized.66 In contrast to the historiography of the Successor States
and France, Bethlen proposed that the Paris Peace Treaties aggravated rather than solved
minority problems in East Central Europe. Without rectification, Bethlen predicted dire
strife for the future of Europe. The author cited the case of the Croats, Ruthenes, and
Slovaks, peoples separated not of their own accord from Hungary who suffered
“oppression” rather than liberation in the Successor States.67 Bethlen considered a
transfer of population to be a possible solution to the ethnic problems of East Central
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Europe, a topic that would be supported by future historians and politicians.68 In the end,
Bethlen begged Great Britain, considered in the Hungary of his time to be fair and
honorable, to champion the Magyar cause at Trianon and thereby prevent future
instabilities in Europe.69
The Magyar voices of dissent and the injustices of Trianon, although ignored by
most politicians of the time, did not entirely fall upon deaf ears in the West. One of the
most important of the neutral proponents of Hungarian history was C. A. Macartney, who
dedicated his academic life to the history of Hungary and the problems of East Central
Europe. Macartney’s works offer a non-partisan, highly detailed, and somewhat
sympathetic account of Hungary’s national plight in the first half of the twentieth
century. His book Hungary and her Successors, published in 1937, extends upon the
Nicholson thesis that the Paris Peace Conference utterly failed to establish a peace of
“moderation and righteousness” in 1919 and 1920.70
Macartney proposes that the Western powers after World War I suffered from a
“war psychology” based on the terrible human suffering endured in the Great War which
caused them to treat “enemy” nations with undue severity. Although the Paris Peace
Conference allowed the “Allied” Successor States to make their case in 1919, Hungary,
as an “enemy” nation, was not invited to the peace table until its fate was already
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decided. All the maps, geographical, and historical data the Hungarian delegation
brought to Paris were in vain and ignored.
Macartney believes that had self-determination been applied as promised at the
Peace Conference, Serbs and Rumanians would have opted for inclusion in the Successor
States, but Slovaks and Ruthenes would most probably have chosen to stay in Hungary.71
Macartney argues on behalf of the inherent strength of the frontiers of the 1914 Kingdom
of St. Stephen in that its was a coherent natural geographic unit with stable frontiers that
had lasted a millennium, qualities absent in its successors.72
Macartney continues his criticism of the world order established by the Paris
Peace Treaties in his collaboration with historian A. W. Palmer in Independent Eastern
Europe, published in 1962. In theory, all international parties at the Peace Conference
were to be addressed according to principles that would eliminate “discord and
antagonism” in Europe.73 Instead, the authors describe Paris in 1919 as a “conference of
victors” which favored the enemies of the Central Powers and treated the vanquished
with undue severity.74
In direct contrast with David Lloyd George’s The Truth About the Peace Treaties,
Macartney and Palmer consider it directly misleading to declare that the 115 million
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people transferred to new states in Europe were “liberated.”75 Although the “experts”
remained in France, the most important parts of the American delegation at the peace
conference departed on 29 June 1919 after the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles.
France therefore took the lead in the treaties of Trianon, St. Germain, and Neuilly.76
Wilson’s terms, the principles by which the Central Powers agreed to an armistice, now
“fell silent.” “Hungary” was simply the “diminished remnant left after the claims of
Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Yugoslavia and Austria [sic] had been met.”77
C. A. Macartney’s most extensive treatise on Hungarian history is his massive
two-volume October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary, published in 1961, and
unequaled in its detail of Hungary’s evolution from desperate isolation to its fatal alliance
with the Third Reich. Macartney argues that interwar Hungary, after the Kun regime,
was consumed by national paranoia, “gripped in the iron ring” of the Little Entente,
terrified of Bolshevik Russia, and positively obsessed by a desire to recoup the lost
territories.78 The combined arms of the Little Entente pitted 540,000 men against
Hungary’s mere 35,000, as delimited by the Trianon dictates, whose express purpose was
the prevention of Hungarian resistance to the boundaries of 1920.79 As revisionism
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became a nation-wide consciousness within Trianon Hungary, the 3.2 million Magyars in
the Successor States clung to their national heritage, desperately hoping for a way to
return to the mother country. The entire interwar Hungarian foreign policy thus became
a search for new allies to break the status quo of Trianon, the Little Entente, and its
supporters in Paris.80
Edward Chászár’s Decision in Vienna: the Czechoslovak-Hungarian Border
Dispute of 1938, published in 1978, summarizes some of the Magyar views on Trianon
from a rather patriotic perspective. Almost universally among Magyars of the interwar
period, Trianon was considered not a freely negotiated treaty, but a forced “Diktat” upon
the nation. The treaty was therefore “unjust” and the nation would use all means in its
power to change its terms.81 By theory, the League of Nations was to be the instrument
by which peaceful changes would be established throughout the world, but to Hungary,
the League was simply the “instrument of the victorious powers to preserve the status
quo.”82 Thus, Hungary would seek allies that opposed that status quo, such as Germany
and Italy.83
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Chászár interprets the interwar era as a “period of false stability.” The West had
sought an “eternal” peace to end the Great War. To implement this peace, “once and for
all,” however, France, the chief supporter of that peace, sought to build a system of
alliances, such as the Little Entente. Budapest hated and feared this union, which it
perceived, quite accurately, as a force to contain any Hungarian resistance to its Trianon
borders. The underlying nervous anxiety among France and its allies manifested in such
treaties as Locarno in 1925 to guarantee the German, French, and Belgian borders, and
the Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928 and its attempt to “outlaw war.” Clearly an underlying
tension had begun to manifest among the supporters of the Europe of the Paris Peace
Treaties.
Another source from a patriotic revisionist Hungarian perspective is Stephen
Sisa’s The Spirit of Hungary, published in 1983. Sisa’s primary thesis concerns the
“mystique” of the Carpathians among Hungarians. To Sisa, the Carpathians represented
the “eternal frontiers” in the Hungarian “collective mind,” and its boundaries served not
only as a defensive shield against the east, but as a bastion of solidarity dividing the two
cultural worlds of Western Christianity and Eastern Byzantine Orthodoxy.84 Sisa argues
on behalf of the geographic unity of the Carpathian Basin and the Kingdom of St.
Stephen and the lack of any geographic cohesion among the Successor States. In
Rumania, the Carpathians and Transylvanian Alps bisect the country like “a gigantic
natural ‘Great Wall of China.’”85 The northern Carpathians which link Slovakia to the
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Hungarian plains have absolutely no geographic correlation to the Bohemian and
Moravian Crownlands, and all the valleys and rivers of Slovakia flow into the heart of
Hungary.86 Pál Teleki put forward this argument in 1923, and Admiral Nicholas Horthy
summarized this theory as a principle thesis in his memoirs: “the central Danube basin is
a geographical unit in that it has a clearly demarcated boundary and a marked center,
while the component parts within its confines complement each other in their harmonious
economic functions.”87 Sisa further argues on behalf of the strategic importance of
Ruthenia as the “gateway to the Carpathian Basin,” and that Russia strategically annexed
this region from the Czechs in 1945 in order to launch an instantaneous invasion of
Central Europe if necessary.88
The 1988 collection of essays entitled The Hungarians: A Divided Nation, edited
by Stephen Borsody, argues not on behalf of revision but as “an effort to expose a
problem for all to see and to seek constructive solutions to it.”89 As many historians have
done, the editor proposes a causal link between the problems of the Paris Peace
Conference and the calamity of World War II. He reminds his audience that it was the
democratic powers that had fashioned the problematic nature of interwar Europe at the
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Paris Peace Conference, thereby defusing blame for the Second World War from the
Fascists. Borsody urges the need for a general historiography of Trianon in order to
counter the Western views that have been so often dominated by Czechoslovak,
Rumanian, Yugoslav, and even Soviet perspectives.90 In the article “State-and NationBuilding in Central Europe,” Borsody continues the criticism of the West for having
dismembered Hungary without respect for Hungary’s “merits in Europe’s history,” that
is, the thesis of the Magyar-Polish shield against the Mongols, Turks, and other nomadic
peoples of the east. Borsody asserts that since Hungarians viewed their “betrayal” as a “a
work of vengeance,” revisionism became the “cornerstone of Hungary’s interwar foreign
policy.”91
Historian Thomas Sakmyster considers the 1918-1921 period a “time of troubles”
for Hungary. The trauma of Trianon, red terror under the Kun regime, and counterrevolution from the political right created an atmosphere that was not conducive to
democracy. Fueled by a right-wing ideological political movement called the “Szeged
Ideal” to regain Hungarian honor and losses, revisionism embraced the Hungarian
government, and Parliament became dominated by revisionist politicians.92 Hungarians
would not forget their betrayal by the West and would desperately seek allies conducive
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to their policy of revising the nation’s borders. The democratic powers had destroyed the
Kingdom of St. Stephen. The ruling classes of Hungary had never been partial to
democracy, and Regent Nicholas Horthy himself could not understand the logic of
democracy, in which he considered “the votes of two idiots count for more than that of
one wise man.”93 Trianon destroyed any chance for democracy in interwar Hungary.
The road to German domination of Budapest was thus born at Trianon.

Breaking the Silence of the Cold War
With the end of World War II and the Russian occupation, discussion of Trianon
became silenced in Hungary. Those Hungarians who reached the free world, however,
especially after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, formed patriotic Hungarian societies
and began the process of writing Hungarian propaganda for the English-speaking world.
Western Hungarian patriots published many pamphlets and books, most of lesser
scholarly value such as the radical publications of Astor Florida’s Danubian Press in the
1970s and early 1980s, which included Edward Chászár’s Decision in Vienna: the
Czechoslovak-Hungarian Border Dispute of 1938, Endre Haraszti’s Ethnic History of
Transylvania, Zathureczky’s Transylvania: Citadel of the West, Anne Sanborn’s
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Transylvania and the Hungarian-Rumanian Problem, and even such radical assessments
as the “documentary” Genocide in Transylvania: Nation on the Death Row.94
Within Hungary, however, such patriotic and revisionist voices were silent.
Trianon became a taboo subject. Between 1945 and 1990, the Trianon question was
rarely officially discussed, and people were considered “chauvinists” if they spoke of the
minorities in neighboring states.95 Tibor Hadjú’s 1984 article “From Sarajevo to
Trianon” explains that authors within Hungary approached the topic of Trianon with
great caution. Only in the early 1980s did such silence begin to break, and some
Hungarians began to consider the thesis that France had treacherously dominated the
Paris Peace Conference for its exclusive agenda to create a new European order
dominated by Paris.96
Another Cold War examination, “The Impact of Trianon upon Hungary and the
Hungarian Mind: the Nature of Interwar Hungarian Irredentism” by Steven Vardy claims
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that Trianon’s lasting imprint upon the Hungarian psyche pervaded Hungary even long
after World War II and through the Cold War, and that the “national malady” of the
“Trianon disease” still engulfs the nation.97 The interwar regime’s orientation was
determined almost exclusively by the psychological shock of Trianon, whose terms were
unacceptable to all Hungarians.98 The shock of Trianon was so severe and allencompassing that the author proposes that it must be regarded as a “syndrome” and a
“malignant national disease.”99
In the interwar period, virtually every Hungarian historian wrote his own
“Trianon book” or “Trianon pamphlet.” Hungarian interwar historians were outraged
that the West did not recognize Hungary’s role and sacrifices in the defense of medieval
Europe from “Oriental barbarism.”100 Children’s history books taught that Trianon was
an “unnatural” violation of the old kingdom’s integrity and a “temporary phenomenon
that was bound to disappear like an evil nightmare.”101 Vardy quotes one historian Péter
Hanák’s Élet és Irodalom (Life and Literature) that Trianon shattered everything that
used to be “absolute, concrete and unambiguous” in Hungary. “[Hungarian] national
consciousness found itself bound not to a living, but to a non-existing [entity], to a
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vanished absolute.”102 The shock of Trianon turned many against the “faithless” and
“treacherous” West, and in its despair, Hungary was willing to turn to whomever would
remedy its dilemma, which resulted in the fatal alliances with the Fascist powers.103
Vardy asserts that only in the late 1930s did Hungary turn from its policy of full
restoration of the Trianon borders to negotiated settlements of the Magyar areas, but this
was done “at the wrong time and with the wrong nations,” which transformed Hungary
into “both the ‘unwilling’ and ‘last’ satellite of Nazi Germany, for which the country and
the nation soon had to once again pay a heavy price.”104

Voices of Freedom: Post-1989 Assessments
In the post-Cold War article “New Sources on Trianon,” author Magda Ádám
explains the modern trend in Hungarian historiography regarding the guilt of France in
Hungary’s Trianon dilemma. Using newly available declassified documents since the
end of the Cold War, Ádám suggests that not only was self-determination not applied to
Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, it was not even considered in French strategic
planning.105 The secret pacts arranged by the West with such nations as Italy and
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Rumania during and after the Great War totally violated the principles of selfdetermination by which the Central Powers surrendered.106
The theory of French diplomatic treachery is currently dominating Hungarian
historiography. Although the Allies initially favored plebiscites, by 1919 France
dominated the peace process and abandoned the cases for self-determination by allowing
the Successor States to victoriously claim much of the territory they demanded.107 This
theory would pin the war guilt for World War II upon the French even more than upon
the Germans. Had actual self-determination and justice been applied to the ethnic and
political problems of Europe at the Paris Peace Conference, many Hungarian historians
believe that World War II could have been avoided.
László Borhi’s “Towards Trianon,” published in 2000, continues this argument.
Borhi argues that rather than for self-determination, border changes in East Central
Europe in 1919 were established on the basis of strategic objectives, economic needs, and
communications networks for the victorious states. In addition to containing Germany,
the Successor States bordering or near Russia would further help to contain Communism
from spreading across Europe as an “Eastern pillar of Western security.”108 The author
concludes that “the priority of economic and communications principles, used frequently
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only as a pretext for underlying strategic interests, was a decisive factor [in the border
created by Trianon].”109
László Szarka’s 2000 essay “A Protecting Power without Teeth: the Minorities
Created by the Trianon Peace Treaty” offers some modern considerations regarding
Hungary’s minorities. Szarka asserts that the lack of self-determination and plebiscites at
Trianon are still an issue among contemporary Hungarians. The great confidence of
Hungarians in the integrity of their kingdom is represented by one Count Apponyi, who
declared at Paris in 1919 that all regions of Hungary, not just the regions with a Magyar
majority, should be subject to plebiscites, to which he stated “I declare that even in
anticipation we will accept the results of such plebiscites, whatever they may be.”110
After Trianon, Hungary was the theoretical protector of the minorities in the Successor
States, however the new frontiers, economic collapse, and domestic chaos left the nation
with little power internally or externally to help the detached minorities.111 Szarka
proposes that with the end of Communism, however, there may be new opportunities for
the minorities: “The Trianon certificate of origin of the Hungarian minorities will no
doubt lose its defining importance when the frontiers of the small states in the region
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become as symbolic as they already have been in the daily life of the happier parts of
Europe.”112
Stephen Várdy’s 1997 post-Cold War assessment, “The Trianon Syndrome in
Today’s Hungary,” declares that in the new-found freedom with the fall of Communism
in Europe, many works regarding Trianon have begun to emerge in Hungary. Although
most of these are of little scholarly value, they do show that many Hungarians feel the
need to vent the frustration “that had accumulated during the decades of enforced
silence.”113 The argument of frontier revision has quieted, however. Although many
may speak out in favor of human rights for the Hungarian minorities, in order to integrate
with NATO and the European Union, Hungary has been expected to accept the status quo
of the current European frontiers.114
A radical re-assertion of the principles of self-determination for the Hungarian
minorities by one Ernö Raffay in a 1994 book called Magyar Tragédia [Hungarian
Tragedy], caused sufficient international reaction among the world’s Hungarians for the
organization of a Hungarian World Federation on 15 January 1996. At this conference,
all agreed that Trianon was unfair and that the effects of the treaty could still be felt as a
“permanent scar upon the Hungarian mind,” but the group was unsure on the issue of
revisionism.115 Another recent result of the “reemerging Trianon syndrome” was the
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establishment of a Trianon Association in 1997 to preserve the Magyar language and
culture in the neighboring states and to further the cause of autonomy in those states.116
Vardy’s article shows that the repercussions of Trianon are still felt by the world’s
Hungarians and it is doubtful that Trianon will ever be forgotten in the Hungarian mass
consciousness.

Summation of the Trianon Problem
Understanding the Hungarian position at Trianon is fundamental to any study of
Hungary in the interwar period. The states that would succeed the Habsburg Monarchy
aggravated the already hot minority tensions that had plagued Austria-Hungary since the
nineteenth century. The ethnicity of East Central Europe was barely understood by the
West, and as the Central Powers collapsed in 1918, Serbs, Czechs, and Rumanians used
their diplomatic status as “Allied” nations to destroy the Dual Monarchy outright. With
the support of France, the Successor States achieved tremendous territorial victories at
the Paris Peace Conference. No Hungarian could accept as final the mutilation of the
thousand-year Kingdom of St. Stephen. Revisionism therefore became the cornerstone of
interwar Hungarian politics.
Many historians in the interwar period have tried to clarify the contradictory
nature of the Paris Peace Conference, which promised self-determination and ethnic
justice, yet greatly favored the “victors” over the vanquished. The Hungarian
revisionists, such as Teleki and Bethlen, are supported by the “concerned neutrals,” such
116
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as Macartney, McEvedy, and Perman, that the Successor States won their cases through
propaganda and one-sided considerations of the ethnic principles that plagued East
Central Europe.
After World War II, historians began to doubt German war guilt for the Great
War, and there is an increasing historiographical trend to blame French diplomacy at the
Paris Peace Conference for the interwar and wartime woes of Europe. France was the
only nation of the Big Four to have a concrete plan for Europe after World War I. In
order to form the new nations that would create the potentiality of a future war on
multiple fronts for Germany, Hungary was forced to pay most of the territorial price.
Since Hungary had been an enemy nation during the Great War, its concerns and issues
were of little interest to France.
As this summary of some of the more important histories of Trianon clarifies,
many of the arguments that had at one time been considered “revisionist” and contrary to
the established histories of the democratic Western world are being challenged. France
conspired at Trianon to sacrifice Hungary for the greater good of French military
planning. The Czechoslovak state, long considered a benevolent democracy sacrificed
for peace at Munich in 1938, purposefully misinformed the Paris Peace Conference for
its own strategic gain, destroying a cultural and economic system in Slovakia and
Ruthenia that had been sustained for a thousand years. Yugoslavia was little more than a
“Greater Serbia” before and after the Second World War. Rumania has repeatedly
violated its allies in both World Wars and conspired to enlarge its territories regardless of
the conventions of international diplomacy.

48

Many Magyars at the end of the war had rested so many hopes on the Fourteen
Points and the principles outlined by President Wilson. Hoping for self-determination
and plebiscites, the Hungarian delegation that arrived at Paris found that the case for
Hungary had already been decided without Magyar representation. With the withdrawal
of President Wilson after Versailles, France was free to dominate the restructure of
Europe to its own strategic aims at Trianon, St. Germain, and Neuilly. The Tenth Point
was absolutely perverted by the drafters of Trianon, who knew that more than three
million Magyars would be separated into hostile neighbors by the peace. By the time
Hungary signed the treaty, it was exhausted from war, revolution, and counterrevolution,
and the nation protested in vain for plebiscites.117 Since the democracies had destroyed
Hungary, Hungary would turn to the only powers that would support its revisionist aims.
The way was paved for the Axis domination of Hungary. Trianon thus united the
interwar Hungarian nation in a way that transcended class, political, and cultural
backgrounds, uniting peasants, workers, students, the intelligentsia, and all political
affiliations (Conservative, Liberal-Socialist, and Communist).118 For the entire interwar
period, every classroom in every school in every city in Hungary would begin its day
with the new “Hiszekegy” or “National Creed:”
Hiszek egy Istenben

I believe in one God

Hiszek egy hazában

I believe in one country

Hiszek egy isteni örök igazságban

I believe in a holy and eternal truth
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Hiszek Magyarország feltámadásában

I believe in the resurrection of
Hungary!
Amen.119

Ámen
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE SUCCESSOR STATES AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

The story of the Successor States at the Paris Peace Conference is one of
deception, outright misinformation, and propaganda that achieved incredible results. The
Successor States of Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia achieved massive
territorial victories at Paris in 1919 and 1920, yet remained unsatiated in their demands.
Rumania sought the Tisza, a purely Magyar region, as the “natural” boundary between
Hungary and Rumania. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia sought a “Slavic corridor,”
perhaps formed from the Burgenland, to link these two nations while cutting off Hungary
from its Austrian and German allies. Yugoslavia remained unsatisfied with its victories,
claiming among other regions, the Istrian Peninsula and Austrian Klagenfurt.1 Since the
histories of these nations have generally been better-accepted among the Western powers,
even long after the end of World War II, the story of the Successor States at Paris in 1919
necessitates a chapter devoted to the exploration of the differing historiographical
interpretations between them and the Hungarian enemy from whom they acquired much
of their territory at the Paris Peace Conference. Ultimately, only a somewhat truncated
Rumania would survive the twentieth century.
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Hungary and the Czecho-Slovak Problem: 1918-1920
Of all the states that succeeded the Habsburg Monarchy, Czechoslovakia was the
most problematic. Whereas Serbs and Rumanians sought merely to enlarge their
territorial possessions, the Czechs sought to create a new state altogether. As precedent
for existence, the Czechs claimed that the medieval realm of Great Moravia from 836 to
894 temporarily united both the Czechs and Slovaks, before the Germans and Hungarians
divided this realm.2 The “Bohemian Crownlands,” although geographically consistent
with Czech demands in 1918, had been at best semi-autonomous provinces culturally and
politically part of the Holy Roman Empire.3 The primary historiographical debate
concerns the Czech thesis of a common Czecho-Slovak “people” or “nation” and the
Hungarian counter-argument of the lack of any cultural or historical affinity between
these peoples.
One of the first publications dedicated to the Czecho-Slovak cause was Edvard
Beneš’s wartime Bohemia’s Case for Independence, written and distributed to the Allies
in 1917 to help establish legitimacy for a united Czecho-Slovak nation. The Beneš thesis
was that the Czechs and Slovaks were essentially the same people, sharing the same
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history, culture, language, and heritage.4 This thesis proposed that the Slovaks had been
part of the ninth-century Kingdom of Moravia and that the Magyars were to blame for the
destruction of that kingdom.5 Beneš demanded that the Magyars be deprived “of the
power to oppress non-Magyars,” and that “German hegemony in Europe” be forever
broken.6 Beneš maintained that there “were never worse oppressors than the Magyars,”7
yet such beliefs were probably not shared by most of Hungary’s Slovaks. Beneš
proposed that Czechoslovakia, with French support, would help form an “anti-German
barrier” which, along with the dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire, would create a
“stable equilibrium in Central Europe.”8
Beneš continued his propagandistic testimony in his War Memoirs, published in
1928. The primary thesis of this book is that the peace treaties of World War I “solved
the problem” of minorities in East Central Europe.9 As a revolutionary movement to deal
“a death-blow to the Habsburg Empire,” Beneš described that the goal of Czech patriots
was to coordinate with the other “oppressed” peoples of the Habsburg Empire: the Poles,
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South Slavs, and Rumanians.10 To Beneš, the war was a struggle of democracy against
absolutism, a black and white contest between “good and evil,” which realized the
“democratic ideals” of the Successor States.11
Charles Wojatsek’s From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award: The
Hungarian Minority in the First Czechoslovak Republic, published in 1980, presents the
Hungarian perspective to the Czecho-Slovak issue. Wojatsek proposes that rather than
solving the minority problems of the Habsburg Empire, the Paris Peace Conference
simply handed the same problems over to new masters. In the case of Czechoslovakia,
the Czechs barely held an ethnic majority over their minorities.12 Czechs accounted for
51 percent of the nation’s population, faced with 22 percent Germans, 15 percent
Slovaks, 5 percent Magyars, 4 percent Ruthenians, 0.5 percent Poles, and 0.15 percent
Rumanians.13 Wojatsek proposes that the very nature of Czech hegemony “condemned
[the state] to extinction,” from its very formation, and as the “the most improvised,
artificially built state in Europe,” it would be the first to feel the winds of change as the
Europe of Versailles decayed in the late 1930s.14
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Wojatsek accuses the Czechs of outright deception in the case of certain
“navigable” rivers the Czechs demanded as necessary for their economy. Many of these
were mere streams, as in the case of the Ronyva, which a contemporary photograph by
Hungarian sources in retrospect shows that the center of the stream barely reached the
knees of children playing in the water.15 Further, the author argues against the cession of
Pressburg (Pozsony or Bratislava) to the Czechs as a capital for Slovakia. Pressburg had
been the capital of Habsburg Royal Hungary during the era of Turkish partition, and the
1910 census of Pressburg listed 146,753 Hungarians, 39,488 Germans, and 18,282
Slovaks.16
A more neutral interpretation is D. Perman’s Shaping of the Czechoslovak State,
published in 1962. Perman proposes that the cooperative solidarity between the
Successor States at the end of the Great War and the support of France allowed the
Czechs to form a state of diverse minorities and territories as a theoretical “second
Switzerland.”17 Perman explains that from the perspective of Paris, the geopolitical
position of Czechoslovakia on the map of Europe made good strategic sense in French
military planning. Geopolitically, Czechoslovakia protruded into the heart of Germany,
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offering an excellent strategic military scenario for the French, while comfortably
standing alongside Poland and Rumania in the cordon sanitaire against Bolshevik
Russia.
The policy for French military security clashed, however, with the principles of
self-determination that the Americans proposed.18 Paris authorized such violations of
self-determination as the military boundary of the Sudeten Mountains for the Czechs, the
annexation of Ruthenia to grant a railway between Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and the
cession of a large strip of the Hungarian Plain to accommodate Czech communications
throughout Slovakia.19 A primary thesis in Perman’s book is that throughout the Paris
Peace Conference, the French followed a strict policy as an “open advocate of kindness
to friends and severity toward enemies” which would ultimately be the undoing of the
whole purpose of the conference–to establish a lasting, even “eternal” peace.20 The price
for the Czecho-Slovak nation-state was great, however, for the new nation faced enemies
on all sides, and Paris was uncomfortably distant.
The Slovak perspective, so often ignored, is addressed in Gilbert Oddo’s Slovakia
and its People, published in 1960. The ultimate purpose of this book is to eradicate the
“myth” that the Czechs and Slovaks are one people.21 Although Oddo concurs that the
Slovaks were indeed part of the Great Moravian Empire, the author denies any real
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relation between Czechs and Slovaks.22 When Masaryk proclaimed such unity in a 1916
British referendum entitled “The Slovaks are Czechs,” the Slovakian nationalist poet
Hurban-Vajanský countered in 1917 that “there is not a single Slovak in Slovakia who
would call himself a Czech. Slovaks regard themselves as an ethnically distinct
nation.”23 Religious differences also divided the Roman Catholic Slovaks from the
Protestant Czechs. From linguistic standpoints, Oddo explains that while resembling the
Czech language, Slovakian contains many different idioms and is definitely a different
language and not just a dialect.24 It is interesting that soon after the hegemony that was
Soviet Communism was lifted from Europe and Slovakia had any say in its affairs, it
declared independence from the Czechoslovak union in 1993.
Margaret MacMillan’s Paris 1919 supports the Hungarian historiographical
interpretation of the destruction of the Slovak economy by Czechs.25 The Czechoslovak
union cut off the river system by which Slovakian timber and coal flowed into the
Hungarian plain, and the difficulty of transverse communications between Slovakia and
the Bohemian and Moravian Czechs devastated the Slovak economy. MacMillan records
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an American witness to the Slovak response to their new government in Prague: “We
thank you for nothing. You say you have rescued us from the political oppression of the
Hungarians which was in fact pretty bad but now we are under martial law, we have no
work, little food, we suffer from cold and our future is black.”26 The report of a Slovak
priest to an American observer in 1919 summarized the Slovak position: “We have lived
alongside the Magyars for a thousand years. All the Slovak rivers flow towards the
Hungarian plain, and all our roads lead to Budapest, their great city, while from Prague
we are separated by the barrier of the Carpathians.”27
Macartney and Palmer’s Independent Eastern Europe, published in 1962,
proposes that the union of Slovakia with the Czech state was an unjust violation of the
principles of self-determination. The authors insist that the Slovaks were generally loyal
to the Hungarian Crown and there was considerable sympathy for old Hungary among
both Slovaks and Ruthenes.28 The Czech thesis of a Czecho-Slovak “people” or “nation”
was rooted only in nineteenth-century romantic idealism, and embraced only by Czech
patriots such as Masaryk and Beneš. Macartney challenges that whereas the Czechs
successfully acquired the Sudeten Mountains as their national boundary based on its
historic unity in the medieval Czech “Historic Lands” as a “national and economic unit,
bound together by history,” the same argument was denied the Magyars in the case of
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Slovakia as part of historic Hungary.29 Macartney and Palmer argue that the Czech
annexation of Ruthenia was nothing less than an “undisguised occupation.”30
A. H. Hermann’s 1975 History of the Czechs challenges the common assumption
in the West of the interwar Czechoslovak “model democracy.” Minorities were unequal
in Czechoslovakia, and the economy outside of Bohemia and Moravia became disrupted.
The author claims that any anxiety among the Slovaks toward Budapest in 1914 was
only redirected against Prague after 1920. Ruthenia was even more devastated by the
Czech annexation. During the winter seasons, Ruthenian timber traditionally flowed
down the Carpathian river system into the Hungarian plain, and many Ruthenians found
summer employment on northeastern Hungarian farms. After the Czechs annexed the
region, these traditional enterprises ceased, causing rampant unemployment and
destitution at a catastrophic level. 31
William Wallace’s 1976 Czechoslovakia asserts that Slovaks truly favored only
autonomy in the Hungarian Kingdom rather than full independence, while the Czechs had
always been more radical against the Habsburgs. Wallace does not support the Czech
state as the model democracy that Prague had advocated. Indeed, Wallace argues that to
assimilate its minorities, Prague abolished the historic “lands” of the region in place of 21
separate districts in an approach to minimize ethnic discontent.32
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The Czechoslovak experiment failed, both before World War II and after the Cold
War. The nation was surrounded by enemies and the minority situation of the state
doomed the nation. Germany dissolved the state in 1939, and although the Czechoslovak
union was resurrected after World War II (minus the Soviet annexation of Ruthenia),
only Soviet Communist hegemony could hold the state together. The union dissolved in
1993.

Hungary and the Yugoslav Question
The issues between Yugoslavia and Hungary are considerably less complex than
those of the Czechs and Rumanians. Relations between the Croats and Hungarians had
been more or less benevolent, based on the special “federated” status between the Croats
and the rest of the Kingdom of St. Stephen. The problem areas for the Hungarian
Crownlands concerned those territories called the Bánát and the Bácska, regions that had
formed the traditional military frontier districts of Habsburg Austria. Frontier regions in
East Central Europe have traditionally been ethnically complex, and the Bánát-Bácska
featured a mix of Magyars, Germans, Serbs, Croats, and Rumanians. The 1910 census
accounts for 547,735 Magyars in the region, with perhaps a comparable number of Serbs,
Germans, and Rumanians.33 The ethnic complexity of this region cannot be understated,
and sometimes single towns possessed multiple languages and religions.
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The Yugoslav Kingdom officially came into being on 1 December 1918, and
since this time has been the subject of a variety of interpretations. Some sources
proclaim Croatian and Slovenian support for this new nation. Others, such as Bruce
Pauley’s Habsburg Legacy point out that many Slovenes and Croats looked upon the
Orthodox Serbs as a culturally inferior people and viewed the Serbs “not as liberators,
but as conquerors and oppressors.”34 It is very probable that the Yugoslav nation was
indeed the “Greater Serbia” its enemies proclaimed.
Ivo Lederer’s Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference is one of the few neutral
accounts that document the formative period of the Yugoslav Kingdom from 1918 to
1920. Lederer continues the thesis that dominates much current historiography that the
creation of Yugoslavia, like Czechoslovakia and Greater Rumania, did not solve the
minority problems of the Habsburg Empire but simply handed the same problem to new
masters. Yugoslavia’s position at the Paris Peace Conference was simplest of all the
Successor States in that its goals were clear from the outset: Slovenia from Austria;
Croatia, the Bánát and Bácska from Hungary. Only in the case of the Bánát was there
any difficulty, for Rumania also claimed this region. Lederer asserts, however, that there
could be no real concrete solution as to which nation had rights in the Bánát, since that
region lacked any geographic, economic, ethnic, or historic unity.35
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Lederer argues that the creation of Yugoslavia set some dangerous precedents at
the Paris Peace Conference. Many regions ceded to the Yugoslav Kingdom, such as the
Bánát, Bácska, Macedonia, and Kosovo, were not inhabited by or lacked a South Slav
majority. Lederer therefore proposes that the very formation of Yugoslavia “violated the
principle of nationality” that had been the major force with which that nation had been
constructed.36
Macartney and Palmer in Independent Eastern Europe assert that the ethnic
complexity of Yugoslavia was great in regions such as the Bácska and Bánát and the
nationalism of the population in such areas was often unclear. Macartney and Palmer
also deny any true “South Slav unity” in Yugoslavia. Slovenes and Croats were
culturally “Austro-Hungarian” and the interwar Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes
became in essence a “Greater Serbia.”37 Throughout the interwar period, the Serbs
increasingly dominated the state. The Croats alone held any administrative independence
or autonomy.38

Although Yugoslavia did fairly well at the Paris Peace Conference,

Lederer asserts that the nation faced hostile neighbors in the entire interwar period among
Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, as well as Italian and Albanian irredentism at the time of
the Paris Peace Treaties. To counter that threat, Yugoslavia secured relations with the
Little Entente and France. The greatest initial threat to Yugoslav’s international position
was Italian demands for Istria, Fiume, and the Dalmatian coastline, territory promised to
36

Ibid., 127.

37

Macartney and Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe, 193.

38

Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, vol. 1, 139.
62

Italy for its involvement in the Great War. Italy settled its claims with Yugoslavia, at
least officially, in the Treaty of Rapallo of 12 November 1920 in which Rome acquired
the Istrian Peninsula with the port of Fiume, as well as certain coastal regions such as the
city of Zadar.39 Although Italy remained unsatisfied, conflict between Rome and
Belgrade was avoided, at least for the time being. Lederer agrees with the increasing
historiographical trend that Yugoslavia’s good fortune at the Paris Peace Conference was
part of a French plot to establish a balance of power and security network in the Balkans
against future potential German aggression.40
The fate of Yugoslavia is a case study of the failure of the “eternal peace” that
was proposed at the Paris Peace Conference. Friction between the nationalities,
especially the Croats, became increasingly difficult for the Serbian government to
manage in the interwar period. The Serbian government therefore abolished the
traditional historic “lands” of the country in favor of nine districts or banovinas.41
Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, and Hungary partitioned the country in 1941 and set up an
independent Croatia. With the end of World War II, the traditional lands were restored as
six federated republics and two autonomous districts (Kosovo and the Voivodina), based
on the pre-Great War divisions. As revolutionary changes began to embrace Europe in
1989, the Yugoslav state could no longer maintain cohesion. Slovenia and Croatia
declared independence in 1991; Macedonia followed in 1992; Civil war began in Bosnia
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in 1993; the future status of Kosovo is undetermined. Like Czechoslovakia, the
Yugoslav union would not survive the twentieth century.

The Transylvanian Problem in Hungarian and Rumanian Historiography
Of the territorial controversies of East Central Europe, none has been so hotly
contested as the Hungarian-Rumanian dispute over Transylvania.42 Hungarians and
Rumanians have considered themselves enemies for the better part of the twentieth
century and their national histories are generally contradictory. The debate concerns
Transylvania, which both nationalities proclaim to be their cultural heartland. Admiral
Nicholas Horthy’s assessment of the Hungarian-Rumanian relationship in Transylvania
has been generally common among most Magyars: “A purely Magyar people lived there
of old, but became overrun by Rumania shepherds and agricultural workers.”43
C. A. Macartney’s 1937 book Hungary and her Successors comments that the
German Saxons and Slovaks had no real problems with Hungarian leadership. The status
of the Croats was also not severely problematic based on the special “federated” status
between Hungary and Croatia guaranteed by the Hungarian Crown and the medieval
Hungarian Constitution. Transylvania, however, was an extremely complex problem,
primarily based on the settlement patterns of the so-called Székely or Szekler population.

42

The Rumanian side of the argument primarily concerns the theory of DacoRoman continuity and issues of primacy in the region. Their theses will thereby be
presented in more detail in chapter three.
43

Admiral Nicholas Horthy, Memoirs (New York: Robert Speller and Sons,
1957), 179.
64

The Szeklers of Transylvania consider themselves the descendants of one of Attila’s two
sons, Csaba, who, according to folklore, remained behind when the rest of the Huns fled
eastward after Attila’s death.44 Although a Magyar people, their dialect is distinguished
from the rest of Hungary and their settlements were in the heart of Transylvania,
surrounded by extensive Rumanian rural populations.45 Although the Rumanians formed
the ethnic majority, Macartney insists that the culture, intellectual, and civic life of the
region remained Magyar and Saxon. In 1914, Transylvania was ruled by and for the
Magyars against the Rumanians. After 1920, the tables turned, and Rumanians
dominated their old Magyar masters.46 In some cases, purely Hungarian territory was
ceded to Rumania simply to facilitate north-south communications in Transylvania.
Macartney claims the Magyars would have happily built a railway for the Rumanians
instead of ceding territory.47
In his 1943 book, The New Europe, author Bernard Newman offers a comparison
between the Hungarian and Polish minority problem in the case of Lwow, an
“unquestionably” Polish city which is surrounded by Ukrainian peasantry in the
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countryside.48 Transylvanian Kolozsvár (Cluj in Rumanian), a Magyar city surrounded
by Rumanian peasants, faced the same problem. Newman states that Magyars looked
down upon Rumanians as an inferior race, 78 percent of whom were illiterate, and
considered their process of Magyarization a means to bring minority populations to a
higher cultural level.49 Almost all higher education in the region was Hungarian.
Newman claims the Austrian re-conquest of Hungary in the seventeenth century
aggravated the problem, after which many villages in the countryside comprised four
races and four religions.50
Probably the most neutral account of Rumania’s lot at Paris in 1919 is Sherman
David Spector’s 1962 Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference. Spector’s thesis is that
the tremendous political ability of its premier Ioan Bratianu is largely the reason for
Rumania’s success at the Paris Peace Conference. Hungarian authors often accuse the
Rumanians of political treachery, and the story of Rumania in the Great War shows them
indeed to be opportunistic. Rumania has the curious distinction of having been on both
sides during the Great War.51 Although technically by treaty part of the Central Powers
at the start of World War I, Rumania sold itself to the Entente in the secret Treaty of
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Bucharest on 17 August 1916 that promised Rumania all of Transylvania, the Bukovina,
and the Bánát. Rumania attacked Austria-Hungary as a coordinated effort with the
Russian General Brusilov’s 1916 Galician offensive, but both attacks were swiftly turned
and the Central Powers occupied and divided Rumania. Spector proposes the Rumanian
solution to this turn of events, however: “Having lost the war, Bratianu did not intend to
lose the peace.”52
During the 1916-1918 occupation of Rumania, much of that nation’s intelligentsia
fled to the West to further the cause of Rumanian propaganda, especially in France,
where most of Rumania’s intellectuals had been educated.53 When defeat indeed came
for the Central Powers, the Western ignorance at the Paris Peace Conference played right
into the hands of the Rumanian delegation. Bratianu personally led the Rumanian
delegates at the conference, and his abilities as a speaker and diplomat achieved victories
for Rumania in a way impossible for Hungary.54 Just as the Czechs demanded Magyar
territory in Slovakia for transverse communication, Rumania demanded and received
many Magyar regions such as the cities Szatmár-Németi and Nagyvárad because the
existing railway there was considered a boon to Rumania’s economy.55 Bratianu and
Rumanians ever since 1918 have frequently argued that the ethnic majority of
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Transylvania had in most cases asked to be joined to Greater Rumania, as in the case of
the Saxons of Transylvania and the Bukovina who asked for such union on 8 January
1919. Spector urges that this be carefully considered, as he asks “were the acts of union
spontaneous or were they arranged under the menacing or protecting guns of the
Rumanian army?”56
Regarding Rumanian opportunism, Spector demonstrates the Rumanian response
to the Kun regime. Rumania used the pretext of Béla Kun’s Soviet regime to validate a
military campaign in Hungary which allowed them to push the Rumanian Transylvanian
border ever further westward. Eventually, however, even the Allies began to see that
some of the Rumanian demands were absolutely ridiculous, such as the Tisza as the
“natural” border between Hungary and Rumania.57 Spector declares that a conspiracy
between Bratianu and Masaryk, his Czech counterpart, was successful in the case of
Ruthenia, which granted a common border for the Czechs and Rumanians while denying
the Magyars a common border with their thousand-year Polish allies.58 With the end of
the Paris Peace Conference, Bucharest established its long-awaited dream of a “Greater
Rumania” in a manner that few in Bucharest could ever have believed possible. With the
geopolitical position of Rumania on the map of Europe, a French-dominated Rumania
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would help secure the containment of Bolshevik Russia, and theoretically aid in the
international isolation of Germany.59

Summation of the Problem of the Successor States
The formation of the Little Entente in 1920 united Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
and Rumania in common cause. These three nations and their French supporter were
dedicated to the status quo of the Europe of Versailles and the containment of any
Hungarian revisionism against the Treaty of Trianon by which these three states acquired
much of their territory. The Little Entente isolated Hungary except its small border with
its Austrian ally.
Although the Europe of Versailles had such high hopes in the formation of these
states, it is ironic how completely they failed in the long run. Czechoslovakia became the
nation “sacrificed for peace” in the 1938 Sudeten appeasement, and soon became
completely dissolved as the Nazis moved into Prague in March 1939 and set up a puppet
government in the newly independent Slovakia. Hungary recovered Ruthenia, and the
Fascist powers partitioned Transylvania between Hungary and Rumania in the Second
Vienna Award of 28 July 1940. The Germans, Italians, Bulgars, and Hungarians crushed
Yugoslavia in 1941. With the fall of France, the Balkans became Hitler’s supply network
for his “crusade” against Bolshevik Russia.
With the arrival of the Red Army in 1944 and 1945, the settlement of Versailles
was reimposed, with some changes, among the East Central European powers, but the
59
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evidence of the instability of these nation-states soon became apparent as Soviet military
hegemony left Eastern Europe beginning in 1989. Czechoslovakia voluntarily divided,
and civil war and dissolution wracked Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Although Rumania has
not suffered the same fate, this may be partly based on the non-irredentist nature of the
contemporary Hungarian government. Budapest has asked for autonomy and protection
for the Magyar minorities in the surrounding countries while (at least officially)
renouncing any aim to reunite these peoples once again into a greater Hungary. The fate
of the states that succeeded the Habsburg Austro-Hungarian Empire illustrate that the
solutions dictated by the Paris Peace Conference were often superficial and unable to
survive the test of time.
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CHAPTER THREE:
MINORITY PROBLEMS OF THE KINGDOM OF ST. STEPHEN

The minority problems that faced the Hungarian Kingdom in the 1867-1914 era
were primarily responsible for the dismemberment of historic Hungary at Trianon in
1920. Understanding the roots of Hungary’s minority problems are the basis to
understanding the core ideals that would manifest in the interwar revisionist movement.
Through a historiographical exploration of the theses of Hungary and its enemies among
the Successor States, it will become clear that many arguments made by the Hungarians
since 1918 are better supported by today’s neutral historians than those of Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, nations that have generally received better press than
Hungary in the first few decades after World War II. At the Paris Peace Conference, the
Hungarian delegation rested their cases on historical, geographic, and economic
principles in defense of the integrity of the Magyar Kingdom as it existed in 1914. These
arguments failed in the face of the ethnic principles by which the Rumanians, Czechs,
and Serbs based their cases in Paris.
Of these, the Serbian demands were least problematic, based on the special
“federated” status that existed between Hungary and Croatia, and the comparatively
small dispute for domination of the region called the Bácska in Hungary which (along
with a strip of the Bánát) became the Serb Voivodina. To the Czechs, the Slovaks were
their eastern “brethren,” not only linguistically related, but culturally and historically
according to Czech historiography. Revisionist Hungarian literature argues that whereas
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the Slovak language is indeed related to Czech, the Slovaks had never had any true
affinity with their linguistic relatives in Bohemia and Moravia. Hungarian historiography
proclaims that the Slovaks were culturally, historically, geographically, and economically
part of the Hungarian Kingdom, whose separation greatly impaired the Slovak economy.
The greatest historiographical controversy concerns the Hungarian and Rumanian
contest for Transylvania, which transcends any other territorial dispute in Europe.
Rumanian national history proclaims as fact the theory of Daco-Roman continuity, in
which the Rumanian people are descended from Romans who settled the Transylvanian
region between AD 106-271. Hungarian historiography counters this theory by
proposing a Balkan migration of the people who would become the Rumanians to
account for the thousand years of silence before the first mention of these people in
Hungarian territory. Another major theme from the Hungarian historiographical
perspective is the medieval confederation between the Magyars, Szeklers, and German
Saxons called the “Union of Three Nations,” of which the Vlachs, as early Rumanians
were known, are curiously absent.
If Czechoslovakia was indeed British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s
“faraway country between people of whom we know nothing,” regions such as
Transylvania, the Bánát and the Slavic and other areas of the Balkans remained even
more foreign. In Hungary and her Successors, historian C. A. Macartney laments that
little more than 15 years after the Paris Peace Conference, little had changed in Western
understanding of the problems of East Central Europe.1 Most of the West looked with
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amazement upon the dissolution and civil war that embraced parts of Europe in the
1990s. Historian Margaret MacMillan’s Paris 1919 warns that Rumania and Hungary
may as well face off one day for Transylvania.2 Clearly there has yet to be an effective
solution for the problems of East Central Europe. Count Paul Teleki’s 1923 Evolution of
Hungary and its Place in European History proposed that “truth alone can be the
foundation for a better world,” and that since “full knowledge was lacking” in formation
of the Paris Peace Treaties, mutual understanding must guide future negotiations in East
Central Europe for the betterment of humanity.3 That mutual understanding begins with
clarification of the minority problems that has embraced this part of Europe for well over
a millennia and a fair assessment of the often conflicting national histories of the nations
involved.

Views as to the Integrity of the Kingdom of St. Stephen
Geography in Hungarian historiography plays a key factor in the Magyar worldview of the integrity of their nation and the importance of the boundaries of the Kingdom
of St. Stephen. Hungarian historian Stephen Sisa in his 1983 patriotic account The Spirit
of Hungary explains that within the Hungarian “collective mind” the ring of the
Carpathians represented Hungary’s “eternal frontiers” as a bastion of solidarity dividing
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the two cultural worlds of Western Christianity and Eastern Orthodoxy.4 Hungarians do
not hesitate to express the geographic, economic, and cultural unity of this region. All of
the Slovakian rivers and valleys flow into the central Hungarian plain, solidifying an
economic union of the northern Carpathians and its minerals and timber with the heart of
Hungary.5 Even the American specialist in East Central Europe during the Paris Peace
Conference, Archibald Coolidge, reported in 1919 that “no country in Europe has been
more genuinely and historically united for the last thousand years than has Hungary.”6
Coolidge further argued in 1919 that the Carpathians were among the best boundaries of
Europe, “marked out by nature,” which embraced cultural minorities in a way similar to
the Alsatians, Bretons, and Basques, who maintain their cultural identity yet do not affect
the unity of France.7 British historian C. A Macartney agrees that the boundaries of the
old 1914 Kingdom of Hungary held an inherent geographical strength as a natural unit
“which lacks in some of its successors.”8
Hungarians have often seemed rather naive regarding the unity of both the lands
and people of the Kingdom of St. Stephen. C. A. Macartney presents the example of
Regent Admiral Nicholas Horthy, who could not imagine that such peoples as the Croats
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and Slovaks would actually wish separation from the Hungarian Kingdom.9 Throughout
Hungarian historiography, there is a self-righteous trend among the Magyars regarding
themselves and their kingdom. Hungarians believe, with some accuracy, that they singlehandedly defended Europe from the “infidel” Turks circa 1380-1526, and that their
sacrifices, both against Turk and Mongol, warrant special treatment or at least
consideration from the greater European community. Neither do the Hungarians (or
Poles, for that matter) regard themselves as an “eastern” European nation, which they
personally regard the Orthodox Serbs and Russians, but rather part of the “heart” of
European culture.
The modern Kingdom of Hungary, however, had profound minority problems. A
cross-section of Hungary’s nationalities based on the census of 1900 listed 8,152,000
Magyars in the Kingdom, facing minorities of 1,902,000 Germans (and an additional
233,000 Transylvanian Saxons), 438,000 Serbs, 2,799,000 Rumanians, 425,000
Ruthenes, 191,000 Croats (in Hungary proper with an additional 1,491,000 in the
federated territory of Croatia-Slavonia), 846,000 Jews, and somewhat under 2,000,000
Slovaks.10 Of these, only the Serbs and Rumanians were hostile to the Hungarian state.
A policy of “Magyarization” of these minorities, however, apparently grew after the
Compromise of 1867 created the Dual Monarchy. Bruce Pauley explains in The
9

C. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary, 1929-1944,
vol. 1 (Edinburgh: At the University Press, 1961), 55.
10

Total figures for Slovaks in the Hungarian Kingdom is unclear due to some
minor Slovak settlements in southeastern Moravia. Data from Paul Robert Magocsi,
Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, vol 1 (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1998), 97-98.
75

Habsburg Legacy that after 1867 “the Magyars almost without exception upheld the
absolute indivisibility of the state and the need to absorb minorities.”11
Count Pál Teleki, later Prime Minister of Hungary, described the Hungarian
position on its minority problem in his 1923 Evolution of Hungary and its Place in
European History. Teleki argued that neither “nationality” nor “linguistic group” were
equal to the term “race.” He cited one British Lord Bryce who called nationality “an
aggregate of men drawn together and linked by certain sentiments.”12 For Teleki, that
aggregate was the Holy Crown of St. Stephen. The crown symbolized legitimacy for
Hungary’s leaders, and after the original Árpád dynasty died out, the crown symbolized
all of the lands and people of Hungary. Teleki proposed that the crown united all diverse
nationalities in Hungary and that all were equal in the kingdom.13 It is improbable that
these diverse ethnic groups held equality or even, in many cases, autonomy, but only the
Serbs and Rumanians really complained about their status in the Hungarian Kingdom.
Count Steven Bethlen, Premier of Hungary from 1921-1931, represented the
extreme view of Hungarian historiography in his collection of 1933 lectures The Treaty
of Trianon and European Peace. To Bethlen, it was “historical fact” that the Magyars
did not oppress their minorities, citing as example the German Saxons who had lived for
centuries with the Magyars with little complaint.14 Bethlen reminded his audience that
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having “single-handedly” defended Europe from Mongols and the Turks, Hungary should
have been granted special lenient treatment at Trianon.15 He reminded his audience that
the Magyar Kingdom was an entity with a thousand-year history, and that throughout
Hungarian history, the nation rarely strayed beyond its natural boundaries. As for
indigenous populations, Bethlen claimed that only the Bulgars and Slovenes could show
any proof of having survived the “dark ages” of East Central Europe. The Avars, Goths,
Huns, and surely the Daks or ancient Dacians had all died off in the waves of barbarian
invasions before the Magyar arrival. He proposed as evidence the Magyar language,
which although had some influence of ancient Slovene, had absolutely no Serb, Croat,
Slovak, Ruthenian, and “beyond a doubt,” no Rumanian influences upon the Hungarian
language.16 Any other races in Hungary, according to Bethlen, entered only after the
Magyar conquest. No aboriginal inhabitants survived. Bethlen’s thesis was that the
Magyars actually “invited” people of other races into the kingdom at various times in
history. For example, according to his theory, Transylvanian Magyars and Szeklers
invited Vlach tribes, fleeing from the barbarous Mongols, into southern Transylvania in
the thirteenth century.17 Further, Bethlen reminded the reader that all urban areas in the
medieval Kingdom of Hungary were Magyar or German.18
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It must be understood, however, that although all Magyars are Hungarians, not all
Hungarians are Magyars. C. A. Macartney in Hungary and her Successors clarifies the
policy of Magyarization in Hungary. Although Magyars discriminated against nonMagyars, if a member of a minority accepted the “Magyar ideal,” and became Hungarian
in language and culture, “every door was open to him.” Although the Magyars were
“quick to punish, [Hungary] is equally generous to reward.”19 The author compares the
Hungarian scenario to those Scots, Welsh, or northern Irish who do not excessively dwell
on their Celtic heritage and are fully accepted as British citizens.20 Pauley’s Habsburg
Legacy concurs that once a minority member renounced his ethnic heritage and accepted
the Magyar ideal and culture as his own, however, he became Hungarian in all senses of
the word and part of Hungarian society.21 Macartney argues that those minorities who
sought to maintain their identity, however, (excepting the autonomous Croats and
German Saxons) such as Slovaks, Ruthenes, and Rumanians, possessed few rights in
1914.22 One of the finer neutral historians of Hungary in the latter-part of the twentieth
century is Thomas Sakmyster’s accounts of the complexities of Hungary in the interwar
period. Despite his neutral stance in his books, Sakmyster argues that Hungary fulfilled
what he considers a “cultural mission” in its history on the fringes of East Central
European civilization. He considers their guidance of the nationalities to be
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“benevolent,” which helped the Slovaks, Rumanians, and South Slavs to develop from
“semi-oriental” conditions to a more European system of life.23

The Thesis of Turkish Partition in Hungarian Historiography
Count Paul Teleki concurred with most historians that Hungary’s ethnic dilemma
doomed that nation at the Paris Peace Conference. Teleki was the first Magyar historian,
however, to propose a single historical event as the key to Hungary’s minority problem.
This is the 1923 thesis that the 150 years of Turkish occupation which began after the
battle of Mohács in 1526 transformed Hungary into a multi-ethnic state. Teleki argued
that the Turkish occupation absolutely devastated Hungary. In the densely-populated
Alföld or Great Hungarian Plain, Turks executed hundreds of thousands of Magyars or
depopulated the region to fill the slave markets of Anatolia. It would take hundreds of
years for the Great Plain to be repopulated. Nomadic tribes thus began to enter the
vacuous fringes of the former Hungarian Kingdom.24 In 1505, before the Turkish
conquest, A Vatican document estimated the population of the Hungarian Kingdom to be
roughly 4 million, 76 percent of which spoke Hungarian.25 The remaining 24 percent
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must have included not only Vlachs, but also Germans, Slovaks, Ruthenes, and possibly
Serbs. It therefore becomes a primary issue in Hungarian historiography that Hungary
was largely an ethnically homogenous state before the Turkish era.
C. A. Macartney’s 1962 Hungary: A Short History concurs that the Turkish
conquest was the greatest calamity for Hungary before Trianon and the root of Hungary’s
minority problem. Macartney explains that the Magyars of the Hungarian Great Plain
faced a worse scenario than other populations throughout the Balkans. Whereas South
Slavs, Bulgars, and Greeks could hide in mountainous regions, the fertile Hungarian
plains offered no such geographic protection. Magyars of the central plain were put to
the sword, enslaved, or perished in the terrible pestilence brought about by the horrible
conditions in the wake of the Turks.26 Macartney agrees that with the Magyar
depopulation of the central plain, Serbs, Vlachs, and Bosnian Muslims pushed into
southern Hungary, or sought refuge in the relatively unoccupied and fairly autonomous
Transylvania.27
With the completion of the Austrian conquest of 1699, the Habsburg emperors
initiated an operation known as the Impopulatio to resettle the now virtually empty Great
Hungarian Plain with populations from other parts of the empire. This resettlement was
predominant in the Bánát, although many Rumanians settled in Transylvania at this time.
Macartney argues that whereas many of Hungary’s minorities became assimilated as
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honorary Magyars, race relations between the Magyars and Rumanians were always
tense, and Rumanians were considered an inferior race on the same social level as
gypsies.28

South Slav Issues in the Hungarian Kingdom
Any historiographical interpretation of Hungary’s minority problems must
primarily address the issues of the three irredentist nationalities which claimed Hungarian
territory after World War I: the Serbs, the Czechs, and the Rumanians. The issues
between Hungary and the South Slavs are far less complicated than the Czech and
Rumanian historiographical claims and theories. Much Hungarian historiography
maintains that relations between the Croats and Magyars were generally fairly good. The
Croats shared a special federated status with Hungary since AD 1102 and enjoyed more
autonomy than any other nationality in Hungary. After the Austrian conquest of Turkish
Hungary in 1699, it is most probable that Croatia remained on Hungarian maps since that
land assured Hungary the port of Fiume on the Adriatic. Charles Jelavich’s South Slav
Nationalisms deals fairly extensively with the sometimes opposing views between the
Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs before the 1914 period and the Yugoslav union that followed
the Great War. Jelavich insists that the Turkish conquest of Hungary greatly disturbed
the status of Croatia, which became part of the Habsburg military frontier against the
Turks. Throughout the nineteenth century, Jelavich claims that Croats had to “fight to
preserve their autonomous rights against Hungarian pressure” throughout the nineteenth
28
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century. With the Compromise of 1867, Croatia was officially returned to the Hungarian
Kingdom, but the Nagodba or Compromise of 1868 between Hungary and Croatia
established greater autonomy for Croatia and an independent judiciary which improved
relations between Budapest and Zagreb.29
Jelavich argues that the Croats and Slovenes may have sided with the Serbs and
the South Slav cause to distance themselves from Austrian or Hungarian domination, but
they did not necessarily share common interest with the Serbs.30 Pauley’s Habsburg
Legacy further comments that many Slovenes felt that they had more common interest
with the Western Austrians than simple Macedonian Serbs who had lived under the
tutelage of the Turks for centuries.31 Further, the Roman Catholic Slovenes and Croats
with their Latin alphabet were definitely a more “Western” folk than the Orthodox Serbs
with their Cyrillic script.
That Croatia should go to South Slavs may not have affected Hungarian policy as
much as other areas in question. Indeed, Croatia was not part of the Republic of Hungary
that seceded from Austria in 1848 under the nationalist hero Lajos Kossuth. Further,
Croatia and Slavonia are absent from the well-known ethno-linguistic map of Hungary
drawn by Pál Teleki in 1930 based on the 1910 census. The main disputed areas between
Hungary and Yugoslavia concern the Bácska and that part of the Bánát that was
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partitioned between Yugoslavia and Rumania at Trianon in 1920. This region of
Hungary is not generally considered by the Magyars to be as important as the Slovakian
Carpathian range or Transylvania, although Hungary did temporarily recover the area in
1941 for its participation in the German invasion of Yugoslavia. Overall, the territorial
dispute between Hungary and the South Slavs is of minor importance when compared to
the Czech and Rumanian claims on the Kingdom of St. Stephen.

The Question of Czecho-Slovak Unity
Of all the states of Europe that either survived or succeeded the Great War,
Czechoslovakia was the most problematic. Czechoslovakia had the greatest minority
problems of Europe, even worse than Yugoslavia. Concrete census data exists for the
1930 census which listed 7,406,000 Czechs, (51.1 percent of total population), 2,282,000
Slovaks (15.8 percent), 3,232,000 Germans (22.3 percent), 692,000 Magyars (4.8
percent), 549,000 Ruthenians or Carpatho-Russians (3.8 percent), 187,000 Jews (1.3
percent), 82,000 Poles (0.6 percent), 32,000 Gypsies (0.2 percent), 13,000 Rumanians
(0.1 percent), and 5,000 others.32 Unlike the Serbs and Rumanians who sought at the
Paris Peace Conference basically to enlarge their territory, the Czechs sought to form a
new state entirely at the expense of its German, Polish, and Hungarian neighbors. Barely
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a majority in their own state, the means by which the Czechs formed their state assured
hostility on virtually all of its borders.
Like Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference, a primary mission of the Czech
delegation at Paris in 1919 was to establish some precedence for not just a Czech state,
but also a Czecho-Slovak entity. For the western boundaries of this state, the Czechs
claimed the Historic Provinces by which Bohemia and Moravia had been known under
the domination of the Holy Roman Empire within the geographic ring of the Sudeten
Mountains and with a population of over three million Germans. The eastern parts of the
country were more troublesome to establish. There had been little historical precedence
for a Czecho-Slovak union on any basis other than linguistic. In historiographical
retrospect after the creation of Czechoslovakia, many pro-Czech authors invoke the
existence of the ninth century Kingdom of Great Moravia which temporarily united the
Czech lands with eastern Slovakia and Pannonia from 836 to 894. Pauley’s Habsburg
Legacy maintains that this inference remained “halfhearted” at the peace table and that
the Czechs therefore based their claims mainly on the ethnic principle.33 Nevertheless,
its mention in pro-Czech historiography necessitates clarification. Although the core of
the Great Moravian Empire was in Moravia and western Slovakia, historical cartographer
Paul Robert Magocsi in his Historical Atlas of East Central Europe argues that before its
destruction by the Magyars in 894, at its greatest extent Great Moravia also briefly
embraced Bohemia, Pannonia (Hungary west of the Danube) and even Silesia and Poland
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along the Vistula as far as Cracow and Wislica.34 The historiographical debate, therefore
is the Czech claim for Slovakia based on ethnicity and historical precedence as a
common “people” or “nation” and the Magyar claims to the contrary, that Slovakia (and
Ruthenia) were historically and economically integral parts of the Hungarian Kingdom.
One of the first published documents for the case of Czecho-Slovak unity was the
Czech nationalist leader Edvard Beneš’s Bohemia’s Case for Independence published in
1917 during the Great War to persuade the Western or Entente powers to the Czech
argument of Czecho-Slovak unity. The Beneš thesis was that the Czechs and Slovaks
had the same history, culture, language, and civilization, separated only on account of
Hungarian aggression and imperialism 35 Beneš claimed that for twelve centuries, the
Czechs had defended themselves, never attacking, from Germans, Hungarians, and others
not just as Czechs, but as “Czecho-Slovaks.”36 In this theory only German and Hungarian
oppression prevented the political unification of a people who were already not only
linguistically, but culturally united.37 Beneš asserted that only by the destruction of
German and Magyar hegemony in central Europe could justice ever be accorded the
Czechs and other Slav peoples of East Central Europe whose fate had been “a martyrdom
unparalleled in history.”38 Beneš remarked in his 1928 War Memoirs that a “Western
34
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Czecho-Slovak nation” had indeed attained a high degree of “historical development” in
Western civilization that was curtailed by Germans and Magyars.39
Beneš’s War Memoirs continued some of the more important Czech historical
perspectives of national identity. In this 1928 text, Beneš argued that the Germans,
Habsburgs, and Magyars sought repeatedly throughout history to rob the national identity
not merely of the Czechs, but of a “Czecho-Slovak” “Western Nation” which had
achieved a high degree of “historical development” in their long developmental course as
an “historical entity.”40 Although Beneš repeatedly attached the Slovaks to the Czech
cause, he did not clarify any actual unifying factors between these two disparate peoples
other than the linguistic basis. The Ruthenian issue was completely ignored.
In the 1971 book, Czechoslovakia: A Short History, author J. N. F. Bradley offers
a brief, albeit comprehensive review of the entire Czech history. The author proposes
that a history of Czechoslovakia is basically the quest of the Czechs throughout the ages
for autonomy as “one long struggle for the preservation of some kind of independence.”41
Bradley asserts that the Czechs faced formidable problems with their nationalities, and
their relations with the Slovaks were much more problematic than they anticipated at
Paris in 1919.42 Although the Czechs sought “fusion” between these two peoples, the
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Slovaks insisted on a separate national identity from that of Prague, and it was clear that
there was no true federal equality between Czechs and Slovaks.
S. Harrison Thompson’s Czechoslovakia in European History, written in 1965, is
a readable exploration of the Czech and Slovak political and cultural movements
throughout European history up to the German occupation of 1939 in an attempt “to trace
the development of several of the more acute problems of Czechoslovak life and
history.”43 The author declares that for more than a thousand years, the Czech and Slovak
presence in Europe could be felt, even if it did not politically manifest that presence.
Although the Great Moravian Empire may not have had any true lasting impact on the
Czechs and Slovaks, Thompson argues that the empire did set some precedence for the
West and South Slavs that would only manifest in the twentieth century–that these people
could indeed unify and achieve independence. Thus, Bohemia could fulfill its dream and
emerge victorious and transcendent from its status as “the classic land of national battles
between German and Slav.”44 Regarding the Slovaks, Thompson claims that their history
“is not a record of wars and expansion, rather it is the story of an uninterrupted struggle
for existence.”45 Their lot had always been one of foreign domination, whose only
instance of independence before 1918 had been in the brief union with Great Moravia,
which the author concurs had no lasting political effect.
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A. H. Hermann’s A History of the Czechs, published in 1975, is one of the finer
analyses of Czech and Czechoslovak history in its thoroughness and objectivity. Besides
the general coverage of Czech history, the author is one of the few to dedicate sufficient
treatment to the Slovak problem. Hermann claims that the Slovaks had been politically
and culturally part of the Hungarian Kingdom since the arrival of the Magyars in the
ninth century. The Slovaks occupied the upper highlands of the Carpathians and became
so intertwined with Hungarian domestic affairs, that Hermann declares “the history of
Slovakia cannot therefore be treated separately from that of Hungary.”46 Their lot was
bad, however, “for they were few, poor, and harshly ruled by the Hungarians,” and tied
tightly to the feudal structure of the Hungarian monarchy which retarded Slovak
economic and social development.47 Hermann argues that with the transfer of power
from Budapest to Prague in 1920, however, the Slovaks simply found a new dominating
power among the Czechs to replace the Hungarians. The author argues that the
“defensive character of Slovak nationalism, the feeling of being threatened, has always
been very prominent, and when Prague instead of Budapest became the seat of the central
government departments after 1918, the force of these emotions was redirected.”48 The
situation for Ruthenia was even worse, and Hermann agrees with Hungarian
historiography that the restructure of the Ruthene economy away from the Hungarian
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plains destroyed the Ruthene economic infrastructure causing rampant unemployment
and destitution at a catastrophic level.49 Hermann’s examination demonstrates that
Czechoslovakia may not have been the “ideal democracy” so often accorded in the West.
William Wallace’s Czechoslovakia focuses on the modern era and eras of reform
from 1849 through the “Prague Spring” of 1968 and offers some considerations
concerning the lot of the Slovaks. Although the author maintains that “Magyar policies
and Slovak aspirations were inevitably on a collision course,” the author contends that
few Slovaks sought actual independence from Budapest and merely favored local
autonomy.50 Wallace presents the Slovaks as an impoverished and uneducated people.
They had no self-government, but Wallace argues that the government imposed by
Budapest was not actually malevolent, and the Slovaks had never truly governed
themselves in their history.51 They sought better representation, but not true
independence, unlike the more radical Czechs.
Kurt Glaser’s 1961 Czechoslovakia: A Critical History is an interestingly hostile
reaction to Czechoslovak history. Although the author’s main theses concern
Czechoslovakia’s relations with Russia as a willing “police state” for Communism “more
orthodox than the Kremlin.”52 Glaser dedicates several scorching chapters to early
Czechoslovak history in an attempt to clear up the Western “myths” about that nation
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which have so often dominated Czechoslovakia’s reception to the West. Glaser
absolutely denies Czecho-Slovak unity and any precedence for such a union.53 Indeed,
the author continually presents the Czechs as “Russophile” opportunists in their desire to
form a state along the lines of Switzerland, only with the Czechs firmly in command of
their minorities.54 Glaser argues that as soon as it was politically able, Slovakia seceded
from this state both in 1939 and 1993.
A strong counter against Czech historiographical theories from the Hungarian
perspective is Charles Wojatsek’s 1980 From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral
Award. Concerning Czecho-Slovak unity, Wojatsek asserts that whereas the Czechs
indeed had a realm of sorts under the Holy Roman Empire, the Slovaks never had any
political identity.55 Both cultures would remain divided for a thousand years. Wojatsek
argues that the only tie between Slovaks and Czechs was linguistic, and their cultural and
religious differences were profound.56 Wojatsek also stresses the importance of the river
system of the Carpathians for the Slovaks and Ruthenes. Since all the rivers flow from
the mountain system of the Carpathians to the Hungarian Great Plain or Alföld, this river
system maintained the Slovakian and Ruthenian economy, in which timber and other
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resources flowed into central Hungary. The establishment of Czechoslovakia therefore
destroyed an economic system that had existed for a thousand years.57 A thesis by
Wojatsek that is supported in much Hungarian historiography is that the Magyars, in a
kind of benign overlordship, brought civilization to the Slovaks, who occupied the
mountains as a loose confederation of tribes in medieval times.58
Regarding the Ruthenian problem, Wojatsek argues that this region formed a
natural boundary between Hungary and Poland, and all the roads and railways flowed
into Hungary. Wojatsek argues that relations between the Ruthenians and the
Hungarians were “excellent” throughout their history and that they even had political
autonomy in Hungary.59 The 1910 population of the region listed 44.8 percent Ruthenes,
33.4 per cent Magyars, 21 percent others; Magyars and Germans accounted for 90
percent of the urban population, however.60
Macartney and Palmer’s 1962 Independent Eastern Europe summarizes the basic
issues between the Czechs, Slovaks, Magyars, and the West. The authors maintain that
Czech propaganda achieved fantastic results in the Great War, but propose that the union
of Slovakia with the Czech state was an unjust violation of the principles of selfdetermination. Macartney insists that the Slovaks overall were basically loyal to the
Hungarian Crown and there was considerable sympathy for old Hungary among both
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Slovaks and Ruthenes.61 The Czech thesis of a Czecho-Slovak “people” or “nation” was
rooted in nineteenth-century romantic idealism and maintained only by Czech patriots
such as Masaryk and Beneš. Macartney challenges that whereas the Czechs successfully
acquired the Sudeten Mountains as their national boundary based on its historic unity in
the medieval Czech “Historic Lands” as a “national and economic unit, bound together
by history,” the same argument was denied the Magyars in the case of Slovakia as part of
historic Hungary.62 Regarding Ruthenia, the authors accuse the Czechs of outright
deception regarding an integral part of the Hungarian Kingdom in the Czech argument
that Ruthenia was not “politically ripe” to determine its own destiny as a basis for what
Macartney terms an “undisguised occupation.”63
Czechoslovakia never became the “second Switzerland” that its founders sought
to create. Indeed, the creation of this state served more as a part of French European
policy to counter future German aggression than as an honest attempt to bring justice to
the peoples dominated for so long by the Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians. As this
essay demonstrates, not only Hungarian historiography, but many neutral authors support
the thesis that Slovakia and Ruthenia were probably better suited as part of the Magyar
Kingdom than with their western linguistic relatives in Bohemia and Moravia.
Czechoslovakia dissolved as a state in 1938 and 1939 not simply because of Nazi
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imperialism, but also because its creation violated the very tenets of the selfdetermination and other Wilsonian dogma by which the Central Powers surrendered in
World War I. That the state broke apart once again in 1993 proves that Czecho-Slovak
union was at best superficial and at worst unrestrained Czech imperialism. The
Czechoslovak experiment was a failure that did not survive the twentieth century.

Introduction to the Transylvanian Dispute Between Hungary and Rumania
The complexities of the Rumanian-Hungarian historiographical disputes are so
great that a brief detailed historical analysis of Transylvania is necessary in order to
clarify the opposing Hungarian and Rumanian historical, historiographical, and ethnic
theories. The word “Transylvania” in Latin means “land beyond the woods,” in reference
to the vast forests of the Carpathians and Transylvanian Alps. The Magyar name for the
region is “Erdély,” derived from the Hungarian root “erdö,” meaning forest. The
Rumanian name for Transylvania is “Ardeal,” an adapted mispronunciation of the
Hungarian “Erdély.”64 If the Rumanians indeed held primacy in the region, it is doubtful
that the name for their homeland would come from a Hungarian place-name.65 Prior to
the 1860 unification of Wallachia and Moldavia, there had never been a term-usage of the
phrase “Rumanian” or “Romanian.” The people who would become known as
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“Rumanians” in the nineteenth century had been known as “Vlachs” in all considerations,
hence the name “Wallachia,” or “Land of the Vlachs.” The word “Vlach,” according to
one Rumanian linguist Margineanu literally means “shepherd,” a far cry from the noble
Roman descent claimed by Bucharest.66 Wallachia and Moldavia remained the
battleground of Russia and Ottoman Turkey for hundreds of years and had little selfgovernment or independence until their 1860 unification. Vlach origins may remain a
historical mystery, but in any case, the histories of Hungary and Rumania are in direct
conflict with each other.

Transylvania During the Era of Partition
The Transylvanian problem is that both Hungary and Rumania claim the region as
the heartland of their culture. In Rumanian historiography, Transylvania is their
autochthonous territory as the heirs of Roman colonists. For Hungary, Transylvania was
the sole region to carry the flame of Magyar independence during the catastrophic
Turkish occupation. Prior to the Turkish era, most Hungarian historians considered the
nation’s heartland to have been relatively ethnically homogenous.67 With the collapse of
the Hungarian military forces at Mohács in 1526, Hungary was partitioned into three
main bodies: the Turkish occupied Great Plain or Alföld, Habsburg dominated “Royal
Hungary” in the northwest, and the relatively autonomous Transylvania under nominal
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Turkish suzerainty. The Habsburgs claimed their right to the Holy Crown of St. Stephen,
but refused to uphold the Hungarian Constitution for which the Crown was a symbol.
Only Transylvania in the east carried on the tradition of an independent Hungary.68
Magyar sources claims that of the 5 million souls who lived in central Hungary before
the Turkish conquest, only 1.5 million survived the occupation.69 If a Magyar district of
Turkish Hungary resisted, the whole area was put to the sword, and every man, woman,
and child was slaughtered.70
The situation in Transylvania was quite different. Admiral Nicholas Horthy
presents an argument in his memoirs that is quite common among most Hungarian
authors: “During the Turkish domination [Transylvania] had been the hearth where the
sacred flame of the national spirit had been kept alight.”71 The Magyar nobility in
Transylvania survived, unlike in the Turkish-occupied Great Plain, or in Habsburg Royal
Hungary where the nobility became absorbed into the German orbit. Indeed, with the
Habsburg conquest of Turkish Hungary, completed in 1699, many of the Transylvanian
nobles established their leadership across the rest of the newly-freed Hungary. Historian
Anne Fay Sanborn in Transylvania and the Hungarian-Rumanian Problem proposes that
the urban composition of virtually all cities in Transylvania at this time were either
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Hungarian or German Saxon.72 Historian Endre Haraszti further supports that 80 percent
of the urban population of Transylvania at this time was Magyar or Saxon.73 In regard to
any Vlach presence in Transylvania by the time of the re-conquest of 1699, Haraszti
argues that they occupied only villages and mountainous areas, and although they had a
culture of their own, they were a migratory people who could just barely be considered
civilized at this time.74 Recent scholarly collaborations from Budapest such as general
editor András Felvidéki’s superb Történemelmi Világatlasz (Historical Atlas of the
World) still maintains that Magyars and Saxons held hegemony over virtually all urban
centers in Transylvania at this time.75
The trend in Hungarian or pro-Hungarian historiography concerning this era is
that the vast depopulation of the Great Plain wrought by the Turks became responsible
for the dispersal of non-Magyar minorities across vast parts of Hungary. As the Turks
exterminated or sold off so many of the original Magyar inhabitants into slavery, other
nationalities, previously migratory and nomadic, began to settle in the southern reaches
of Turkish Hungary such as the Bánát. Hungarian historian Gyula Zathureczky proposes
as the basis of his thesis in Transylvania: Citadel of the West that the Turkish era was
indirectly responsible for the large Rumanian population that flocked to the outlaying
areas of the Transylvanian mountains. Zathureczky argues that the Vlachs sought refuge
72

Sanborn, Transylvania and the Hungarian-Rumanian Problem, 214.

73

Haraszti, The Ethnic History of Transylvania, 126.

74

Ibid., 56.

75

András, Felvidéki, ed., Történemelmi Világatlasz (Budapest: Kartográfiai
96

within the confines of the Transylvanian nobility as they fled from Turkish horror in the
Balkans.
Even as Vlach numbers increased in the region, however, they were so disbanded
as to have no national structure, the Orthodox Church alone being a unifying factor
among the Vlachs. Their national consciousness only grew after 1700.76 Within the
confines of Transylvania, however, Hungarians brought many cultural benefits to these
people. Historian Anne Fay Sanborn cites the example of the first Vlach Bible, translated
by Hungarians into Rumanian in 1561 at the expense of the Magyar landowner Miklós
Forró of the city Brasso which started the birth of Vlach literature.77 The Transylvanian
Rumanians had no distinct culture of their own. A major thesis by author Albert Wass de
Czege in Documented Facts and Figures on Transylvania, contends that any true culture
that may be considered “Rumanian,” that is, a culture more refined than that of simple
Vlach shepherds and nomads, was imported into Transylvania from the neighboring
provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia.78

Rumanian Origins and the Theory of Daco-Roman Continuity
The theory of Daco-Roman continuity has become the cornerstone of virtually all
Rumanian historiography from the time of the Vlachs’ national awakening to the present-
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day. In the late eighteenth century, two Uniate (Greek Catholic) clerics who studied in
Rome, Gheorge Sinkai and Samuel Micu Klein, found the similarities between Latin and
the Vlach tongue thought-provoking. Noting a large percentage of Latin root words in
the Rumanian language, they formed a theory of continuity linking the Vlachs to the
ancient Roman colonists of Dacia.79 Their theory is that the Vlachs were the ethnic
remnants of the Roman colonists who had settled in Dacia between AD 106-271 during
the Roman occupation. Gheorge Sinkai and another Rumanian scholar, Peter Maior,
prepared and printed the Supplex Libellus Valachorum in 1791, which outlined a new
history of the Vlach people.80 In this theory, the Roman population that remained after
the general withdrawal in AD 271 intermarried with the original inhabitants and survived
the waves of barbarian invasions by hiding in the hills of the Transylvanian Alps. They
allied with each invader and maintained their local identity until they became “second
class citizens” to the Magyars, who were intruders to the region in the ninth century.81
Even though history has no records of the Vlachs in this area until the thirteenth century,
the Supplex Libellus Valachorum became a “declaration of rights” for a people now
calling themselves “Romanians” or “Rumanians.” By 1895, as Rumanian nationalism
began to soar, this document greatly fueled Rumania’s claim to Transylvania, now the
proclaimed heartland of its culture.
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The general and neutral historiographical counter against this theory is that there
is no trace of any early Vlach civilization in Transylvania: no roads, remnants of cities, or
any archeological evidence exist which could support this theory.82 There are further no
legends, tales, ballads, or folks songs of Roman influence among the Magyars and
Saxons, not even folk art to demonstrate any evidence of Roman survival among the later
conquerors of the region.83 Rumanian culture is decisively Balkan in its orientation,
showing Slavic, Albanian, Bulgarian and Greek influences.84 Colin McEvedy, one of the
most prominent neutral historians who has dedicated his life’s work to ethno-linguistic
history in his Penguin Atlases of World History directly refutes the Rumanian theory.
The McEvedy thesis is that ten centuries exist between the overthrow of the Roman
province in AD 271 and the first mention of the Vlachs around 1220-30. In support of
Hungarian historiography, McEvedy asserts that a more plausible idea is that the Vlachs
could have descended from the Latin-speaking populations south of the Danube, as in
Moesia (northern Macedonia), where Roman roots were deeper and survived much
longer within the Latin cultural orbit.85
Many Hungarian historians propose that analysis of the Rumanian language
supports the thesis that the Vlachs are of Balkan rather than Dacian-Roman descent. One
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analysis proposes that the Rumanian language, although definitely a Romance language,
is comprised of 45.7 percent Slavic, 31.5 percent Latin, 8.4 percent Turkish, 7 percent
Greek, 6 percent Hungarian, and 0.6 percent Albanian root words, which lends support to
the Magyar theory of the Vlachs’ Balkan migration.86 Stephen Sisa’s Spirit of Hungary
proposes through his sources that in addition to similarities in phonology and
morphology to Albanian, there are hundreds of Albanian loan-words in the Rumanian
vocabulary, tracing the Vlachs to the Illyrian coast, a region within the Roman orbit for
over a millennia.87 Had the Vlachs existed in Transylvania before the Goths or Avars,
there should be some East Germanic influence in modern Rumanian. There is, however,
no such influence in the Rumanian language.88 Although the basic grammar and syntax
of the Rumanian language is of Latin origin, much of the vocabulary was enriched with
Latin loan-words in the nineteenth century.89
In a general survey of the Romance languages, linguist Rebecca Posner in The
Romance Languages indicates that there remain to this day scattered Rumanian dialects
in the regions of Greek Thrace and southeastern Albania, which would support the
Hungarian thesis of Balkan migration.90 Posner further argues that in the last two
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hundred years or so, there has been a movement among Rumanian linguists to replace the
older Slavonic forms in Rumanian with new Latin and French loanwords in an effort to
“Romanize” the language as much as possible.91 Indeed, Slavonic forms are abundant in
the Rumanian language, and these Slavonic and other Balkan influences are what
differentiate Rumanian from the other Romance languages in the West. Finally, Posner
agrees that there is indeed some distant relationship between Albanian and Rumanian, a
fact which is curiously absent in Rumanian linguistic analyses.92 In another scholarly
treatment, linguist Graham Mallinson in The Romance Languages also argues that
Albanian and Rumanian share a distant ancestry.93 Further, Mallinson agrees that the
preponderance of southern Slavic in the most basic forms of Rumanian vocabulary
indicate a Balkan origin for the early Vlachs.94 Although the core of the Rumanian
language is Latin based, such linguistic evidence counters a purely Dacian origin for the
ancient Vlachs.
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A History of Transylvania from Ancient Times to the Arrival of the Magyars
Since the historiography of the Transylvanian issue appears so often subjective in
Hungarian and Rumanian historical theory and either ignored or at best misunderstood by
most in the West, a brief neutral objective account of the region’s history is of paramount
importance to clarify many historiographical perspectives. Such a history begins with the
settlement of the region by a people known as the Daks, or Dacians, linguistically from a
branch of the Indo-European family of languages called Thraco-Phrygian, a linguistic
sub-group related to both ancient Greek and Hittite.95 These nomadic people merged
with other migratory tribes throughout much of their early period, from about 1600 B.C.
until they established a formal Dacian or Dak Kingdom around 44 B.C.
During the height of Imperial Rome, the warlike and aggressive Daks under their
king Decebalus occupied a position deemed dangerous to the Roman flank north of the
Danube and the Roman province of Moesia. After increased border conflicts, Rome
decided to destroy the Daks outright in what became known as the Dacian Wars of AD
85-89.96 Emperor Trajan finally subjugated the Daks and formally created the Imperial
Province of Dacia in AD 105.97 Hungarian historian Anne Fay Sanborn proposes as a
major thesis in her Transylvania and the Hungarian-Rumanian Problem that, based on
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analysis of Roman records, Rome totally annihilated the Daks, since after the conquest
there remained virtually no Dak archaeological or cultural relics.98
The Dacian conquest freed Roman legions for the ever-present wars in the east
against Persia and Parthia. However, the geographical position of the colony, north of
the Danube and with few natural defenses, meant that its defense was only tenable so
long as no new threat emerged in the region. The Romans evacuated the colony for two
reasons: increasing barbarian activity in the region and restructure of the Roman army.
As the East Germanic Goths and Gepids pressed along the colony, Rome retreated to its
traditional static defensive line along the Danube in AD 271.99 With the retreat in 271,
Emperor Aurelian ordered a scorched-earth policy in the face of the advancing Goths:
buildings, food supplies, and everything that remained of the Roman colony were
destroyed as the Romans evacuated.100
In the vacuum left by the Romans, Dacia became settled by several East
Germanic tribes: the Vandals, the Gepids, and the Visigoths. A new threat to all
emerged, however, in the onslaught of the Huns in the fifth century: Attila, the “scourge
of God,” emerged from the east in a fierce path of destruction. The Germanic tribes, now
in a panic, burst into the Roman boundaries, where some had been allowed to settle in
sanctuary from the Huns. The Visigoths sacked Rome in AD 410, and other Germanic
98
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tribes transformed the western Roman Empire from Imperial territory to a scattering of
Germanic kingdoms. Roman power declined in the west and the German chieftain
Odoacer deposed Romulus Augustulus, the last Roman Emperor in the west, in 476.101
Attila created a great Hun empire which began with his rule in 434 and ended
with his death in 453, after which the Hun tribes scattered without central leadership. As
the Huns faded into memory, the Germanic Gepids occupied the former Dacian lands
until a new tribe from the east, the Avars, advanced from the steppes of Central Asia. By
561 they subdued the remnant Huns and Germans from the Volga to the Danube. The
Avars settled as a loose collection of unified nomadic tribesmen in the center of the
Carpathian Basin, a region from which they pressured the Byzantine Empire with forays
into the Balkans, sometimes reaching close to Constantinople, as in their campaign of
626.102 For two hundred years, the Avars would remain in the region that would later
form the crownlands of the Hungarian kingdom. They remained a barbarian people
during the time of the formation of such realms as that of the Merovingian Franks, and a
constant threat to the eastern heirs of Rome in Byzantium. With the aid of the Bulgars,
another Turkic people migrating from the steppes, Charlemagne destroyed the Avars in
796.103 The destruction of the Avars was the last step in the settlement of the Carpathian
Basin before the arrival of the Magyars, who, during the time of Charlemagne, had
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already reached the Ukraine from their ancient homeland, traced along the Urals, which
Hungarian historiography claims as the Magyars’ aboriginal homeland.104
A thousand miles from their Uralic homeland, where even today languages
related to Hungarian survive, the Magyars descended on horseback in a fury upon Europe
in 896 and terrorized Germany, Italy, and France for a half-century until finally defeated
in battle at Lechfeld in 955. The early Magyars consisted of seven tribes led by a tribal
chieftain named Árpád, a figure whose dynasty would last from 896 to 1301. With the
Magyar defeat by Christian knights at Lechfeld, the Magyar forays and raids stopped and
Árpád’s grandson, Géza (972-97) encouraged the pagan Magyars to settle and adopt
Christianity. Géza’s son, Stephen (István in Hungarian) brought about the true birth of
Hungary as a Western Christian state by officially converting the tribes to Christianity
and organizing the Magyar nobility as a monarchy based on Western models. Stephen
was formally crowned by Pope Sylvester II in 1001, and with his reign (997-1038),
Hungary embarked on its thousand-year national history. Stephen established a Roman
Catholic Archbishopric in the city of Gran and was sainted for his conversion of the
pagan Magyars.105 Hungarians take great pride in that, with its ally Poland, Hungary
formed a shield for the West against eastern barbarian and nomadic incursions, allowing
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the flowering of high medieval times in western Christendom.106 In any event,
Transylvania remained an integral and “organic” component of the medieval Hungarian
kingdom.107

Historiographical Interpretations of the History of the Rumanians
The first records of the Vlach people originate neither in Hungary nor Wallachia,
but in a Byzantine Greek Chronicle that in 976 mentions a people called the Vlachs who
lived in the vicinity of modern-day Albania,108 a region occupied and controlled by the
Romans since 145 B.C.109 These Vlach shepherds were relocated apparently to a region
in Moesia called Chalkidké by order of the Byzantine Emperor Alexios Komnenos in
1097, which began the Balkan migration of the Vlachs, later becoming a cornerstone in
Hungarian historiography.110
An important development prior to any evidence of any sizeable Vlach
settlements in Transylvania is the establishment of the medieval “unio trium nationum,”
or “Union of Three Nations,” of the twelfth or thirteenth century which politically united
106

Gyula Zathureczky, Transylvania: Citadel of the West, trans. by A. Wass de
Czege (Astor Park, Florida: Danubian Press, Inc., [not dated]), 17.
107

Sándor Balogh, Separating the Myths and Facts in the History of Transylvania
(Youngston, Ohio: Catholic Publishing Company, [not dated]), 6.
108

Albert Wass de Czege, Documented Facts and Figures on Transylvania
(Astor, Florida: Danubian Press, Inc., 1977), 13.
109

Colin McEvedy, The Penguin Atlas of Ancient History (New York: Penguin
Books, 1967), 67.
110

Sanborn, Transylvania and the Hungarian-Rumanian Problem, 26.
106

the Magyars, Szeklers, and the German settlers or Saxons in Transylvania for common
defense under the King of Hungary. The importance of this union is the inclusion of the
Saxons, who represented a small minority in Transylvania before the fifteenth century.
Their inclusion demonstrates that the Hungarian monarchy sought to unite all ethnic
groups of any importance within the kingdom. Although Hungarian sources from this
time mention Slavic peoples at the realm’s frontiers, only in the twelfth century had the
Vlachs even been mentioned in the early Hungarian chronicles, and then only as a
scattering of shepherds.111 Had the Vlachs been a true population component at this time,
and had their presence in Transylvania held any significance, they would have been
included in the Union of Three Nations. British historian C. A. Macartney’s prolific
accounts of Hungarian history argue that a Saxon presence in the Union of Three Nations
shows that Magyars counted groups with smaller populations among their “nation.”
There were far fewer Germans in Hungary than Magyars and Szeklers.
Count Steven Bethlen argued in The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace that
those Roman colonists who did not evacuate from the colony were exterminated first by
the Huns, then by the Germans, who destroyed all traces of civilization in Dacia.
Magyars as well destroyed indigenous populations they encountered in their nomadic
period, and the Mongols committed the final killings.112 The only people that seemed to
have survived the central Balkans from the time of the barbarian German invasions to the
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Magyar arrival were the Bulgars and the Slovenes. The Avars, Goths, and Huns all
seemed to die off.113 By this thesis, there were no aborigines left in Hungary after the
initial Magyar conquest.114
Hungarian histories claim that the first Vlach migration into Hungary and
Transylvania was due to the Mongol invasion of Europe. Pope Gregory IX in 1234 is
reported to have requested that King Bela IV of Hungary grant “for the sake of God [to
provide] refuge [for] those poor Vlachs,” who were fleeing the Mongols, resulting in the
first political document for the Vlachs in Hungary: the “Silva Vlachorum,” of the mid
thirteenth century.115 The Mongol campaigns of 1241 devastated Hungary, exterminating
much of the population they encountered. In Hungarian historiography, this led to the
first stage of migrations by people such as the Vlachs and Serbs. From the eleventh to
sixteenth centuries, Vatican studies during these times declared that 76 percent of the
population of Transylvania was Magyar.116 In a royal archive of 1358, Transylvania was
claimed to be “the richest part of the Hungarian kingdom” with its Magyar-German
population, although there is some mention of Vlach herdsmen who lived in the
mountains tending their sheep.117 Magyar historians even credit Hungary with creation
of the first Vlach state: King Charles Robert of the Anjou line in 1314 established
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Wallachia, literally “Land of the Vlachs,” after the Mongol extermination of the Cumans
in that area.118
Whatever their origin, the Vlachs remained an impoverished nationality
throughout their history.119 As late as 1910, 72 percent of the population was illiterate,
and most of the Vlach people were peasants or herdsmen.120 Regardless of
circumstances, the Vlachs never integrated with the Magyars. They were considered
thieves and vagabonds by the Magyars, and regarded as an “alien element.”121 The
Rumanians further did not seek assimilation with the Magyars, and remained the
population least linked with the Hungarian monarchy. Hungarians considered the Vlachs
“savages” and on the same social/racial level of the gypsies; a backward people in
comparison to the other races in the kingdom.122
A major thesis among Magyar and most neutral historians is that from the period
of Austrian liberation from the Turks in 1699 to the 1918 dismemberment of the
Hungarian Kingdom, the ethnic settlements of the Transylvanian countryside were
constant: all cultural centers and cities were either purely Magyar, Saxon, or Szekler,
while Vlachs remained simple shepherds outside the cities in the countryside and
mountainous foothills. The small Rumanian villages almost always lay far outside the
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traditional Transylvanian cities.123 Nevertheless, the Rumanians were prolific, and the
1910 census listed 2.8 million Rumanians in Transylvania compared to 1.7 million
Magyars,124 or 55 percent Rumanian, 35 percent Hungarian, and 9 percent German.125

Aspects of Rumanian Historiography
It is rare in the history of a people that so much energy and effort has been made
to back a theory of historical existence and manipulate history to fit facts as the
Rumanians have treated their theory of Daco-Roman continuity. The primary aim of
virtually all Rumanian historiography concerned with Rumanian origins is to establish
the legitimacy of their theoretical Roman origins. A scholarly and well-documented
account that nonetheless fails to successfully defend the Roman prehistory of the early
Vlachs is Nicolae Stoicescu’s Continuity of the Romanian People, published in Bucharest
in 1983. From the outset, the author declares that his purpose is to absolutely maintain
the legitimacy of the Daco-Rumanian theory. 126 The author’s main thesis is that the
Romanization of Dacia did not stop with the withdrawal of the Roman legions.127
Stoicescu suggests that only the “officialdom” of Roman influence was removed from the
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colony, while the bulk of the population–bankers, landowners, tradesmen, etc.,
remained.128 How this civilization survived waves of invading Goths, Avars, and others,
remains unclear in this account. The author is unable to successfully account for the lack
of archaeological evidence of a remnant Dacian civilization, and weakly argues that
archaeology alone cannot discount the Vlach presence of the region during the late
ancient and early medieval period.129 To explain how such a theoretically noble and
civilized people degenerated into a population of simple herdsmen, Stoicescu proposes
that it was exactly because of the invasions of nomadic and other migratory peoples
throughout the centuries of early medieval times that the Vlachs abandoned their
settlements and farms and turned to the mountains and their sheep.130 To explain the lack
of a Vlach presence in the early Transylvanian chronicles Stoicescu claims the
chroniclers only dealt with migratory and nomadic populations and ignored the Vlachs
and their settlements.131
Seton-Watson’s 1934 History of the Roumanians is an interesting account in that
it was the first by a British author to accord a national history of the Rumanian people
and nation, although one highly sympathetic to Bucharest with a continuous anti-German
and anti-Hungarian tone. From the outset, the author supported Daco-Roman continuity,
claiming the “well-marked social and economic structure,” that was Dak society blended
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with the Romans and thereby formed modern Rumanian society.132 The author firmly
attested to the survival of that culture in the face of the waves of invaders, however he
simultaneously admitted that “it is not until the beginning of the thirteenth century that
history breaks its long silence and reveals the existence of a ‘Vlach’ or Roumanian
nation.”133 The author further could not successfully explain the “mysterious silence” of
the Rumanian people for that thousand years, although he proposed as a possible theory
that the Mongol incursion of 1241 may have destroyed any previous records of the
Vlachs.134 Seton-Watson’s summary of the problem between Hungarian and Rumanian
historiography was accurate, however, in that Bucharest’s ultimate goal was to link its
past with Rome while Budapest sought to deny that union.
Ioan Aurel Pop’s Romanians and Romania is a brief yet interesting account for
the average reader of the Rumanian view of its history. At the outset Pop declares that
the popular belief of every schoolchild in Bucharest that they are descended from the
Romans is not far from the truth.135 Although he does not account for the thousand year
silence between the third and thirteenth centuries, Pop argues that the Roman
administration of the Dacian colony, as well as justice, education, and economic models
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survived in Dacia after the Romans withdrew.136 An interesting exception to Pop’s
account, so often missing in Rumanian historiography, is an attempt to explain the
absence of the Vlachs in the Union of Three Nations and the Vlach settlements along the
mountainous fringes of Transylvania far from the Urban centers. Pop claims that the
early Vlachs went to the hills, deep forests, and mountains to flee from extermination by
the Huns, Avars, and early Magyars.137 Indeed, he calls upon an old Rumanian proverb
to this end: “the forest and the Romanian are brothers.”138 Pop’s testimony is a
fascinating exploration of the Rumanian point of view, but as so many other texts, it blurs
the medieval period and archaeological issues that must be addressed in objective
historical analysis.
Stefan Pascu’s A History of Transylvania was published in 1944 in Rumanian as
the first complete history of Transylvania. In an excellent forward, Paul E. Michleson
from Huntington College, contends that the “national historiography of each people . . .
reflects its national experience.”139 Hence, the Rumanian interpretation of the
Transylvanian problem is so concerned to enforce the perspective of a Rumanian-LatinDacian origin in its national historiography. The author contends that “it is on the
historical front that the most ammunition is expended” in such national historiography
and that “the Romanians, a synthesis of the Dacian and Roman peoples, have always
136
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constituted an absolute majority of the Transylvanian population,”140 a statement which is
in violation of established and solid historical tenets regarding population patterns in
medieval and ancient Transylvania.
Pascu insists that “Romanization” of the Dacian region affected the
autochthonous Dak population, resulting in the birth of the Rumanian people and that
during the brief reign of the Romans in Dacia, the population was transformed in the
manner typical of the Roman citizens in the rest of the empire.141 As the Roman troops
withdrew, the Romanized Daks did not abandon their homes and maintained a national
and cultural identity in the face of the centuries of marauding invaders.142 The author
declares that linguistic unity with very little dialectical variation demonstrates a
continuity in the Rumanian people,143 however he does not account for the presence of
Albanian in the language if the population was exclusively indigenous to DaciaTransylvania.
Rumanian author Dumitru Berciu proposes to shed light on the Rumanian
problem by focusing strictly on the Rumanian theory of origins in his 1978 book DacoRomania. The author’s purpose is to demonstrate through cultural, archaeological, and
historical analysis to “prove” the theory that the Rumanians are the autochthonous
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population of Transylvania and directly linked to Rome. The author suggests as
historical fact that the “Romanians are the people of the Carpathians and the lower
Danube, never leaving this homeland during the period of the great migrations.”144
Berciu proposes to demonstrate by archaeological finds that the Dacian inhabitants
survived the Roman withdrawal, but virtually all his examples are before the third
century with a few that date from around the ninth century, of which most are primitive
motifs, some of which are strongly German in design or likewise are dubiously
authentic.145 Hungarian and much neutral historiography contend that the Romans
vacated the colony in a scorched-earth operation. Berciu’s evidence suggests that there
may have been some remnants of the “Romanized Daks” after the withdrawal, but few if
any of his archaeological finds date beyond the period of the Avars who migrated from
Asia in the sixth century and whose khanate remained in power until destroyed by
Charlemagne in 796. Ultimately, Berciu’s argument is the standard Bucharest
interpretation, that “within the framework of Daco-Romania the Romanian people came
into being on the same territory which they occupy today; and from time immemorial this
region, protected and consolidated by the spinal column of the Carpathians, has
developed with unbroken continuity and in perfect unity.”146
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New Trends in the Historiography of Hungary’s Minority Problems
A massive three volume History of Transylvania was written by a board of
Hungarian scholars in the late 1980s and translated into English in 2001. Political
constraints at the time of its writing prevented much historical analysis beyond 1919, but
the set serves as an important facet of Hungarian historiography regarding Transylvania.
Despite the time of its publication in its original 1987 Hungarian language version, the
book is not a Marxist history, and treatments of the topical material are clear and biased
only in the scope that the work is clearly from a Hungarian perspective. Rumanian
arguments such as Daco-Roman continuity are presented and only refuted when they
directly contrast with Hungarian historiography.
Author Endre Tóth in this history predictably resists any lasting Romanization of
Dacia after the Roman withdrawal based on the archaeological perspective and the
conclusion that during the turbulent years following the Roman withdrawal of AD 271,
“Dacia would remain excluded from the Romanized world.”147 The authors maintain that
the early Rumanians in the medieval period confined themselves to the southern
mountainous regions of southern Transylvania in the thirteenth century, and that they
only began to “proliferate” in that region in the fourteenth century, always in the hills and
mountains unoccupied by the prior populations of Transylvania.148
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A chapter in this volume by one Péter Katalin discusses the Rumanian way of life
in the early modern period. Even by the end of the sixteenth century, most Rumanians
still had not achieved a truly settled way of life in Transylvania and remained an ignorant
and superstitious people.149 Indeed, in the early nineteenth century, the authors contend
with supportive evidence from editors of Rumanian newspapers and publications in that
period, that of the 3 million Rumanians in Transylvania, only 10,000 of them were
literate.150 The Daco-Roman theories of the 1791 Supplex Libellus Valachorum fed the
growing Rumanian intelligentsia of the nineteenth century, whose patriotic nationalism
from Wallachia and Moldavia spread across the Hungarian border. The military
authorities in Austria and Hungary looked with disdain on any reference to the DacoRoman theory as a destabilizing element in Transylvania, and indeed by 1848 the
Rumanians in Transylvania began to become vocal in their desire to be led by Wallachia
and Moldavia instead of the Hungarians.151 University students and intelligentsia in
Bucharest, many of whom had been educated in France, began the rampant spread of the
mythical noble Roman origins of the Rumanian people.
If there is any general theme of the “Rumanian question” or ‘Rumanian problem”
in this massive three-volume history, it is that the Rumanians truly had so little historical
influence or impact upon the history, culture, and politics of ancient, medieval, and
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modern Europe, yet had achieved such great political victories in the early twentieth
century. It is rather by omission of any true Rumanian influence in the history of
Transylvania that this book makes it greatest statements against the Rumanian people.
Since the ninth century, Transylvania had remained a Hungarian, and to a lesser extent, a
German issue in the politics of Europe. The Rumanians achieved the great victories of
their state by deception and subterfuge in the twentieth century, especially at the Paris
Peace Conference under their expert propagandistic speaker Ion Bratianu, whose claims
fed into the ignorance of the international delegation at Paris concerning issues of East
Central Europe. Rarely has a people who have contributed so little to European cultural,
political, or social development attained such great achievements in their foreign and
domestic policies as the Rumanians at Trianon in 1920.
The theory of any autochthonous remnants of the old Roman Dacian colony has
been disregarded by most historians based on the thousand-year series of invasions in the
region after the Roman withdrawal in 271 by Germans, Avars, Huns, Magyars, and
Mongols. Lack of any archeological evidence further supports this theory. All urban
centers, even in medieval Hungarian Transylvania, have been composed of Magyars,
Szeklers, and Saxons. This has been abetted by the lack of any Rumanian influence on
the Hungarian language, the absence of Rumanian place-names in Transylvania, and the
lack of a Vlach presence in the thirteenth century “Union of Three Nations,” which
included the small settlements of German Saxons with the Magyar and Szekler majority
in Transylvania.
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Hungarian and pro-Hungarian historiography point out several suppositions that
have generally become more accepted among the historical community than the
arguments made by the Successor States. The Carpathian Basin served not only as a
political boundary, but as a cultural, religious, and economic system for a millennium
that united Slovaks and Ruthenes successfully within the Hungarian Monarchy. The
Czecho-Slovak union had no true historical precedents. Regarding the case of
Yugoslavia, Croats and Slovenes definitely were culturally a more Western folk than the
Orthodox Serbs. Rumanian historiography seems to hold acceptance only among the
political community.
With the end of World War II and throughout much of the Cold War, Hungary
attained an unflattering position for being on the wrong side in both World Wars. Upon
closer examination, however, those arguments so often considered “revisionist” in the
West by Hungary’s diplomats, scholars, and historians have been found to be quite
possibly closer to the truth than the propositions of the “Allied” Successor States,
especially in the history of national minorities. Ultimately, the current map of Europe
demonstrates that the settlements of the Paris Peace Conference has failed to stand the
test of time.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
THE COST OF REVISION: GERMAN-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS, 1938-1944

Resistance to the Trianon Diktat and the common view of the Magyars regarding
the authenticity of their ethnic and other claims against the Successor States led the way
to the achievement of the revisionist movement that began in the late 1930s. Virtually all
Hungarians believed that their cause against the Successor States had been validated by
the Magyar interpretation of the history of East Central Europe and its ethnic problems,
which Magyar historians claimed to be a far more honest assessment of Hungarian
regional history than the arguments presented by the Successor States at Paris in 1919
and throughout the interwar period. The historiographical summations of Hungarian
historians seemed to prove, at least in Magyar historiography, that the crucial ancient,
medieval, and early modern historical analyses backed Hungarian claims to the ethnic
population and the borders of the Kingdom of St. Stephen, so horribly mutilated at
Trianon. From 1938 to 1941, Hungary began to achieve revisionist victories that fulfilled
at least the ethnic demands of the Hungarian government, but such victories irrevocably
tied Hungary to the policies of Nazi Germany.

The Problem of Hungary’s Affiliation with the Axis
Approaching the topic of Hungary’s relations with Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich is
rather problematic in concluding the story of Hungary’s revisionist movement. The era
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of the late interwar and wartime period is certainly the most controversial period in
Hungarian history. The legacy of the Trianon Treaty dominated Hungary’s domestic and
foreign policy, and all aspects of interwar and even wartime Hungarian diplomacy
singularly focused on revising the borders imposed by Trianon. For almost two decades,
Hungary sought a way to regain the Trianon losses, and the nation achieved common
cause with the powers opposed to the Europe of Versailles. Alliance with Italy and Nazi
Germany helped Hungary attain many of its irredentist demands on its neighbors, but
such victories carried a price. Based on its geopolitical position within Germany’s
Balkan network of supplies, Hungary became the unhappy rail-center for the economic
livelihood of the Third Reich. Hitler further brilliantly established a competitive balance
of power between Hungary and its Rumanian enemy, forcing Budapest to everincreasingly align its domestic and foreign policies to German demands lest Rumania
gain Hitler’s favor. The “national malady” that was the “Trianon syndrome” among
interwar and wartime Hungarians began to spiral out of control as Hungary attained its
border revisions from 1938 to 1941. All too soon, it became clear that these victories
could only be maintained by allegiance to the Axis cause, and as World War II
progressed, Hungary found itself once again on the losing side in a World War.
Several questions emerge, however, in a historiographical analysis of the
literature concerning Hungary’s alliance with the Third Reich. Hungary’s lot surely
became tainted in early analysis after World War II. After all, the nation was “Hitler’s
last ally” and the source of one-third of the Third Reich’s oil supply after the defection of
Rumania. Whether Hungary had a choice in this distinction will be assessed. From this

121

follows the thesis and counter-thesis of the “willing” or “unwilling” status of Hungary as
a satellite to Nazi Germany. While one historical school insists that Hungary was
sympathetic not only to Germany, but to National Socialism, another counters that
Hungary used its position alongside the Third Reich only to achieve the territorial
revision of the Trianon Diktat. The latter school proposes that Hungarians opposed the
excesses of National Socialism and suggests as evidence Hungary’s lenient anti-Jewish
policies while Hungary remained a truly independent nation, that is, before the unofficial
German occupation of March 1944.
By examining and contrasting the varying historiography of the subject, a new
interpretation may become evident: that the injustices of Trianon, Hungary’s geopolitical
position in the heart of Europe, and the nation’s unfortunate orientation between the
policies of Nazi Germany and Soviet Bolshevism predestined the nation to its fate in
World War II. There was no other choice for Hungarian policy in World War II.
Hungary’s Regent, Admiral Nicholas Horthy, comments in his memoirs that Hungary
followed a policy alongside Nazi Germany to “gain time” and hopefully somehow
maintain Hungarian independence in the face of the collapsing world order that was Axis
Europe toward the end of the war. In the end, Hungary badly managed its way out of the
war, unlike Finland and Rumania, countries that shared the luxury of the Red Army
approaching their borders. In contrast, Hungary became occupied by Germany six
months before the Russian Front even approached its borders. The German Wehrmacht
defended every inch of Hungarian territory until the very end. Indeed, the last German
offensive of the war, the so-called Battle of Lake Balaton or Operation
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Frühlingserwachen from March 6 to March 16, 1945 was fought on Hungarian territory.
Although some historians may blame the Regent and the Hungarian government for
Hungary’s fate alongside Nazi Germany, this examination will testify that there was little
variation between what could have happened and what truly became the fate of Hungary
in the Second World War. In any event, the history of Hungary’s alignment with the
Third Reich by which it attained its revisionist victories concludes the story of the
Hungarian revisionist movement.

The Failure of the Paris Peace Treaties and the Fall of the Europe of Versailles
It has already been argued that Paris Peace Conference failed to establish a lasting
general European peace. Although the Paris Peace Treaties favored the “victorious”
Successor States of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Poland in a plan for
French security against Germany and maintenance of the cordon sanitaire against
Bolshevik Russia, one by one these dissolved or turned to new masters. Germany
disbanded Czechoslovakia without a shot fired; Poland fell to the Wehrmacht; Rumania
became a German lackey; Yugoslavia nervously sought a precarious neutrality until it too
fell before the German war machine.
Although the military solution sought by Nazi Germany upon its neighbors cannot
ever be excused, many historians have argued that had a balanced solution been imposed
upon the ethnic and other problems of East Central Europe, perhaps World War II could
have been avoided. American author John Flournoy Montgomery in his book Hungary:
the Unwilling Satellite, published in 1947, blames the problems of late interwar Europe
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on the Versailles “blunder” which created a multitude of nation-states instead of a
“Danubian Federation” along the lines of Switzerland, an idea at one time supported even
by American President Woodrow Wilson.1 The so-called “Switzerland-solution” is
indeed supported in much pro-Hungarian historiography for the Transylvanian problem.
Bernard Newman’s book The New Europe, written during the height of the war in 1943
supports the theory that the status quo of the Paris Peace Treaties and French support for
its adherents aggravated the tensions of Europe and were to blame for the calamity that
began for Europe in 1938.2
For Hungary, however, the dissolution of the Little Entente of Czechoslovakia,
Rumania, and Yugoslavia brought the first breathing space for the nation. Hungary had
perceived a constant threat from the Little Entente and despised the French support of
Budapest’s enemies. The Little Entente began to dissolve as a power bloc in the face of
the Sudeten and Vienna agreements of 1938 against Czechoslovakia. Despite French and
British political guarantees to Rumania, Bucharest, fearful of Germany’s rising strength,
soon sought closer relations with Berlin instead of Paris.3 With the final dissolution of
the Czechoslovak state in 1939, Little Entente unity disintegrated and France’s solution
for a permanent European peace was destroyed.

1

John Flournoy Montgomery, Hungary: the Unwilling Satellite (New York: the
Devin-Adair Company, 1947), 215.
2

Bernard Newman, The New Europe (New York: The MacMillan Company,
1943), 239.
3

Ibid., 240.
124

Nicholas Kállay was Prime Minister of Hungary from 1942 to 1944, and his
memoirs Hungarian Premier are a powerful representation of much interwar and wartime
sentiment among the Magyars. Kállay admits that since 1920, revisionism had been the
singular goal of the Hungarian nation. This differed slightly between the generations, for
only the older veterans and contemporaries of the Great War desired restitution of the
entire 1914 frontier, but even the younger students and intelligentsia demanded that at
least the Magyar-inhabited lands should be reunited with the kingdom.4
With the assistance of Germany in the 1938-1941 period, Hungary recovered
most of the lands inhabited by Magyar minorities, but at a price. Since Germany was the
primary architect of these territorial awards, Kállay asserts that the territorial victories
cost Hungary its political freedom of action and irrevocably aligned Hungary with the
Axis powers.5 After the Vienna Award of 1938 which returned southern Slovakia to
Hungary, Hungary felt obliged to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact on 24 February 1939.
With the Second Vienna Award of 1940 and the return of the northern two-fifths of
Transylvania to Hungary, Budapest signed the Tripartite Pact on 20 November 1940.6
Hungary’s revisionist victories drastically increased the nation’s dependence on
Germany.
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Hungary’s Revisionist Dilemma
Historian Thomas Sakmyster has written several important histories of the
Hungarian revisionist period from a neutral perspective. Sakmyster argues in his book
Hungary, the Great Powers, and the Danubian Crisis, published in 1980, that the date of
the First Vienna Award of 2 November 1938 is a clear dividing line in the history of the
Hungarian revisionist movement. Hungary received in that award 4,900 square miles of
Slovak territory with a population of 1,030,000 consisting of 830,000 Magyars, 140,000
Slovaks, 20,000 Germans, and 40,000 Ruthenes.7 With the Vienna Award Hungary
attained its first revisionist victory. This date also serves as Hungary’s first formal step
to the Axis cause. Although Sakmyster criticizes that Hungary had chosen a course of
diplomatic action that would one day be regarded as “unflattering” for Budapest,
Sakmyster admits that Hungary could hardly have won its case with the Western powers,
and even less with the League of Nations, all which seemed to support the status quo of
Versailles and the political bloc of the Little Entente. Sakmyster reminds the reader that
Hungary’s geopolitical position in the heart of Europe compromised the nation’s options,
for Hungary’s only friendly border in 1938 was with the Third Reich after Germany’s
annexation of Austria.8 Sakmyster opposes the hypothesis of Hungarian neutrality in the
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manner of Switzerland based on this proposition, and reminds the reader that willing or
not, Hungary was the center of the Third Reich’s rail system to its region of supplies.9
Sakmyster is the first historian to propose the thesis of Hungary’s “revisionist
dilemma” that stemmed from Trianon and prevented the nation from acting sensibly in
the late interwar period.10 Sakmyster asserts that Hungarians felt that without the
“natural” Carpathian boundaries of the Hungarian Kingdom, the nation could not fulfill
its “cultural mission” as the “defender of the West” and maintain the “benevolent”
nationalization of “backwards” minorities such as the Rumanians, Slovaks, and South
Slavs from “semi-oriental” conditions.11 Sakmyster argues that this arrogant national
philosophy transcended class boundaries and united the nation in almost unanimous
solidarity.12
Charles Wojatsek’s From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award, published
in 1980, continues the argument of how geopolitics affected Hungary’s revisionist
scenario. The Wojatsek thesis is that Hungary’s very internal and foreign policies were
dictated by the nation’s geopolitical position in Europe. Hungary felt very isolated by the
Little Entente, with its 540,000 soldiers compared to the Hungarian army of only 35,000.
France directly supported the policies of the Little Entente, and Hungary felt that France
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was the conscience of the West, the very architect of Versailles and the status quo that
Hungary so dearly hated.
Wojatsek attempts in this book to illustrate the benevolence of Hungarian foreign
policy in contrast to the militaristic expansionist nature of Hitler’s Third Reich. Hitler
had hoped to implement “Operation Green” against Czechoslovakia sometime in 1938, in
which a Hungarian invasion of Slovakia would draw away Czech reserves as the German
Wehrmacht shattered the Czech defenses in the West and completed the military
conquest of the Czech state. Wojatsek urges that historians must realize Hungary’s
“benevolence” in refusing this militaristic option, even when Hitler offered Hungary all
of Slovakia. The author argues that the solution of the First Vienna Award and the
Hungarian reclamation of only the Magyar districts of Slovakia proved Hungary’s
commitment to peaceful negotiation instead of warlike aggression.13 The author does
hint, however, that Hungary may have feared a Yugoslav-Rumanian strike in southern
Hungary if Budapest moved against one member of the Little Entente.14
Edward Chászar’s Decision in Vienna is a good supplement to Wojatsek’s
treatment of the Hungarian-Czechoslovak problem. The author’s thesis is that the
Europe of Versailles was a “period of false stability” in Europe, in which the League of
Nations and its Western supporters sought to enforce a permanent peace upon Europe.15
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He proposes that France was the leader of that peace, which supported the Little Entente
not only to curtail Germany but also to stifle Hungarian irredentism, since the nations of
the Little Entente had been formed with huge portions of territory historically part of the
Hungarian Kingdom.16 Chászar supports the thesis that the First Vienna Award is a good
dividing point in Hungarian historiography, for with the resolution of the Czechoslovak
crisis of 1938, Germany began to eclipse France as the dominant power of the
continent.17
It is interesting to note that both Hungary and Czechoslovakia asked Germany
and Italy to arbitrate their dispute and not the Western powers. This remains an area of
interest not really addressed in the historiography of the region. Chászar proposes that
Germany and Italy were only too happy to negotiate the award, which would show the
world that Franco-British leadership in the affairs of Central Europe had dissolved.18
Chászar explains that unlike Trianon, the First Vienna Award was based on ethnicity,
whereas Trianon’s economic and strategic considerations often worked against Hungary,
as in the case of the cession of Ruthenia to the Czechs to facilitate a railway between
Czechoslovakia and Rumania.19 With the victory of the First Vienna Award of 1938,
Hungarians felt that the era of Trianon had ended and a new order for Europe was about
to begin. It was, in fact, the beginning of the end for the Hungarian Kingdom.
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Assessment of the Horthy Regime
Interpretations of the regime of Regent Admiral Nicholas Horthy are central to
any analysis of the Hungarian revisionist movement, for his regime had become the very
symbol of revisionist Hungary for many Hungarians, especially those with patriotic (and
generally somewhat right-wing) tendencies. The Horthy era in Hungary is often
synonymously associated with the Nazi era in Germany, but such a consideration is a
gross exaggeration of the realities of late interwar and wartime Hungary. Horthy’s
regime was characterized by a general patriotic reaction by many Hungarians, especially
as the lost territories began to be reclaimed, but his regime lacked the malevolence
associated with German National Socialism.
Author Miklós Molnár in A Concise History of Hungary, published in 1996, links
the revisionist victories that patriotic Hungarians invoked in Horthy’s name to the actual
fall of Hungary in World War II. Molnár groups interwar Hungary into three periods:
one of national consolidation after the Trianon calamity under Prime Minister István
Bethlen (1921-1931), the gradual slide to alliance with Germany in the later 1930s, and
the “fatal spiral” after 1938, in which revisionist policy tied Hungary irrevocably to the
Third Reich.20 Molnár assesses Horthy’s regime as controversial, and directly blames the
Regent for Hungary’s fall in World War II: “[Horthy] carries the responsibility for what
can only be described as a massive failure.”21
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Stephen Sisa’s rather patriotic Spirit of Hungary represents the sympathetic
assessment of the Horthy regime. Sisa portrays the Regency as a “semi-feudal
autocracy,” and in no way “fascist,” “semi-fascist,” or an “anti-Semitic dictatorship.”22
Sisa explains that the philosophical basis for Horthy’s rule was based upon the right-wing
dogma of “Hungarism,” which itself was based upon an early counter-revolutionary
movement called the “Szeged Idea” (a szegedi gondolat) which favored Magyar
domination of Danubian and Carpathian Europe. Although a movement of the political
right, it differed from National Socialism in that it had no pathological anti-Semitism in
its dogma, even in its more extreme form in Ferenc Szálasi’s Arrow Cross party. In
Sisa’s interpretation, Horthy was no hero, but neither was he a villain. He quotes
American Ambassador Nicholas Roosevelt: “[men] might question his judgement, but
none questioned his integrity and uprightness.”23
Historian John Montgomery occupies the position in Hungarian historiography of
the “interested and somewhat sympathetic neutral” in Hungary: The Unwilling Satellite,
published in 1947. United States Minister to Hungary from 1933 to 1941, Montgomery
witnessed first-hand the problematic years of late interwar Hungary. Montgomery
declares that the main purpose of his book is to explain to the West what had been in his
day considered the “Nazification” of Hungary that began in the late interwar period, a
process that he urges was not understood by his contemporaries.24 Montgomery seeks to
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clear the Regency of wartime guilt and to defend the position that Hungary was not
responsible for the calamity that descended upon the nation with allegiance to Nazi
Germany and belligerence in World War II. The Montgomery thesis is that in no way
was the Regency a “fascist” power during the war. Montgomery proposes that Regent
Horthy was a man of good integrity whose “rash decisions” resulted from the national
obsession to reclaim the lost territories.25 To support this argument, Montgomery reports
that in 1938 Ferenc Szálasi and his ultra-right Arrow Cross Party formally protested and
led demonstrations against Horthy’s lack of support for the extreme Hungarian right
wing.26
The 1954 memoirs of Nicholas Kállay in Hungarian Premier continues the
positive assessment of the Horthy regime. Kállay maintains the integrity of the Regency:
“Horthy was no dictator, only a restorer of order and authority. It was he who gave
liberty back to our people after the Communist terror of 1918 and the ensuing Rumanian
occupation.”27 Further, Kállay adds “there has hardly been a period in the thousand years
of our history in which our country developed so vigorously, and labored and created
with such rich results, as in the course of the twenty-five years under Horthy . . . it was
under his rule that the nation found the means, the possibilities, the tranquility, and the
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faith necessary for such a regeneration.”28 He concludes that “during the war, Hungary
was an island of individual liberty and humanity in the Nazi sea.”29
Perhaps that most valuable and objective summation of the Horthy regime in
recent years is Thomas Sakmyster’s extensive Hungary’s Admiral on Horseback,
published in 1994. Sakmyster has a rather mixed appraisal of Horthy. Sakmyster
concurs with nationalist Hungarians that the Regency was one of honor and loyalty, even
if with the wrong powers. As the Russians advanced deep into Hungary in 1944, Horthy
refused to declare war on Germany, even when it served Hungary’s interest, based on the
Regent’s principals that Hungary had never attacked an ally in its history.30 Sakmyster
asserts that Horthy badly managed Hungary’s attempt to get out of the war, however. He
blames Horthy’s personal ineptitude in diplomacy for Hungary’s predicament, unlike
Rumania, which managed to change sides, and Finland, which managed to escape
occupation by the Red Army.31
Sakmyster’s assesses the Regent as naive and gullible, and poses the question in
his interpretation “how could such a person achieve lasting political success?”32
Sakmyster claims that many paradoxes characterized Horthy’s reign. Horthy had no
belief in democracy, and scorned such nations as Greece where “the votes of two idiots
28
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count for more than one wise man.”33 Horthy’s rule offered certain assurances, however,
for many Hungarians. Patriots flocked to him and he seemed to be the person who could
restore the nation's honor and frontiers.34 Despite his flaws, Sakmyster claims that there
was a certain benevolence in Horthy’s rule of Hungary, and his Hungary was an island
“where a semblance of the rule of law and a pluralistic society had been preserved in a
sea of barbarism.”35 Though he did not share their views, the adherents of democracy,
liberalism, and parliamentary government and social reform could live and exist in his
Hungary, or at least maintain a precarious foothold there.36 Ultimately, as Sakmyster
points out, only a man of extraordinary ability could have saved Hungary in World War
II, and such a man was not Horthy.
General editor of the 1998 essay compilation Hungary in the Age of Total War,
historian Nándor Dreisziger, offers some interesting perspectives on the Regent in
Hungary’s role in World War II in an essay entitled “Miklós Horthy and the Second
World War.” The author concurs that Horthy was “one of the most controversial
statesmen in modern Hungarian history.”37 Dreisziger’s major criticism is that he
personally blames Horthy and the Regency for Hungary’s role and fate in World War II.
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This counters the Montgomery thesis in Hungary the Unwilling Satellite, which
sympathizes with Horthy and blames Hungary’s predicament on the Paris Peace
Treaties.38 Dreisziger does support, however, that even though Horthy possessed
substantial power as head of the Hungarian state, he never used it to “enhance his
personal influence.”39 Dreisziger cites historian István Deák that “[Horthy] was no
democrat but never tried to be a dictator.”40 Further, it is to the Regent’s credit that he
did not participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, despite the opportunity to win
Slovakia in its entirety.41 Dreisziger urges that Horthy further opposed any kind of
radicalism, although he hated and feared Communism above all else.42
A more recent and important interpretation of the Horthy regime is István Deák’s
article “Admiral and Regent Miklós Horthy: Some Thoughts on a Controversial
Statesman.” The author’s purpose is to clarify the interpretation of the Regency without
sentiment. Although Deák does not condemn Horthy, neither does he sympathize with
the Regent. Deák stresses that Horthy sought above all else to emulate the regime of his
beloved Emperor Franz Joseph in a “noble, chivalrous, and humane” manner. Deák
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claims that in the Horthy regime, terror sometimes prevailed and more than half of
Hungary’s Jews were deported to Auschwitz.43 After the fall of Béla Kun’s Soviet
regime in 1919, Deák claims that Horthy’s officers brought a murderous reign of “White
Terror” against Jews and anybody that opposed the counterrevolution, circumstances
denied in Horthy’s memoirs.44
With the end of the Regency, Hungary was destroyed. Deák proposes that
Horthy’s personal responsibility for this fiasco is still in debate. The Regent was wellliked in Hungary, with resistance only from the extreme political left and right.45 As a
ruler, Deák portrays Horthy as more extreme than the standard Western constitutional
monarch, but still less the dictator that enemies of his reign portray.46 The press was
relatively free in his reign, and the courts were independent, at least until German
interference with Hungarian politics became more direct.47
Regarding the personal relationship between Horthy and Hitler, Deák claims that
Horthy greatly admired the capabilities of the Wehrmacht, but had a cautious relationship
with Hitler, mostly due to the Regent’s distaste for the “fascist mob” that was the rightwing Arrow Cross Party in Hungary.48 Deák proposes that Horthy’s strong objection to
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Bolshevik Communism favored a swift German conquest of the Soviet Union in 1941.
With Slovakian, Rumanian, and Croatian participation on the Eastern Front, however,
Deák argues that it would have been difficult for Hungary to maintain any true neutrality
in the war with Russia.49 In the end, it is generally agreed by most historians that Horthy
badly managed Hungary’s attempt to leave the war. Deák offers a new proposition to
Hungarian historiography regarding that scenario: unlike Rumania, whose officer corps
was loyal to the King, Deák claims that the Hungarian officer corps was strongly proGerman to the point of disloyalty to the Regent.50 Horthy could not effectively negotiate
a surrender when his army refused to comply.
Deák’s final analysis summarizes the principal aspects of Horthy’s Regency.
Deák claims that in retrospect, Horthy’s regime basically “failed” on all levels in World
War II.51 It did not preserve the regained territories, the country was destroyed, political
continuity was lost to the Russians, and half a million of its Jews were exterminated
(some of which were the nation’s most productive workers). Still, Deák proposes that no
other regime or government could probably have achieved different results.52 The fate of
the smaller nations of Europe in World War II “depended on luck, geography, and great
power politics.”53 Horthy seems to be a rather bland, middle of the road politician in any
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retrospect: “He was neither a fascist nor a liberal; he was not a monster, but he was not a
humanitarian either. He was no democrat but never tried to be a dictator. . . Miklós
Horthy deserved both to be rewarded and to be punished severely after the war. He
might even merit a little sympathy, but he does not deserve admiration.”54

The Path to the Axis: Interpretations of Hungary’s Alliance with Germany
The roots and evolution of Hungary’s relationship with Nazi Germany have
generated a considerable debate in the historiography of the Hungarian revisionist
movement. Since Hungary recovered most of the major Magyar-inhabited territories of
the Successor States with the aid of Germany and, to a lesser extent, Italy, the
development of that relationship has generated considerable contrasting arguments
among historians of wartime Hungary. A good introduction to the more patriotic
Hungarian perspective is Stephen Sisa’s analysis of the German-Hungarian relationship
in The Spirit of Hungary. Although Sisa’s presentation is not exactly propagandistic, he
does approach the topic rather apologetically. The Sisa thesis is that fear of Bolshevik
Russia was the major catalyst in Hungarian foreign policy by which Hungary found
common cause with Germany and Italy. Hungarians were terrified of Soviet
Communism and were eager to join a political cause dedicated to its containment. Sisa
argues that the turning point in Hungarian policy, however, occurred with the fall of the
Western Allies in 1940. The weakness of the West and the strength of the German war
machine greatly influenced the Hungarian government to adopt a pro-German policy. It
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seemed that Germany had indeed won the war, and most Hungarians were only too eager
to attach themselves to the victorious cause of their ally from the Great War.55
The issue of Hungarian “honor” is invoked by many Hungarian historians, and
many neutral historians such as C. A. Macartney, John Flournoy Montgomery, and
Thomas Sakmyster have tended to support many aspects of Hungarian policy. Sisa’s
main argument to this point concerns Hungary’s decisions during the 1938 Czechoslovak
crisis. Sisa contends that Hungary’s refusal to participate in a military solution to the
Czech state demonstrated Hungary’s commitment to peace. Even when all of Slovakia,
which had historically been part of the Kingdom of St. Stephen, had been offered the
Hungarians, Budapest opted for the much less radical Vienna Award of 1938 and claimed
only the Magyar districts of southern Slovakia.56
Sisa further cites Hungarian “honor” in the nation’s response to the Russian peace
proposals of 1944, as the Red Army swept across Transylvania and entered the
Hungarian Great Plain. Horthy and the Hungarian government refused the Russian
negotiations which stipulated that Hungary declare war upon Germany as conditional to
Soviet peace terms. Horthy refused based on Hungary’s “honor” in never in its
thousand-year history having declared war upon or otherwise turned against an ally.57
This argument is difficult to maintain in the face of Hungary’s participation in the 1941
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Axis invasion of Yugoslavia despite a treaty of “eternal friendship” with that nation.
Sisa’s explanation of the Yugoslav fiasco is the standard “official” argument among
patriotic Hungarians: that Croatia’s declaration of independence from the Yugoslav union
nullified Hungary’s treaty since Yugoslavia was no longer truly a sovereign state, and
Hungary only entered territory possessed by the Hungarian Kingdom of 1914.58
A further examination of the Hungarian perspective is historian Gabor Baross’s
Hungary and Hitler, a 1970 tract from Astor Florida’s Cold War right-wing Danubian
Press which published many propagandistic texts in the late Cold War period circa 19701985. Although the scholarship of such texts may be doubted, they are important to
illustrate the primary nationalistic arguments from the school of patriotic Hungarian
authors who left Hungary in 1945 or 1956. Baross’s purpose in Hungary and Hitler is to
establish a “scientific study” for historians to explain Hungary’s position alongside
Germany in World War II.59 The thesis of the book is that circumstances beyond
Hungary’s control pushed the nation into the German orbit in World War II. Since
Hungary lay between the encroaching forces of Germany and Russia in the interwar
period, Hungarian foreign policy had to adjust accordingly. Fear of Bolshevik Russia
and the solidarity of the Little Entente oriented Hungary from the start toward Germany,
a step which was further accentuated by German domination of the Hungarian economy.
Baross stresses that Hungary was not prepared, however, for the alarming progression of
events that began in 1938. Baross proposes that the German annexation of Austria, the
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Sudeten agreement, Hungary’s attainment of southern Slovakia through the First Vienna
Award, and the decline of the Little Entente happened so quickly as to amaze most
people in Budapest.60 Even the more reasonable and pro-Western Premier Count Pál
Teleki perceived the West as weak, and the German military victories of 1940 seemed to
prove that Germany was unstoppable.61
Regent Horthy’s memoirs further clarify the Hungarian position of the
relationship between the revisionist movement and the alliance with Germany. Horthy
asserts that “we desired revision, yes, but revision by peaceful means,” such as the
refusal of Plan Green and the option for the Vienna Award of 1938.62 Horthy supports
the thesis of the Vienna Award of 1938 as the dividing line in the Hungarian revisionist
movement. With the 1938 Vienna Award, Horthy asserts that many Hungarians became
increasingly pro-German, for it appeared that Germany was returning lands which had
been taken from Hungary by the West in the Great War.63 Horthy maintains, however,
that although he and most Hungarians were friends of “Germany,” they were not
necessarily friends of the “Third Reich,” whose Nazi “pseudo-philosophy” the Regent
considered “repugnant.”64
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The Second Vienna Award of 1940 which returned the northern two-fifths of
Hungary becomes more problematic in interpretation, however. Hungarians were
delighted with the return of the predominantly Magyar districts of Transylvania and the
return of the Szekler region to Hungary. Regent Horthy personally rode his famous white
stallion in triumph into Kolozsvár (Rumanian Cluj), the ancient capital of Hungarian
Transylvania. The award never truly satisfied Hungarian demands, however, and the
Rumanians were downright incensed, having already ceded territory to Russia and
Bulgaria. Horthy proposes a thesis in his 1957 memoirs that has become an interesting
consideration in the historiography of the period–that the very purpose of the award was
to satisfy neither Hungary nor Rumania, thereby establishing a competitive balance of
power in the region. Horthy claims that only Ciano and Ribbentrop, the architects of the
settlement, were satisfied at Vienna in August 1940. Thus emerges the thesis that
Germany established a rivalry between Budapest and Bucharest in which both nations
would vie for the Führer’s graces, in the hopes that the rest of Transylvania would be
returned to the power that followed Germany to the “final victory.”65 Although the
important historian of Hungary C. A. Macartney in his extensive October Fifteenth
counters that such inner purposes were absent from the award’s construction,66 it is clear
that the effect did indeed stabilize Hitler’s volatile southern flank for the imminent
invasion of Russia. Soon Hungary became forced to follow Rumania’s example in

65

Ibid., 180.

66

C. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary, 19291944, vol.1 (Edinburgh: At the University Press, 1961), 425.
142

participation in the Russian campaign, in stricter economic alignment with Germany, and
in the declaration of war against the United States.
Just as the Regent expressed the distaste for National Socialism among many
Hungarians, former Hungarian Premier Miklós Kállay argues in his memoirs that
Hungary was not the “willing last ally” of Nazi Germany in World War II that had found
ground in the West in immediate retrospection of the war. Kállay urges that Hungary did
not throw itself into Germany’s arms, but followed a policy of “hesitation and intricate
maneuverings” with Germany in order to resist too close an association with Berlin.67
Kállay insists that Hungary’s close relations with Germany were not only logical but
necessary, for Western support for the Little Entente and the status quo dictated that
Hungary seek allies elsewhere. Since Hungary’s enemies enjoyed close friendship with
the West, it was difficult for Budapest to establish a working rapport with the Western
nations.68
Thomas Sakmyster’s Hungary’s Admiral on Horseback is probably the clearest
critical analysis of the German-Hungarian wartime relationship. Sakmyster supports the
thesis that Hungary had little time to adjust its internal and external policies to the rapid
European developments in 1938 and 1939 regarding Czechoslovakia.69 Most people in
Budapest perceived that Soviet Russia, not Nazi Germany, was the greatest threat to
world peace. Sakmyster’s thesis is that Hungary’s quest for revision eventually spiraled
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out of control and resulted in the fatal repercussions of Budapest’s alliance with
Germany. Had Hungary maintained its senses before it invaded Yugoslavia, the nation
may have found some Western support for revision. Even Britain initially supported
some of Hungary’s claims. Sakmyster quotes Winston Churchill on 6 September 1940 in
the House of Commons: “Personally, I have never been happy about the way Hungary
was treated after the last war.”70 All too soon, Hungary’s ties to the Axis became
irrevocable, and it became clear to many in Hungary, including the Regent, that Hungary
would be unable to maintain its extended borders if Germany lost the European war.71
Sakmyster proposes that the core problem of the Hungarian “revisionist dilemma”
specifically followed the Second Vienna Award. With return of the Magyar regions of
Transylvania, the Hungarian population became ecstatic to get the rest of the lost
territories, and even Regent Horthy could show little self-restraint. Sakmyster asserts
that for any of the revisionist victories to be lasting, Hungary would have needed the
benevolent neutrality of the West, a thesis that exactly corresponded with Hungary’s
clear-thinking Premier Pál Teleki.
Sakmyster proposes an alternate thesis regarding the Second Vienna Award,
however, that differs from the general historiography of the period. Sakmyster argues
that the Second Vienna Award was neither a benevolent act to Hungary nor the
competitive power balancing act many historians propose. He interprets the award as a
military maneuver by Hitler and the German high command against a potential Russian
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invasion of the Balkans. As the Russians demanded Bessarabia and northern Bukovina
from Rumania and Bulgaria pressed for southern Dobrudja, Hungary planned an invasion
of Rumania in the summer of 1940. As Hitler nervously pondered the diplomatic
situation on his southern flank, he feared the worst: that a conflict in Rumania would
have precipitated in a Russian advance in the Balkans, possibly all the way to the Turkish
straits.72 Thus, the Sakmyster thesis regarding the Second Vienna Award is that it was a
German act to safeguard Rumanian oil and other vital supplies in the region for the Third
Reich and to prevent a potential Russian military move in the Balkans.73 Bernard
Newman’s New Europe, written during the war, summarizes the situation after the award.
Although Hungary received 17,500 square miles, and a population of 2,370,000, (48
percent Magyar, 43 percent Rumanian, 2.5 percent German, and 6.5 percent other) over
400,000 Magyars remained in Rumania, and both sides committed atrocities against their
remaining minorities.74 Although the Second Vienna Award may have staved off a
military conflict in the region, it truly created only more problems.
Miklós Molnár’s Concise History of Hungary, published in 1996, considers the
Hungarian alliance with the Third Reich to have been suicidal, although in reality, there
probably was no other choice. Molnár concurs that after the Anschluss or annexation of
Austria in which Germany became a direct neighbor to Hungary, there was no real room
for Hungarian politics to maneuver. Now that Hungary shared a common border with
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Germany, many of its internal and foreign policies supported the dictates of Berlin.
Molnár argues that Hungary’s reputation was stained in retrospect by Hungary’s grant of
military transit rights to Germany in 1940, and Hungary was the first nation among the
Axis minor satellites to join the Tripartite Pact. Molnár argues that even Prime Minister
Pál Teleki, so often historiographically regarded as an honorable gentleman, sought to
strengthen Hungary’s ties with Germany, for Teleki knew that by this point the
revisionist movement could not be successfully continued and maintained without ties to
Germany.75
In the collection of essays Hungary in the Age of Total War, general editor
Nándor Dreisziger declares that there is a discernable path that drew Hungary to the Axis
orbit before 1941.76 Resentment of Trianon, hatred of Communism, the legacy of the
military comradeship of arms in the Great War, “force of past association,” and the
geopolitical threat of the Little Entente all pushed Hungary firmly into the German
orbit.77 This German orientation had a price, however, as the author declares that “For
every act of German help Budapest had to make political and economic concessions to
the Reich.”78 The author maintains that the Second Vienna Award in particular was a
“concession by the Axis leaders to Hungary that signaled the reduction of Hungary to the
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status of an Axis puppet state.”79 Germany and Italy supported Hungary’s case against
Rumania for revision, but as author István Mócsy declares in his article “Hungary’s
Failed Strategic Surrender,” Axis support directly “endangered Hungary’s
independence.”80 Mócsy also claims that Britain seemed so distant and France so easily
defeated that with the Second Vienna Award, Hungary was pulled away from any
potential for neutrality. The price was high, however, for the award pushed Hungary into
signing the Tripartite Pact and allowed Germany complete military transit rights in its
preparation for the invasion of the Soviet Union.81
As Hungary entered the war in 1941, Dreisziger declares that Hungary’s
international situation based on its foreign policy greatly deteriorated with the nation’s
military moves against Yugoslavia and Russia.82 Several different schools of
historiography based on the 1941 blunders become apparent. There will always be an
interpretation that Hungary’s interwar policy did not predestine its alignment with Nazi
Germany, however, an important school of historiography insists that Hungary’s
revisionist and “fascist” goals made the events of 1941 unavoidable.83 Another thesis is
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that the Vienna Awards were the cause of Hungary’s entanglement with the Axis.84 The
price of the First Vienna Award was closer alignment to Germany, and Germany’s
military successes distanced Hungarian public opinion from Britain. All historians seem
to agree, however, that 1941 became the low point of Hungary’s foreign policy in the
wartime period.85 Dreisziger declares that some historians argue that Hungary created its
greatest errors–war with Yugoslavia and Russia–and learned the mistakes of that policy
in the same year.
Sakmyster’s Hungary, the Great Powers and the Danubian Crisis firmly states
that despite constant denials to the contrary in pro-Hungarian historiography, Hungary
was indeed a nation friendly to National Socialism.86 Sakmyster’s thesis is that all too
often, the “Hungarian question” was tied to the “German question”– that all too often
Hungary supported the internal and foreign policies of the Third Reich, at least in the
1938-1942 period. Sakmyster presents the example that Hungary was the first nation to
congratulate Hitler’s annexation of Austria as an event which happened “without the loss
of blood.”87 Sakmyster does soften his interpretation, however, that Hungary was forced
to choose between the two evils of Fascism and Bolshevism, and that even Britain before
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the war would have considered Communism a greater menace to the world than the
German Nazi regime.88
The alternate perspective becomes the principal thesis of John Montgomery’s
Hungary: The Unwilling Satellite, published in 1947. As the title suggests, Montgomery
believes that Hungary, although indeed an ally of Nazi Germany, was not the willing
participant as Slovakia or Rumania, nations which whole-heartedly embraced Germany’s
fascist internal and foreign policies.89 Montgomery urges that Hungary was not your
average Axis state in the war: it possessed a relatively free press, lenient Jewish policy,
and a Parliament of many political parties.90 In his analysis, Hungary was an island of
relative freedom in Axis Europe. If there is one national fault and singular prejudice
among the Magyars, Montgomery argues it was their immense superiority complex over
the Rumanians, whom they considered an inferior race.91
Montgomery stresses in his analysis that the Hungarian people were not
responsible for what happened to them in World War II. He proposes that Hungary’s
Foreign Minister Kánya well-summarized Hungary’s wartime predicament: “whosoever
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won, Hungary would lose.”92 Hungary supported the German cause because Germany
supported the revisionist movement. France and the Little Entente did not. Britain,
although sympathetic to some of Hungary’s claims, did not actively seek to implement
any territorial changes, and by 1940 could no longer commit any influence to the
continent. Although most Hungarians generally liked the Germans (especially the
Austrians) as a people, Montgomery asserts that most were horrified by the excesses of
National Socialism.93
An interesting and somewhat accusatory testament to historical relations between
the Germans and Hungarians throughout their long historical association is Ivan
Volgyes’s article “The German Question in Hungary.” In Volgyes’s analysis, the
“German question has been one of the continuing problems of Hungarian national
existence.”94 The author argues that the Germans in one form or another, especially in
commerce and economics, have been “inextricably a part of the history of the Hungarian
people.”95 The author points out that in much Hungarian historiography, it was not
forgotten in Hungary that the Habsburgs liberated the Magyars from Turkish rule.
Nineteenth and early twentieth century “German imperialism” further fostered a positive
and approving response from Budapest.96 Thus, Hungary favored Germany and Italy
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over the West, although the author asserts that any actual Western orientation would have
been impossible based on Horthy’s “dictatorship,” and the “undemocratic” outlook of the
interwar Hungarian government. Even if Hungary had become a democracy after World
War I, however, the Entente would still have dismembered Hungary at Trianon, thus
Volgyes urges that any pro-Western Hungarian stance was “doomed by history,
nationalism, and Realpolitik.”97
Regarding the pro-German stance of Horthy’s regime, the author suggests that
alliance between Hitler and Horthy was inevitable because “Horthy’s Hungary had
nowhere else to turn! [italics author’s].”98 Volgyes does not support the Horthy regime,
however, suggesting that “there was a great similarity of values between the Fascist
Hitler and the ‘salon-Fascist’ Horthy, between the racist policies of the Nazi Hitler and
the anti-Semitic, conservative Horthy,” and that this realization must be understood in the
historiographical interpretation of this period.99

Hungary’s Path to the Second World War
Despite attempts by some in the Hungarian government to keep Hungary out of
the war, as Hungary’s association with the Third Reich grew, it became more and more
difficult to keep the nation out of the conflict. Count Pál Teleki, at heart a geographer,
scholar, and quiet gentleman, became Prime Minister of Hungary on 15 February 1939.
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Although a staunch revisionist, Teleki believed that for revision to become lasting,
Western approval would be needed for permanency in Hungary’s revisionist victories.
As war descended upon Europe with the German invasion of Poland, Teleki’s singular
goal was to keep Hungary out of the conflict. With the recovery of southern Slovakia,
Ruthenia, and northern Transylvania, Hungary’s debt to Germany became ever greater,
until Hungary finally militarily joined Germany in the invasions of Yugoslavia and
Russia.
While many sources patriotic to Hungary try to distance the actual cooperation
between Hungary and Germany in the Second World War, it is more probable that most
Hungarians favored close relations with Germany, especially as France fell and Hungary
recovered northern Transylvania in 1940. Both Regent Horthy and Prime Minister
Kállay’s memoirs continually stress that Hungary was basically forced into alliance with
Germany based on geopolitics and competition with Hungary’s Rumanian enemy.
Historian Thomas Sakmyster challenges this notion in his book Hungary’s Admiral on
Horseback. Sakmyster cites a letter from Horthy to Hitler on 28 March 1941, only days
before the German attack on Yugoslavia, that Hungary was “fully and wholly united with
Germany,” and that Hungary would “stand by the German Reich in unalterable loyalty
and to the extent of its strength.”100 With the attack on Yugoslavia, Sakmyster asserts
that the German and Hungarian military commands found a romantic renewal in the old
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“comradeship in arms” that had existed between the Hungarian and German officer corps
in the Great War.101
Regarding Hitler’s war with the Soviet Union, Sakmyster proposes that Horthy
sought to sit back and let Hitler have his swift victory in the East with minimal
Hungarian involvement. Sakmyster does support the thesis of the more patriotic
Hungarian assessments of the campaign, however, in that it soon became evident that
Hungary had to participate in the Russian campaign since Slovakia, Italy, and Rumania
had supported Operation Barbarossa from the outset. By January 1942, it became clear
to all members of the Axis that the Russian campaign was not going to be the swift
“blitzkrieg” style conquest of Germany’s campaigns in the first two years of the war. As
the United States joined the conflict, Britain remained undefeated, and the conflict
escalated to global war, Sakmyster claims that Horthy sought some way of finding peace
with the Western powers while maintaining belligerency on the Eastern Front. To
Horthy’s dismay, all attempts at diplomacy received the same answer from the West: so
long as Hungary supported the war against Russia, Hungary would receive “neither
sympathy nor consideration from the Allies.”102 All too soon, Hungary found itself once
again on the losing side of a global conflict.
Since Hungary became considered an enemy nation to the West as an ally of Nazi
Germany in the Second World War, it becomes important in the historiography
sympathetic to Hungary to try somehow to exonerate Hungary’s position as an Axis
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nation in that conflict. Although Regent Horthy’s supposition is fairly predictable, his
thesis regarding Hungary’s impossible diplomatic position alongside Nazi Germany is
quite probably accurate. In his memoirs, Horthy continually tries to draw Hungary away
from responsibility from its belligerency in the conflict. Horthy presents the argument of
Hungary’s diplomatic position regarding the Tripartite Pact: Germany “invited” Hungary
to join the Tripartite Pact, ominously suggesting that if Hungary did not, Rumania would
be granted this “place of honor.”103 Hungary signed the Tripartite Pact on 27 September
1940, according to Horthy in order “to gain time” or at least postpone direct German
interference with Hungarian politics.104
Regarding Hungary’s position in World War II, Horthy explains that “we were
not . . . Germany’s ally by treaty [as in the Great War] - we had been forced against our
will into a war that was waged to further Hitler’s expansionist aims.”105 As Hitler began
to doubt Hungary’s loyalty, in March 1944 he offered Horthy the choice of either direct
cooperation with consolidated German “supervision” or outright occupation as an enemy
nation. Horthy laments “What was I to do?”106 Horthy’s final analysis is that Hungarian
neutrality would have been impossible, for any attempts at neutral solidarity would have
speeded the German occupation that indeed manifested in March 1944.107
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In his 1970 book, Hungary and Hitler, author Gabor Baross greatly supports the
argument of the competitive balance of power that Hitler established between Hungary
and its Rumanian enemy. The Baross thesis is that although Hungary and Rumania were
bitter enemies, both nations were bound to the Axis and the Anti-Comintern Pact, and
Hungary feared to lose German favor to the Rumanians if it did not orient its policy
according to the other members of the Axis.108 Although Baross asserts that most
Hungarians indeed favored the “crusade against Bolshevism,” it was with great hesitation
that Hungary entered war with the West in late 1941. Baross maintains that Hungary
went to war with the United States because of its fear that Rumania would gain German
favor.109 Bernard Newman’s wartime New Europe further clarifies Germany’s
psychological domination of its minor Axis satellites through the threat of the “Red
menace” that was Soviet Russia. Hungary was terrified of Bolshevik Russia, which
Newman explains is the reason for Hungary’s continued belligerency on the Eastern
Front even in the face of the tremendous reversals of Stalingrad in 1942 and Kursk in
1943.110
Historian Mario Fenyo is one of the few authors to detail Hungary’s wartime
position exclusively in Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary, published in 1972. Fenyo concurs
with the general historiography that Hungary was indeed a more reluctant satellite than
Germany’s other minor partners, but in his view, Hungary was still a National Socialist
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“puppet” state, although an ungrateful and unreliable one. As Fenyo explains, Hungary
attained all its revisionist victories with the aid of National Socialism.111 Fenyo agrees
with the thesis that Hitler successfully manipulated his minor allies to further his aims in
the war effort. Hungary feared Slovakian and Rumanian enthusiasm for the “crusade
against Bolshevism,” and continued its (unenthusiastic) support of materiel and
manpower for the war in the east to maintain German favor.112 The campaign in Russia,
however, manifested in the realization of Hungary’s greatest prewar fears: war with
Britain and the United States. Britain declared war upon Hungary, Finland, and Rumania
on 7 December 1941, and despite Hungary’s cordial official relations with the United
States, Hungary felt compelled at this time to announce the existence of “a state of war
with” the United States.113 Fenyo concurs with the general historiography that the
Hungarian state of war with America was influenced by the fact that Rumania and
Bulgaria had already declared war, but in reality, he claims that by this time the minor
Axis allies were “puppets of Hitler and had merely jumped when the strings were
pulled.”114
An important facet of much of the historiography favorable to Hungary asserts
that since the Trianon Treaty had left Hungary bereft of minerals and raw materials,
Hungary was forced into economic cooperation with its fascist neighbors. Fenyo
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dedicates significant analysis to Hungary’s economic relationship to the Third Reich.
Although Hungary “contributed less than half of what she might have contributed to the
German armaments program,” Hungary was nonetheless tightly tied economically to the
Third Reich.115 Revisionist historiography claims that Hungary was helpless in the
economic predicament of German domination of its markets which thereby caused such
tight alignment with the Third Reich. Fenyo counters this thesis, and argues that
“Hungarian trade with Germany is insufficient by itself, to explain the pro-German
orientation of Hungarian foreign policy.”116
In retrospect of World War II, Prime Minister Kállay proclaims that Hungary’s
declaration of war upon the United States was “the gravest error committed by the
government.”117 Although it was probably impossible for Hungary to have avoided
severing ties with the United States, Kállay declares that the state of war could have been
avoided, which directly counters the Regent’s and other patriotic interpretations. While
Kállay asserts that the war with the West was avoidable, war with Russia was not: “The
Hungarian people feared the Soviet Union both as Russians, and even more, as
Bolsheviks.”118 Kállay maintains that Hungary did not commit itself whole-heartedly to
the campaign in the east, however, and Hitler soon began to pressure the nation with the
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threat that if Hungary did not participate with greater earnest, adjustments to the
Transylvanian frontier favorable to Rumania could result.119 It is clear, then, the
territorial awards checkmated Hungary’s internal and external politics as a lackey of
Germany: if Hungary did not send troops to the front, Kállay asserts that Germany would
have occupied the country, and if Germany won the war in the east and Hungary had
maintained neutral solidarity, the country would have been occupied as an enemy nation
or likewise have lost its independence.120 Once again, Hungary was checkmated in its
available options.
Editor Nándor Dreisziger’s collection of essays in Hungary in the Age of Total
War is strictly dedicated to Hungary’s wartime predicament. If there is a general thesis
to the work, it is that had Hungary been non-belligerent in World War II, it is possible
that it could have been spared some of the calamities that descended upon the nation due
to the war, but Hungary’s unfortunate position of being Hitler’s “last ally” forfeited the
nation’s rights.121 The author indeed concurs that Hitler started a “race” between
Hungary and Rumania for “the Führer’s graces” in the Second Vienna Award by which
Germany exploited these nations for the next four years.122 Ultimately, however,
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Hungary’s collaboration with Germany ruined Hungary’s reputation among the Western
Allies in World War II.123
The author presents a perspective regarding Hungary’s belligerency in the war in
Russia that must be considered, however. Hungary had to make a quick decision in the
Summer of 1941 as Germany invaded the Soviet Union, for most Hungarians in 1941
believed that Russia would imminently collapse.124 If Hungary did not closely adhere to
Axis policy, its independence could have been endangered. Many historians have
discussed the issue of Hungary’s position in October 1944 regarding armistice with
Russia. Among all analyses, historian István Mócsy’s thesis in “Hungary’s Failed
Strategic Surrender” is probably the most accurate. Mócsy declares that the members of
the Axis alliance were only able to surrender when the front line reached them, as in the
case of Rumania and Finland.125 Since Germany in 1944 had already committed
excessive reserves to the defense of Hungarian territory, Hungary did not have the luxury
of Finland (which had a minimum of German troops in the country) to successfully
negotiate an armistice.
It is indeed for the sake of “honor” that patriotic Hungarian authors argue that
Hungary stayed with the Axis alliance even as the Red Army began its invasion of
eastern Europe and the Balkans. Baross expresses the typical Hungarian view in that
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Hungary “honorably” stood by Germany as the Russians approached, unlike Rumania,
which changed sides as soon as the Red Army approached its frontiers.126 Sisa continues
with the ever-present Magyar thesis that never in its thousand-year history had Hungary
ever betrayed an ally, therefore it was impossible for Hungary to turn against Germany in
the war. In actuality, Hungarian support for the war had always been rather lukewarm,
unlike the enthusiastic Rumanian support for Germany and the war that began with the
regime of General Ion Antonescu in Bucharest following the abdication of King Carol II
in September 1940. Sisa cites German General Erich von Manstein’s memoirs: “the
Rumanians were our best allies, whereas we more or less forced the Hungarians into the
war.”127
Although the question of Hungarian guilt in the Second World War rages back
and forth between historians in retrospect, it is quite clear that Hungary faced a lack of
available options in its diplomacy during the Second World War. Germany’s
overwhelming victories in Poland and the West amazed most Hungarians, and in
actuality, many Hungarians favored Germany as a neighbor and an ally. Although the
official Hungarian argument strives for the contrary, it was with enthusiasm that many
Hungarians initially greeted Hitler’s campaign in Russia. The stain of German
affiliation, however, was too great for the realists in Budapest such as Prime Minister Pál
Teleki. Although Teleki greatly supported the border revisions of 1938 and 1940, he
knew that the West was not truly defeated so long as Britain endured with the tacit
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support of the United States. With the Hungarian support for the invasion of Yugoslavia,
Britain officially declared the attack “an eternal shame to Hungary” who would be
“brought to judgment” at the end of the war.128 Believing that his country had become
“dishonored beyond redemption,” Teleki took his own life in protest on 3 April 1941. In
his final letter to Horthy, he declared “We have become breakers of our word . . . I have
allowed the nation’s honor to be lost. The Yugoslav nation are our friends . . . but now,
out of cowardice, we have allied ourselves with scoundrels.”129 There was now no way
out of the Axis alliance for Hungary. All too soon, Hungary’s support for the war in
Russia would cost the nation its independence.

The Jewish Question in Hungary
With some pride, many Hungarian authors boast of the nation’s treatment of
Hungary’s Jews prior to the German occupation of March 1944 as evidence of inherent
Hungarian “honor.” In actuality, there are some contrasts in the historiographical
interpretation of Hungary’s Jewish policies. It is true that until March 1944, 95 percent
of Hungary’s Jews were alive and relatively safe in Hungary, compared to the threats
facing Jews in the rest of Axis Europe. Indeed, István Deák’s article, “Admiral and
Regent Miklós Horthy: Some Thoughts on a Controversial Statesman,” claims that when
Hitler demanded the deportation of Budapest’s Jews, Horthy declared that such was
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impossible lest the economic infrastructure of the Hungarian war economy collapse.130
Although Horthy cared little for the Jews of the countryside, Deák argues that he
defended the Jews of Budapest, some of whom were personal acquaintances of the
Regent.131 As the SS followed the German soldiers into Hungary, many Hungarians in
Budapest personally risked their lives to protect the Jews of Budapest. In the end, despite
deportations after March 1944, 40 percent of Hungary’s Jews survived the Holocaust.
John Flournoy Montgomery praises Hungary’s lenient wartime policies toward
the Jews in Hungary: the Unwilling Satellite. He asserts that not until the Gestapo
descended upon Hungary in the March 1944 occupation were Hungary’s Jews in any real
danger. German National Socialist dogma turned many Christians into Jews, as in the
case of having a single Jewish grandparent. Hungary by contrast turned many Jews into
Christians. A Jew who converted to Christianity or was baptized Christian while having
one Jewish parent, for example, was a Christian in Hungary in every sense of the word.132
Prime Minister Kállay’s assessment of the Jewish question in Hungary is that demands
against the Jews would have been followed by demands against “Socialists, left-wingers,
pro-Jewish Gentiles, ‘Anglophiles,’ and against the whole Hungarian elite.”133 Kállay
argues, with some honesty, that it is to Hungary’s credit that Hungary kept its borders
130

István Deák, “Admiral and Regent Miklós Horthy: Some Thoughts on a
Controversial Statesman,” The Hungarian Quarterly 37, no. 143 (1996): 86.
131

Ibid., 87.

132

John Flournoy Montgomery, Hungary: the Unwilling Satellite (New York: the
Devin-Adair Company, 1947), 188.
133

Kállay, Hungarian Premier, 122.
162

open, at least in the beginning of the war, through which many Jews, Poles, and others
fled across its borders to safety in the West.134
Contrary to pro-Hungarian historiographical assessment, Mario Fenyo in Hitler,
Horthy and Hungary counters that anti-Jewish regulations had been enforced in Hungary
even prior to the March 1944 occupation. The Hungarian “Law 12” of 1942 confiscated
Jewish property in Hungary, Jews were eliminated from service in Hungarian civil and
military administration, and often faced “severe economic hardship.”135 Fenyo urges that
Hungarian historiography of the Jewish question must be rather carefully examined, for
the Jews of Hungary, although much better off than in other nations controlled by the
Axis, still faced discrimination and hardships.136 Nonetheless, the Jews of Hungary faced
far fewer restrictions before the German occupation than any other region in Axis
Europe. Although their lot may not have been “ideal,” neither were they in any real
danger so long as Hungarians truly held independent control over their government.
Hungarian “honor” in this case, at least, may have been earned by Budapest in historical
retrospect.
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Critical Arguments Against Wartime Hungarian Foreign and Domestic Policies
Although there is a substantial trend in modern historiography to vindicate
Hungary of some of its wartime guilt, there remain considerable criticisms of Hungary’s
wartime policy as an ally of Nazi Germany. Miklós Molnár’s Concise History of
Hungary, published in 1996, presents one of the more critical interpretations of
Hungary’s interwar and wartime policies. Molnár argues that Horthy’s government was
often oppressive, especially against the political left.137 Whereas Macartney and
Montgomery protest that Horthy’s reign was not authoritarian, Molnár argues that some
applicable labels for Horthy’s regime include “Fascist, semi-Fascist, authoritarian,
nationalistic, anti-Semitic, semi-feudal, [and] archaic.”138 Molnár urges that Horthy’s
rise to power was marked by violence, anti-Semitism, and even “white terror.”139
Regarding the strata of Magyar society in Hungary, Molnár believes there is some
credence to the nineteenth century conception of “a thousand lords and 3 million
beggars” in Hungary.140 Whereas many historians insist that the revisionist movement
penetrated all classes, Molnár insists that it was most prevalent among the higher and
upper middle classes.141
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Molnár argues that Hungarians have always had “a tendency to see all their
misfortunes originating elsewhere–with some justification.”142 Whether from the
Mongols, Turks, or Trianon, Hungarians have always sought to pin the blame for their
national calamity upon sources beyond their control. Molnár does admit, however, that
perversion of the Fourteen Points by which Hungary surrendered, the nation’s lot at
Trianon, the aggravated invasions of the Successor States, and economic ruin with the
loss of all its natural resources at Trianon fostered an environment that was conducive to
a regime that could promise national renewal and reclamation of the lost territories.143
Mario Fenyo’s Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary contrasts any interpretive empathy
for the Regency as “benevolent” and refutes the thesis that forces beyond Hungary’s
national control pushed the nation into its wartime blunders against Yugoslavia, Russia,
and the United States. Fenyo argues that although Hungarian foreign policy in the war
“was determined by geographic, geopolitic, economic, psychological, and a number of
other factors,” Hungary was hardly guiltless in World War II.144 Fenyo proposes that
Hungary had more closely aligned its political, military, and economic resources to Nazi
Germany than Hungarian nationalistic historiography contends. Hungary’s participation
in the Russian campaign was less than the other minor Axis powers (except Bulgaria,
which did not fight in Russia at all), but Fenyo contends that Hungary must still be must
be seen as a power that did indeed serve the Third Reich of its own accord. Although
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Hungary was most probably the “unwilling satellite” that has dominated much
sympathetic historiography, Fenyo raises questions that Hungary could have possibly
done more to maintain its so-called “honor” as a nation.
Fenyo criticizes that many so-called Hungarian “patriots” were quite pro-German
in their outlook. Whether such affiliation was based on the belief of unavoidable German
victory in the war, or in gratitude for Germany’s help in reclamation of some of the lost
territories, many such “patriots” were virtually National Socialists, or at least favored
Nazi dogma.145 Regarding Hungarian “honor” in refusing to declare war upon Germany
in 1944 like Rumania, Fenyo asks, where was Hungarian honor when it attacked
Yugoslavia despite its treaty of “eternal” friendship?146 Pro-Hungarian historiography
often maintains the tolerance of the Regency toward political parties and philosophy
banned elsewhere in Axis Europe. While this may be true, Fenyo asserts that this
argument is somewhat misleading. Fenyo declares that of the 296 delegates in the
Hungarian Parliament in 1941, 178 of them were of the far right wing, pro-German, and
even National Socialist in their outlook.147
A counter-analysis against the Hungarian revisionist movement from the point of
view of Hungary’s enemies is well-represented in Viorica Moisuc’s 1987 article
“Revisionism: A Serious Threat.” According to this author, revisionism and
“Horthyism” were a direct threat to the security of Europe during the interwar period. In
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this interpretation, the Trianon Treaty was a solution for European peace “written in
[Rumanian] blood, not ink,” to establish justice and “enabling people to live in peace and
progress for many years to come.”148 Moisuc argues that “from the beginning,
revisionism [italics author’s] . . . proved to be a factor of instability and regress in
international life, an obstacle to interstate cooperation, a source of hatred among
peoples.”149 Thereby Hungarian revisionism had “the purpose of conquering foreign
territories and bringing other peoples into economic subordination. Revisionism has
been synonymous with insecurity, instability, with the disturbance of the climate of
peace.”150 This proposes that Horthy’s regime was hostile and “chauvinist,” dangerous to
European peace, with a goal only to occupy and dominate minorities in other lands.151 In
this interpretation, the Little Entente, so often reproached in Hungarian historiography,
was a body formed in order to enforce “the peace and stability in Central and Southeast
Europe.”152
Moisuc’s strongest accusations concern Hungary’s relations to the Third Reich:
“Horthyist Hungary was a permanent hotbed of aggressiveness by both its own plans of
occupying other territories, and its role as an outpost of German imperialism and
revisionism and eventually by its serving as an instrument of Hitlerism for isolating the
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anti-revisionist states in the region, conquering and dominating them.”153 Moisuc
portrays the Hungarian people as bloodthirsty conquerors, citing as example Horthy’s
letter to Hitler on 10 July 1940: “It is our burning wish to take our revenge on the
Romanians . . . . We cannot tolerate ‘Greater Romania.’” Regarding the Second Vienna
Arbitration, the “‘saviours’ brought terror, fear, [and] monstrous crimes” to its “peaceful”
neighbors.154 The summation of Moisuc’s argument is that the Hungarian revisionist
movement was strictly a malevolent desire by hostile and warmongering Magyars to
impose upon their peaceful neighbors, whose peace had been established by the “just
dictates” of the Paris Peace Treaties.155
In a critical analysis of C. A. Macartney’s massive two-volume history of
interwar and wartime Hungary in October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary,
Author M. Incze’s 1958 review of that book offers some interesting contrary commentary
on the revisionist movement itself. Incze criticizes Macartney’s assessment that
somewhat vindicates Hungary’s alliance with the Third Reich. Against the Macartney
interpretation of the Horthy regime’s relative benevolence, Incze argues that the Bethlen
period (1920-1929) was “in effect a parliamentary dictatorship.”156 Incze’s criticism of
Macartney can further be extended to many other historiographical tendencies of
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supportive Hungarian histories in the defense of Hungarian policy in World War II.
Incze accuses that Macartney tries to “excuse every step” of the Hungarian government
in its domestic and foreign policy alongside Nazi Germany, a policy followed by many
other sympathetic historians ever since.157 This historical school basically fails when
confronted by the Yugoslavia problem of 1941. Whereas Macartney and some
supportive historians argue that Hungary’s diplomacy in the Treaty of Eternal Friendship
lacked policies in the event of a change of government in Yugoslavia, Incze considers the
Hungarian violation of that treaty “the most shameful act of wartime Hungary.”158 In any
event, Hungary was unable to escape from the war, and the nation became stigmatized as
Hitler’s last puppet state under the Szálasi regime.

Summation of the Problem: the Predestination of Hungarian Wartime Politics
There will always remain considerable controversy regarding Hungary’s role in
the Second World War. Many historians of Hungary have followed a sympathetic
approach to Hungary’s lack of responsibility for its role in World War II, while others
have blamed Budapest for its alliance with the Third Reich and the nation’s dishonor in
the Yugoslav and Russian campaigns of 1941. Historiographical retrospect must place
the truth somewhere in the middle. Certain themes remain constant in the historiography
of Hungary that may establish an interpretation that Hungary was indeed predestined to
its role in the interwar and wartime period.
157

Ibid., 424.

158

Ibid., 426.
169

Trianon and Western support for the Little Entente directly turned Hungary
against the West in the early interwar period. Between Germany and Russia, the powers
most dominant in the affairs of East Central Europe, most Hungarians greatly favored
Berlin over Moscow. The force of past association of Hungary with its German allies
remained strong in Hungary throughout the interwar period. The progression of events in
1938 seemed to indicate that Germany and Italy were replacing France and Britain as the
dominant powers on the continent. The rapid fall of the West in the 1940 German
military campaigns convinced many Hungarians that the war had been won by the Axis
and that the Europe of Versailles and Trianon was finally at an end. Hitler’s effective
manipulation of the Hungarian-Rumanian Transylvanian dispute placed Hungary deeper
into the Axis camp. Hungary’s geopolitical position in Europe further compromised the
nation’s options throughout the war as the center of Hitler’s Balkan supply network.
Although some authors have declared Hungary’s position alongside Hitler’s Third Reich
as “suicidal,” in reality, there were probably no other political options open for Hungary,
at least in the 1938 to 1944 period.
Hungary’s “revisionist dilemma,” the nation’s desperate desire to regain the lost
territories, spiraled Hungary into rapid alliance with the Fascist powers. All too soon, the
tide of the war turned against Germany, the Hungarian Army was destroyed in the field
during the Stalingrad fiasco of 1942 and 1943, and the Red Army pushed further and
further toward East Central Europe. The Regency and the rest of the Hungarian
government soon found that their ties to Germany were irrevocable. As soon as Hitler
doubted the loyalty of his Hungarian subjects, the German Army occupied Hungary in
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March 1944. The Wehrmacht defended Hungarian territory to the last, and the country
and its cities were badly damaged until the Russians “liberated” the country in 1945.
Although the German alliance indeed proved fatal to Hungary, there was in
actuality no other route open for Hungarian foreign policy. Hungary’s fate would most
likely have been similar to Germany’s “solution” to the Yugoslav problem had Budapest
resisted German demands, based on the nation’s proximity to Germany’s oil supply in
Rumania. Hungary’s Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya’s summation of Hungary’s
international predicament in World War II may have been the most accurate in historical
retrospect: “whosoever won, Hungary would lose.”159 Hungary was not entirely guiltless
for its fall in World War II, for most Hungarians were quite pro-German, and some of
these even favored National Socialist philosophy. But although Kállay, Horthy, Teleki,
and many others have insisted that they found the “pseudo-philosophy” of Nazism
repugnant, nothing will ever truly remove the stain that Hungary, willing or not, was the
last ally of Nazi Germany.
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CONCLUSION

As this historiography demonstrates, any approach to the history of East Central
Europe is both problematic and formidable. The histories of Hungary and its interwar
Czech, Serb, and Rumanian enemies are generally contradictory. Since the Successor
States had been generally considered “Allied” nations in one form or another during the
Great War, they had been initially subject to a far better press in the West than in
Hungary, technically an enemy nation to the Entente in the Great War and the Allies in
World War II. Czechoslovakia’s assessment by the West as the “democracy sacrificed
for peace” at Munich in 1938, Yugoslavia’s 1941 conquest by the Axis, and Rumania’s
successful turncoat operation as the Red Army approached its borders all seemed to
confirm, at least initially in the West, that these nations were, in one way or another,
“Allied” powers which deserved sympathy, while Hungary nefariously remained
“Hitler’s last ally” among the Western governments as World War II drew to a close.
The benevolence of the Successor States was an illusion, however, that historiographical
analysis demonstrates.
The minority problems of the Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Empire doomed that
nation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The antiquated nature of that realm could
not survive the national aspirations of its component minorities. As Czechs, Poles, South
Slavs, and Rumanians revolted against their Austrian and Hungarian overlords, Western
recognition added to the cause of these secessionist powers. As this thesis demonstrates,
many of the arguments that the Successor States presented at Paris in 1919 based on their
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national and ethnic histories have been found by many contemporary historians to have
been misinformation, falsification, exaggeration, and propaganda. True Czecho-Slovak
unity has been denied by the lack of any official affiliation between those realms other
than linguistic, and Slovaks have opted for independence from that union both in 1939
and 1993. Many Croats favored the “Western” orientation of the Habsburg Empire and
soon began to doubt their attachment to the South Slav cause that was Yugoslavia. When
the Axis destroyed Yugoslavia in 1941, the Croats became an independent Axis state that
even committed several Waffen SS units to the Russian front.160 In 1991, they were
among the first nations to secede from the Yugoslav Union. Rumania has based its
whole national history upon the theory of Daco-Roman continuity and its theoretical
historical link to the Roman Empire. Although accepted by some international
governments and politicians, most neutral historians are eager to point out the thousandyear gap between the Roman withdrawal in AD 271 and the first mention of the Vlachs
in the thirteenth century. Linguistic evidence also points the Vlachs to the former Roman
Province of Epirus within Roman Macedonia as it existed circa AD 240.161
The ignorance of the minority problems and ethnic history of East Central
Europe, combined with French strategic and political aims to contain Germany and
enforce the cordon sanitaire against Bolshevik Russia, resulted in an unjust settlement in
1919 and 1920 for East Central Europe. Hungarians sincerely believed in the historical
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unity of both the nation and its component minorities, comparing their lot with the
minority situations of both Britain and France, which in no way disrupted central
governing unity. The treaties of St. Germain and Trianon did not solve the minority
problems of East Central Europe, but merely handed them over to new masters.
Hungarian and pro-Hungarian historiography point out several suppositions that
have generally become more accepted among the historical community than the
arguments made in the Successor States. The Carpathian Basin served not only as a
political boundary, but as a cultural, religious, and economic system for a millennium
that often united its component minorities successfully within the Hungarian Monarchy.
Most historians now criticize the severity and injustice of Trianon and its ramifications
upon the Hungarian people and their government, both in domestic and foreign politics.
Trianon destroyed thousand-year old economic institutions in Slovakia and Ruthenia.
The course of Hungarian diplomacy during virtually the entire interwar period
was dominated by the legacy of Trianon. Current historiographical trends supported not
only by pro-Hungarian sources but also by many neutral perspectives have tended to
blame France for the harsh diplomacy of Trianon as an extension of French military
planning. By the creation or expansion of the Successor States at Hungary’s expense,
France sought military containment of both Germany and Bolshevik Russia, without
consideration of the ramifications of such policy in the long term. An increasingly
common thesis in the historiography of the Paris Peace Conference is that by grossly
favoring “victors” over “vanquished,” Paris Peace Treaties ensured a second and even
more terrible World War. Hungary was denied the promised self-determination by which
the nation sought peace at the end of World War I and was refused plebiscites even when
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Magyar leaders promised to abide by their results. Hungary thus realigned its policies
against the Western powers, the League of Nations, and all who supported the status quo
of the Europe of Versailles. Hungarians became desperate to the point of a national
obsession to find allies to revise the despised diktat of Trianon. Since the democratic
powers had destroyed historic Hungary, Hungary became forced to find allies that
opposed the status quo of the Europe of Versailles.
Hungary’s minority problem led to Trianon, the severity of Trianon led to the
revisionist movement, and the circumstances of the revisionist movement predestined
Hungary to alliance with the Axis powers. Revisionism totally dominated Hungary’s
foreign and domestic politics in the late interwar and wartime periods. The revisionist
movement transcended class and political affiliations among virtually all Magyars for
this entire period. As many authors have indicated, the “Trianon syndrome” became a
“national malady” which perhaps ultimately clouded the better judgment of the
Hungarian government and people as the nation’s involvement in World War II
progressed. This “Trianon syndrome” absolutely predestined Hungarian domestic and
foreign politics both to the Axis alliance and the nation’s belligerence in World War II.
For its participation in the Axis cause in World War II, Hungary attained an
unflattering reputation for having been on the wrong side in both World Wars. In
actuality, Hungary’s affiliation with the Axis was not only predestined, but unavoidable
and the only course open for Hungarian diplomacy. Germany and Italy provided the
means by which Hungary was able to recoup at least the Magyar regions of the Successor
States. In return, Hungary became the rail center for the German region of supplies, and
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a military transit ground for the staging of the military conquest of Yugoslavia, Greece,
and the Soviet Union.
There becomes a clear dividing line, however, in establishing Hungary’s “honor”
and the eventual loss of that honor as an Axis participant in World War II. A constant
theme in pro-Hungarian historiography is the general “honor” of the Hungarian nation
that it has maintained throughout its history. It is to Hungary’s credit that it refused
Hitler’s “Plan Green” for the military conquest of Czechoslovakia, opting instead for the
Vienna Award of 1938. Hungary further peacefully acquired Ruthenia, to which
Budapest had at least as legitimate a claim as Prague. Hungary further sought a
diplomatic solution to the Transylvanian problem, even when the nation was fully ready
to wage war against Rumania. These revisionist victories cost Hungary its freedom of
action, however, as the nation became forced to align ever closer with Germany lest
Rumania gain Hitler’s favor. Hungary was forced to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact, the
Tripartite Pact, and grant Germany both military and economic transit rights on its
territory.
Hungary’s fall from grace was its participation in the Yugoslav campaign of April
1941. Despite the treaty of “eternal” friendship with Yugoslavia, Magyar historiography
argues that with the Croatian declaration of independence from the Yugoslav union, that
treaty was no longer valid. The official Hungarian interpretation of the conflict that has
been the thesis of many pro-Hungarian historians, including the memoirs of Regent
Horthy and Prime Minister Kállay, is that Hungary’s involvement in that campaign was a
“defensive” operation to “protect” the 468,000 Magyars of the Bácska (Serb Voivodina).
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This is a direct falsification that can be proved by a military analysis of the Yugoslav
campaign.
If the Hungarian move was indeed a defensive or protective maneuver, Hungarian
forces, upon crossing the Yugoslav border, would have moved in a broad formation to
simply secure the towns of the Bácska. Instead, study of the tactical move made by the
Hungarian Third Army reveals that Hungary launched its attack in a double-pincers
move, a classic military maneuver meant to encircle and destroy an enemy force. The
Hungarian invasion, in contrast to the claims of Horthy and other Hungarian authors, was
definitely a military move with a military objective: the isolation and destruction of the
Yugoslav First Army, which was massed in the Voivodina in a support role of the
Yugoslav Fourth Army, which was engaged at this time by the Germans in the northwest
of the country. Hungary’s encirclement and destruction of this army group ensured no
strategic relief for the forces engaged with the Germans in the northwest.162 Further,
Hungary’s pincer attack on the Yugoslav First Army could not have achieved such
textbook success were it not for German intelligence on the region. Germany possessed
absolute air superiority in the Yugoslav campaign, and must have thoroughly investigated
the Yugoslav military positions even in the Bácska (Voivodina) and identified the
positions of the Yugoslav First Army, allowing Hungary to move with great accuracy to
isolate and destroy that enemy force. The tactical and strategic precision of the
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Hungarian military in the region therefore quite possibly linked the Hungarian military
command with elements of the German High Command, regardless of Hungary’s claims
of innocence.
With the Yugoslav fiasco, Hungary’s position as an ally of the Third Reich
became irrevocable. In compliance with the other Axis powers, Hungary declared war on
the Soviet Union as Operation Barbarossa progressed. War with Britain and the United
States shortly followed. It seems that only Hungarian Prime Minister Pál Teleki properly
understood that for Hungary’s revisionist aims to be lasting, Hungary would have needed
the support of the Western powers. With Teleki’s suicide after the Yugoslav invasion,
Hungary lost the last of its diplomats that held any favor with the West. The war now
embraced Hungary, and all too soon, Hungary found itself once again irrevocably on the
losing side of a global war. The result was worse than Trianon: loss of political
continuity and Russian occupation from 1945 to 1989.
Ultimately, this summation of the general historiography reveals certain trends in
the histories of revisionist Hungary. The Hungarians had always considered the
Kingdom of St. Stephen to be an indivisible political, cultural, geographic, and economic
entity. Trianon represented the worst nightmare possible for virtually all Hungarians. As
many neutral historians have pointed out, the Trianon Treaty was unprecedented in its
severity. The humiliation of Trianon and the loss of 3.2 million Magyars to the
Successor States united all Hungarians under the slogan “nem, nem soha!” (No, no
never!). Hungarians vowed to never accept the Trianon diktat and their entire interwar
policy was dominated by a desperate search to reunite those lost lands. Since France was
the leader of the status quo of interwar Europe and the hated Little Entente, Hungary was
179

forced to find common cause with the only powers that would support revision of
Trianon. The path to the Axis was therefore predestined by the Trianon Treaty, and even
more, the only sensible path for Hungarian foreign policy. If the Hungarians chose the
“wrong” side in World War II, it must be understood that the West had dismembered
historic Hungary, and few Hungarians would have chosen support from Bolshevik
Russia. The only avenue for Hungarian policy, then was the Axis alliance. If Hungary
went too far by participating in the Yugoslav and Russian campaigns, it must be
understood that the joy of recovering the lost lands from 1938 to 1940 possibly clouded
the better judgment of the Hungarian people and government.
Having lost two revolutions (1848 and 1956) and two world wars, Hungary has
little fight left. It is clear, however, that there still remains a “Trianon syndrome” among
Hungarians, often from those abroad, who fled the nation in 1945 and 1956. Although
Hungary is currently seeking modern peaceful endeavors for its own security such as the
NATO alliance and the European Union, it is unlikely that this “Trianon syndrome” and
the romantic remembrance of the Kingdom of St. Stephen will ever escape the Magyar
mass consciousness, and the greatness of Hungary’s glorious historical past and its heroic
figures, from St. Stephen, Louis the Great, Matthias Hunyadi, to Lajos Kossuth, will
never be forgotten among the Magyars of the world.
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Hungary during the era of Turkish of partition showing Habsburg Royal Hungary and the
semi-independent Transylvania.
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The Hungarian thesis of the ancient migration of the Vlachs.
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